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Abstract 
Violent conflicts have economic causes and economic consequences. In addition 
to the lost lives, injuries and the overall scale of human suffering that conflicts 
create, they also destroy assets and institutions. The consequences, the intensities 
of conflicts and their linkages with human endeavours to protect people from 
critical threats are not only a major national, but also an international 
developmental challenge. The terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 
drastically changed the paradigm and the epicentres of conflicts to something 
much different from the 20
th
 century. In the changed paradigm, terrorist planning 
and attacks are largely considered to be originating from Muslim countries, 
masterminded by internationally linked organisations like Al Qaeda. These 
organisations are considered to be the source and Western countries to be revenge 
targets, particularly the United States because of its foreign policy repercussions 
in Muslim countries. Considering this fact, this thesis examines global conflicts 
and their links with income, economic development and democracy from 2000-
2009, the period which fundamentally transformed the nature of global conflicts. 
This study is expected to be the first attempt to cover the period and to have a 
specific focus on Muslim majority countries, using similar econometric 
techniques and variables to those applied to broad global analyses.  
This study then moves from global analysis to focus on the micro household 
effects of the recent violent civil conflict in Swat, Pakistan. A visible gap in 
economics-based conflict-orientated research was identified, with no apparent 
studies of post-conflict livelihoods in Swat. This thesis seeks to fill the void, and 
investigates losses of key household assets and their impact on determining post-
conflict livelihood choices in Swat. Using survey data from 275 randomly 
sampled households in five out of the seven affected tehsils of Swat district, 
several statistical and modelling techniques are used to assess how and to what 
extent the conflict, which became civil war, has affected household livelihoods in 
Swat. Specifically the following relationships were considered and examined: (i) 
iii 
 
assets and income portfolios of households, and the quantitative extent of 
damages to conflict-affected household assets; (ii) asset endowment and its impact 
in prioritising post-conflict livelihood strategies; and (iii) possible alternative 
livelihood opportunities resulting from positive post-conflict interventions in the 
regional economy, which effectively results in livelihood revival.  
It was found that households lost human, physical, natural, social, and financial 
assets, and the post-conflict environment constrained their income and 
employment opportunities. Their expenditures increased and as a coping strategy, 
many sold their assets. The limited and damaged asset endowments (physical, 
financial and natural) were identified as major constraints to pursuing known 
livelihood choices or adopting more rewarding ones, in the shattered 
infrastructural and physical economic environment of Swat. Finally, in finding 
appropriate revival options, and by using simulation modelling, this thesis 
suggests an integrated development framework to enhance the regional economy 
and household livelihoods. This revival of pre-war thriving sectors is expected to 
decrease economic incentives to join militant groups such as the Taliban.  
Keywords: CONFLICT ECONOMICS, CIVIL WAR, SWAT AND THE TALIBAN, 
POST-CONFLICT SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1   Conflicts and their Repercussions 
More than 40 years ago, Ted Gurr, a distinguished social scientist, titled his book 
“Why Men Rebel” (Gurr, 1970). More recently, the renowned economist Alan 
Krueger asked “What makes a terrorist?” (Krueger, 2007). These queries stand as 
salient research questions in economics and other social sciences. Collective 
violent and destructive actions have economic and social
1
 causes, as well as 
economic consequences. This has led to an emerging, important strand in the 
economics literature - the economics of conflict and terrorism. Post-World War II 
history has witnessed a shift in the dynamics of violent conflicts. Instead of 
traditional interstate wars or conflicts between rival nations, a tremendous 
increase has occurred in intrastate conflicts, thus changing the mould of 20
th
 
century wars (Human Security Report, 2009-2010). By the mid-1970s civil wars 
against colonial powers to gain independence had shown an inexorable increase. 
Later, other civil wars, including the geopolitics of the Cold War, replaced wars 
for liberation, and the outbreak of conflicts and their intensity barely diminished. 
The end of the Cold War in early 1990‟s removed a major source of interstate 
conflicts from the international arena. There was a paradigm shift in governance 
structures and the world witnessed the majority of countries adopting democracy 
as their governance system. Conflicts decreased for a few years, but from the 
early 2000 there has been a steep rise in violent conflicts globally. This increase 
has its roots in Islamist political violence
2
 and the so-called war on terror (Human 
Security Report, 2009-2010) 
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States drastically 
changed the dimensions and epicentres of conflicts. Cross-border terrorist 
planning and attacks were largely considered to be originating in Muslim 
countries, masterminded by internationally linked organisations like Al Qaeda. 
Muslim countries are widely believed to be a source of revenge terrorist acts 
                                                          
1
 Relevant social issues are discussed where appropriate in Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 7 
2
 Over 25 percent (9 out of 34) conflicts started or re-started in mid of the decade are associated 
with such violence, and international and local efforts to crush such violence 
 
 
2 
 
across the globe, mostly stemming from their internal economic and political 
concerns, for which they put the onus of responsibility on developed countries, 
particularly the USA
3
 (Espisto, 2002; Mamdani, 2002).The Conflict Barometer 
(2010) report observes 109 violent conflicts globally in 2010 alone. Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Asia and the Middle East are the central arenas for the most violent 
intrastate conflicts.   
 
More than 1.5 billion people live in areas affected by fragility, violence, and 
conflicts. The World Development Report (WDR) (2011) indicates that no low-
income, conflict-affected country has achieved the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (UNMDG). New data on poverty reveal a decline in poverty 
overall, but conflict-affected countries are lagging behind in poverty reduction 
efforts at substantial levels (WDR, 2011). The direct and spillover economic costs 
of more than US $300 billion resulting from these conflicts are three times more 
than the annual available global development aid of about US $100 billion to 
developing countries. Apart from the lost lives, injuries and the overall scale of 
human suffering which conflicts create, they also destroy assets and institutions. 
Recovering and rebuilding takes many years, and the irony is that efforts do not 
always succeed (World Bank, 2009). The consequences and intensities of 
conflicts and their linkages with human endeavours to protect people from critical 
threats are not only a major national, but also an international developmental 
challenge. Humphreys (2003) elaborates the belief of researchers that we cannot 
understand the economic development process without understanding violent 
conflicts: addressing these linkages requires us to change the way we think about 
human well-being. Such efforts have established the concept of „human security‟, 
which redefines the way we look at human well-being. Human security looks 
beyond a violence-free society; it encompasses caring governance, human rights, 
access to economic opportunities and development of human capabilities (United 
Nations Trust Fund for Human Security) (UNTFHS), (2010). Insecurity not only 
still exists; it has become a primary developmental challenge of our time (WDR, 
2011). 
 
                                                          
3
 This war is largely considered as war against Islam 
 
 
3 
 
Violent conflicts are distinguished from other (economic) shocks by their 
inherently destructive nature. Conflict, once initiated, typically acts as a catalyst to 
perpetuate the poverty, hunger and underdeveloped status of already deprived 
people. Killings, injuries and displacement aggravate joblessness, vulnerability 
and the precariousness of household livelihoods (Justino, 2006). The breakdown 
of infrastructure, social services and ties, loss of agricultural land and assets, 
limited access to and inflated prices of essential commodities are associated with 
violent conflicts, which seriously affect survival strategies and disrupt livelihoods 
and people‟s goals4. 
1.2   Conflict in Swat: Pakistan 
Among the five presently most conflict-ridden countries
5
, which are, Iraq (militant 
groups), Nigeria (Boko Haram), Syria (militant groups: ISIL) Afghanistan (the 
Taliban) and Pakistan (the Taliban and other Islamic militants), the latter two are 
neighbours in South Asia. That makes this underdeveloped region volatile, 
violent, and extremely antagonistic to economic developmental challenges. In 
Pakistan, the violent civil conflict intensified when the Taliban succeeded in 
forceful occupation of Swat district, which lies 270 kilometres north of the capital 
Islamabad, in early 2009. Their occupation and its outcomes created huge 
repercussions for the regional economy, and on households and their livelihoods. 
Swat was a renowned tourist resort: the Taliban invasion and later a large-scale 
civil war, involving the Taliban and Pakistani security forces, turned the region 
into devastated and destructive area. Assets were destroyed, infrastructure was 
severely damaged, and households had to move for safety and survival. Suicide 
bombings, targeted attacks as offshoots of the conflict in Swat, made not only the 
region but the country overall extremely insecure. Growth and development were 
seriously affected: the government had to diversify resources, and drastically 
change internal priorities.  
 
The above discussion described some repercussions of global conflicts and of the 
particular conflict in Swat. The conflict in Swat involving the Taliban had an 
                                                          
4
 Chapters 2 and 6 discuss such repercussions in more detail 
5
 A publication by Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index – 2014 reports that 
more than 80 percent lives lost to terrorism occurred in these five countries in 2013. 
 
 
4 
 
Islamic militant identity and the objective was to enforce Sharia (an Islamic 
governance system), which re-shaped and altered the balances of power and 
transformed economic and social spheres in the region by changing a functioning 
state system and creating a mini-state. Violent intrastate conflicts remain a major 
developmental challenge to understand and address, particularly region-specific 
conflicts that affect the future prosperity of nations.  
 
This thesis looks at the economic underpinnings of the circular relationship 
between an initial conflict-related shock, loss of income, loss of economic 
opportunities, and further conflict. It begins from a global perspective, probing 
links between conflict and economic development, and ultimately narrows the 
focus to a particular regional conflict; a former hotbed of violent activity which 
became a state civil war and terrorist recruitment - the Swat valley in Pakistan.  
1.3   Research Aim and Research Questions 
The Key Research Aim of this thesis is an investigation of the economic 
relationship between income poverty, sustainable livelihood opportunities, and 
violent conflict.   
Research Questions 
This thesis studies the poverty-conflict relationship from two distinct perspectives. 
The first is a global analysis, after which it focuses on a specific arena of violent 
conflict, terrorist activity and recruitment in the Swat district of Pakistan. 
Accordingly, four main research questions are addressed:  
 
1. Using global data, is there a relationship between conflict and key 
economic variables such as per capita income, economic development 
indicators (including education), and democratic freedom? Can further 
econometric testing establish such a relationship in a subset of Islamic 
countries? 
 
2. Given the results from econometric testing of different sets of countries, 
my research then moves to focus on household livelihoods in specific 
post-conflict settings. The next research question becomes: what are the 
 
 
5 
 
various forms of household assets (human, social, physical, financial, and 
natural), income, and expenditure patterns of recently affected post-
conflict households, using Swat (Pakistan), as the region of study? 
3. How do different household assets affect households‟ decisions to choose 
different livelihood portfolios in post-conflict Swat? 
 
4. How do households‟ livelihood assets interact to determine livelihood 
opportunities, which may emerge from positive shocks applied to the 
regional economy of Swat? Can increased livelihood policies and 
opportunities decrease the economic incentives for further recruitment into 
militant organizations such as the Taliban?  
 
The research questions are framed to investigate the links between conflict and 
income and sustainable livelihoods in post-conflict environments and will help in 
finding livelihood revival possibilities within the framework of the key research 
aim. The motivation for my research topic originates from my own experiences. I 
have lived in Pakistan since birth. In recent history I have not seen bigger 
economic development and social challenges than the current civil armed conflict 
in my country, affecting its more than 180 million people. It has not only hindered 
peace and growth, but has jeopardised future security and developmental 
prospects. I have witnessed a number of negative outcomes, not only economic 
but also social and psychological transformations resulting from the still ongoing 
conflict in the country. The suicide bomb attacks and news of killings every day 
bring fear and insecurity to every household. These attacks not only disrupt 
economic activities but threaten human security in Pakistan. One of my cousins, 
Dr. Israr Shah, a former candidate for the national assembly, was critically injured 
in a bomb blast at a political rally in Islamabad. He lost both of his legs: his wife 
(a doctor by profession) and children are unable to live normally even more than 
six years after that incident. The conflict has significantly altered the livelihood 
context, assets, strategies, and outcomes not only in the affected areas but for 
many households in the country. Studying the economic impacts of conflict on 
households and highlighting the relevant revival options is of utmost importance 
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for the present and future development goals and prospects of both the regional 
and national economy.  
1.4   Conceptual Framework 
1.4.1 Sustainable Livelihood Framework 
The recent violent conflict in Swat has had multiple impacts on rural and urban 
households, livelihood choices, assets and outcomes for households and various 
institutions. It was insufficient and unconvincing to merely study the impact of 
conflict on employment and income opportunities. To address this, a 
comprehensive approach comprising a Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) 
was adopted to explore the livelihoods of conflict-affected households in Swat 
district.  
This framework was proposed by DFID (1999; 2000; 2001) and is summarized in 
Figure 1.1. This people-centred approach analyses livelihoods, and how these 
change over time. It is holistic and attempts to identify the most pressing 
constraints faced by and the most promising opportunities open for the people. 
Another characteristic of this approach is its dynamism, as it effectively 
recognizes the effects of external shocks on livelihoods. Chambers and Conway 
(1991) argue that a term like Capability as used by Amartya Sen (Sen, 1984) is 
the ability of a person to perform functions that he/she is capable of doing. Equity 
relates to a relatively equal distribution of assets, capabilities and opportunities 
and Sustainability is the capacity for self-sufficiency and long term self-reliance 
in pursuing livelihood outcomes: all three combine in the concept of Sustainable 
Livelihood and are linked. 
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Figure 1.1: Sustainable Livelihood Framework
 
 
The definitions and key concepts of this framework are explained next: 
Sustainable Livelihood  
Chambers and Conway (1991, p. 6) define livelihood as follows: “A livelihood 
comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and 
activities required for a means of living”. They also indicate within the definition 
that “A livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and 
shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable 
livelihood opportunities for the next generation”. Chambers and Conway (1991) 
describe the core of livelihood as a „living‟ and in the anatomy of household 
livelihood the most significant aspects are tangible and intangible assets. Based on 
these assets people construct a living, during which they use their physical labour, 
skills, knowledge and creativity. 
Vulnerability Context 
Vulnerability context in the SLF framework frames the environment in which 
people exist: and has two aspects. One is external and consists of the stresses and 
shocks which people have to face. The internal context of vulnerability is the 
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ability to cope and manage. Stresses are the pressures which are typically 
continuous and often predictable like seasonal shortages, rising population and 
declining resources, while shocks are unpredictable, traumatic and sudden, such 
as fires, floods, earthquake, diseases and civil violence (Chambers & Conway, 
1991). The various assets of households determine their vulnerability context and 
enable them to cope with stress and shocks with reduced risk of disturbance to 
their future livelihoods.  
Livelihood Assets  
Scoones (1998) suggests that livelihood strategies are dependent upon the basic 
material and social, tangible or intangible assets, which people possess. DFID‟s 
framework identifies five core assets or capitals on which livelihoods are built. 
The asset pentagon in Figure 1.1 is a visual representation showing the inter-
relationships among the five core assets, which are described as human, physical, 
financial and social capitals. These assets are defined briefly below, and more 
detailed description of the core livelihood assets is included in Chapter Five.  
Human capital: According to DFID, “Human capital represents the skills, 
knowledge, ability to labour and good health that together enable people to pursue 
different livelihood strategies and achieve their livelihood objectives” (DFID, 
1999, p. 7). At a household level, human capital is a factor of the amount and 
quality of labour available; this varies according to factors including household 
size, skill levels, leadership potential and health status.  
Social capital is defined as the “social resources upon which people depend in 
pursuit of their livelihood objectives” (DFID, 1999, p. 9). This capital includes the 
networks, social claims, social relations, affiliations, and associations upon which 
people draw to seek various livelihood strategies (Scoones, 1998). 
Natural capital refers to the natural resource stock from which useful resources 
for livelihood are derived and utilized. Natural capital includes assets that are used 
directly for production and economic benefits such as land, trees, water and soil 
quality (DFID, 1999; Scoones 1998). Obviously, natural capital is of great 
importance to those whose livelihood strategies depend partially or totally on 
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natural resources such as farming, forestry, fishing, mineral extraction, and 
ecological tourism. 
Physical capital includes the basic infrastructure and producer goods needed to 
support livelihoods. Infrastructure consists of those changes which make people 
more productive and producer goods are the tools and equipment which help in 
increasing productivity. The essential infrastructures are commonly public goods, 
which help in sustainable livelihoods, including affordable transport, secure 
shelter and buildings, sufficient water supply and sanitary conditions, clean and 
affordable energy and easy access to information and communication (DFID, 
1999). 
Financial capital consists of the financial resources that people use to achieve 
their livelihood objectives. Financial capital consists of two main sources: 
available stocks and regular inflows of money. Savings are the preferred form for 
the first source, in the form of cash and bank deposits or other liquid assets such 
as jewellery and livestock, whereas the second source excludes regularly earned 
income. It consists of money received from pensions, transfer from the state and 
remittances.  
Transforming structures and processes 
Within the livelihoods framework, transforming structures and processes consist 
of institutions, various organizations, policies and legislation that shape and affect 
livelihoods (DFID, 1999). They have effects at all levels: international, national, 
regional, community and individual households. At the household level they 
effectively determine access to different capitals, livelihood choices, the terms of 
exchange of different livelihood capitals, and economic or other returns to 
livelihood strategies. 
Livelihood strategies 
Livelihood strategies can be defined as the range and combination of activities 
and choices that people pursue in order to achieve their livelihood objectives, such 
as activities concerned with production, investment and others (DFID, 1999). 
Livelihood strategies can be identified at different levels ranging from individual, 
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household and village levels to regional and national level (Scoones, 1998). A 
household livelihood strategy as Ellis (2000) defines it is a combination of 
activities that create the means of household survival.  
Livelihood outcomes 
Livelihood outcomes are accomplishment or outputs of livelihood strategies: these 
goals vary between people and the richness of these goals and the priorities of 
different people are as significant as the major constraints in their achievements. 
Increased income relates to economic sustainability but people also value non-
material goods like self-esteem and the physical well-being of household 
members, health status, and the maintenance of their heritage. These outcomes 
indicate the level of well-being (DFID, 1999). For poor people, reducing their 
vulnerability and increasing overall sustainability may be most significant. 
Improving food security is an important objective because hunger and inadequate 
diet are distinct dimensions of deprivation. This research will focus on livelihood 
outcomes (economic and physical well-being) in a possible revival of post-
conflict household livelihoods in Swat.  
1.4.2 Dynamic Modelling Framework 
To analyse the linkages of the capitals (human, physical, social, financial and 
natural) and their interactions to determine the labour allocations based on 
profits/wages among different sectors in post-conflict Swat, a System Dynamic 
model is used in Chapter Seven. System dynamics (SD) methodology has grown 
rapidly in recent decades for modelling dynamic phenomena. It is consistent with 
traditional economic modelling approaches but uses different conventions and 
terminology (Smith & Ackere, 2002).  
The study of livelihoods requires the collection of wide-ranging information, 
which is likely to show that complex interactions are taking place at different 
levels. The interactions in capitals may determine opportunities and strategies, 
like changing preferences for labour sectors. System Dynamic Modelling (SDM) 
facilitates the analysis of such complex interactions and provides sound 
reflections whose focus is not only on system structures but also on different 
linkages, which generate predictive evaluations of alternative behaviours. SDM is 
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a widely applicable system-based problem-solving approach that increases 
understanding of how certain behaviour links with internal structure and external 
factors (Kassa & Gibbon, 2002).
6
 Software such as Vensim facilitates this 
complex examination of livelihood systems. System dynamics has emerged as a 
powerful methodology for social system analysis as it has the ability to address 
short and long-term issues in real systems, and can model complex nonlinear 
relationships (Sanjaykumar, 2008).  
1.4.3 Conceptualization of Post-Conflict System 
A conflict area is considered as a system involving human actions, behaviour, 
activities and household livelihoods: it consists of many subsystems. These 
include the human, physical, social, financial, and natural assets or capitals, which 
people possess or aim to possess. All these subsystems are interdependent and 
interlinked and function as a dynamic unit. An external shock like conflict 
changes the functioning of the subsystems, disturbing the livelihood opportunities 
and strategies not only of the whole system but also of the subsystems involved in 
it. The complex issues in post-conflict environment like damaged livelihood 
opportunities and preferences for labour allocation can be addressed properly by 
policies and alternative opportunities. Simulations are used to understand the 
influence of such policies on the overall functioning of the system (in Swat 
district) and to arrive at optimal solutions and practical guidelines for sustainable 
livelihood development.  
During the field study, particularly to observe the effects of damaged assets and 
their linkages to post-conflict livelihoods, a variety of case studies were done. The 
information from the case studies was useful in observing the effects of asset 
losses on household livelihood and on their pursuit of post-conflict livelihood 
revival. These insights informed the development and analysis of the simulation 
modelling in Chapter Seven. Two selected case studies are presented next.    
 
                                                          
6
 See more examples of SD modeling focusing on sustainable livelihoods in Chapter 7 
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1.5   Post-Conflict Linkages of Capitals and Sustainable 
Livelihoods    
Case Studies 
                                                         Case Study - One 
 
Rehana Aziz is a teacher at the girls‟ primary school of Ronial, a small village eight 
kilometres west of Matta city. The area was worst affected during the civil war between 
the Taliban and government forces. Rehana said, “Insurgency and war has devastated my 
household life”. She has five children and her husband is a retired school teacher. The 
school where she teaches was set on fire by the Taliban in June 2008, destroying the 
building and the furniture. She initially sent her son to Mingora city to continue his 
education. Later, when the violence spread to Mingora, she had no option but to send her 
children to Lahore, more than 600 kilometres away from her village. Curfews and 
violence made the lives of Rehana and her family extremely difficult. They could not go 
outside; food items were scarce and became very expensive. Wood, coal and oil for 
cooking were in short supply. The supply of electricity was completely disrupted without 
any efforts from the appropriate authorities to resume it. Women normally fetch water 
from a nearby spring; they could not do so easily anymore, so people sometimes did not 
have drinking water. The government gave little attention to supplying water or to 
developing other basic physical infrastructure in such villages.   
 
She was not being paid a salary and her husband was not getting a pension, making the 
financial status of the family extremely vulnerable. She borrowed from her brother who 
lives in Karachi, but had to cut down many expenses including on food items. The stress 
on her financial capital had health costs for Rehana and her husband. There is a basic 
health unit (BHU) in the village, but its staff left and there was no source of medicines 
and medical care for Rehana‟s family or the whole village. She takes regular medication 
for a gastrointestinal problem, and the shortage of these left her unconscious on some 
occasions.  
Finally, they decided to leave their home and went to Lahore to live with some relatives. 
She borrowed from other family members and had to sell her gold jewellery to meet the 
costs of her migration and the expenses of her children to sustain them in a far-off city. 
She describes those months as most difficult time of her life. The school was rebuilt after 
two years and she started teaching again, a job which she likes very much.  
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Recalling the war times she says all families in the village lived in continual trauma. She 
praised her neighbours and relatives who supported each other and were always willing to 
cooperate and help, though no-one had much to share. “We shared wood, sometimes 
food, and even sitting and spending time together with other people greatly helped”, she 
recalls about the strengthening of social networks in her village. Life at the time of the 
field study was apparently normal in Ronial: the school was functioning with a newly 
built building, and there was a doctor in the BHU with medical supplies. Shops had 
regular quantities of food and other items, and access to other areas was quite safe 
although everyone had to answer many questions at numerous heavily guarded military 
check posts. But how long it would take for Rehana‟s family and other people to regain 
sustainable livelihoods was hard to guess.  
                                                       Case Study - Two 
Hamayun Khan is head of a quite large joint family; he owns a roadside restaurant in the 
village of Baboo, close to Khwazakhela city. This is an area which the Taliban 
completely occupied in the early days of the conflict. Hamayun Khan recalls, “We lost 
my uncle, two young nephews and a cousin during the Taliban era”. He owns some 
agricultural land where he had grown orchards of plums and peaches. War in the area and 
curfews forced not only his family but all people of his village to leave in 2008, like more 
than one million other people who left their houses and found refuge in other places or in 
refugee camps.  
He, along with his family, lived for 13 months in Abottabad, a city quite far from his 
village. For the first two months they had to live in a government school. The war and 
subsequent migration took its toll on all of his income sources: he had to close down his 
restaurant. His orchards were destroyed due to severe fighting in the area and were 
unattended during his absence. Both of his livelihood sources either ended or were 
damaged. The losses of financial capital posed a big question for him: how to sustain his 
family? The deaths of close family members and the responsibility to care for a large 
household took away his meagre savings; he sold the van, which he used for bringing 
stock to the restaurant, and two motor bikes belonging to his son and nephew, further 
depleting his assets and physical capital. Aside from borrowing from other people, he had 
no other option to support his family. Friends and relatives largely understood the 
vulnerability facing affected families, and social relationships and capital had positive 
contributions.  
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 His children and nephews did not attend educational institutions during this time, and 
lost one complete year of education. Hamayun remembered, “Restarting education was 
difficult, initially there was no teaching staff, also children were scared to go to school 
and leave their homes”.   The negative impacts in pursuit of human capital may have long 
term effects. His family‟s medical expenses increased considerably because of various 
diseases, as they were living without proper shelter and most of the time eating 
unhygienic foods during their refugee period.  
When they returned things were far from ideal. His house was badly damaged due to 
artillery fire, and his restaurant‟s walls and roof had collapsed. The agricultural land was 
in a very bad state, and the fruit trees were close to dying. He borrowed more for 
rebuilding and still owes debts to many people. This left him more vulnerable and 
squeezed his financial and physical capital. The reconstruction and repayment of debts 
has affected his livelihood and his income has decreased substantially from pre-conflict 
times. He said, “tourists and visitors are very few in number so restaurants have lost 
clients and on the other side the orchards need more inputs and time to recover. But I am 
short of finances”.  It might take years for him to regain a sustainable livelihood.  Despite 
hard work, the depletion of various capitals had put him in a vulnerable position for 
successfully pursuing his livelihood. The area was peaceful at the time of the field study, 
but if insurgency re-emerges he might not be able to face the shocks of conflict and 
displacement. It remains possible he might support the militants to avoid further 
vulnerability and to ensure his household livelihood. 
1.5.1 Interaction of Assets and Livelihoods 
The case studies explain how the shock affected households not only in terms of 
income opportunities, but also in terms of possession of the five capitals and in 
pursuing pre-war livelihoods. The observed behaviour in the first case study 
explains these connections and relationships. Militants destroy a girls‟ school and 
that results in loss of jobs and income for female staff. Loss of income affects 
financial resources and the household finally has no options other than seeking 
credit from other family members, or selling assets. Education, health and general 
wellbeing of the household deteriorate, indicating a negative impact on human 
capital, and similarly the natural environment for the whole village is 
contaminated as an aftermath of violence, curfews and military movements. The 
outward migration further damages livelihood assets and sustainability. Some 
government interventions might have helped, such as salary and other due 
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payments to the particular household but the broader benefits that accrue from 
development initiatives were not in sight. 
 
The second case study involves the ultimate loss of human lives for a family 
which had a sustainable pre-conflict living. Conflict severely damaged their 
income sources, agricultural land, and other opportunities for sustainability. Loss 
of livelihood forced the whole family into a prolonged migration to find 
temporary refuge at a variety of places. The government established many refugee 
camps, but these were either completely without educational and health facilities 
or if they existed, they were insufficient. There was a major resource constraint 
for a developing country‟s government to support a large displaced population. As 
a result, the family members could not sustain their human capital. Their financial 
capital was under a lot of stress and short or long-term borrowing, and selling 
their physical assets were the only available survival strategies. After a prolonged 
absence from their home, the family returned back to restart their livelihood, but 
the damaged assets and fearful atmosphere prevented a smooth resumption of 
their previous lifestyle. They were not sure about their future vulnerabilities and 
livelihood opportunities, raising the question of whether the male members were 
at risk of joining the Taliban.  
 
Household studies determine that assets interact and this interaction formulates 
livelihood opportunities and strategies. The adverse impacts of conflict on 
sustainable livelihoods of households raise questions about what opportunities are 
open for people, as it may take a long time to re-establish a sustainable income 
and living. If the post-conflict period has increased the vulnerability of households 
it may not be possible for them to sustain another external shock. The research 
questions in this thesis include identifying possibilities which can enhance 
livelihoods in Swat (see Chapter Seven) and thus decrease income-based 
incentives for joining the militants.    
1.6   Significance of Research/Contribution to Knowledge 
Global conflicts and their links with different parameters are widely studied and 
reported in the literature. These parameters consist of income, development and 
demographic characteristics and geographical factors which make people or a 
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region more prone to collective civil violence. However, a unified study finding 
relationships between income, well established development indicators and lack 
of democratic rights and the onset of conflict covering the first decade of the 21st 
century is lacking. This study aims to fill the gap. This study extends this analysis 
to the understudied area of intrastate violent conflicts in Muslim majority 
countries. It provides an empirical model which investigates links between 
various parameters at the global level and then in a subset of Muslim majority 
countries, and determines whether these links are substantially different from or 
similar to those found for countries in the larger global sample. 
 
 Integrating cross-country econometric work with country- or region-specific data 
is a very recent and promising direction of research in the economics of conflict 
(Blattman & Miguel, 2009). Collecting information and seeing the changes in the 
lives of directly affected people gives individuals and households centre stage in 
such studies. Some recent studies including those of Blattman (2009) on Uganda, 
Arjona and Kalyvas (2008) on Colombia, and Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) 
on Sierra Leone, collect data from conflict-affected regions to explain the 
consequences of civil wars. Previous research has not examined the conflict in 
Swat and the later civil war involving the Taliban and security forces. There is a 
particular lack of study of the repercussions on post-conflict household 
livelihoods, on household assets and their role in making livelihood choices. This 
study seeks to fill the void.  
 
Finally, the simulation modelling technique is part of answering the final key 
research question which identifies the possibilities for revival and enhancement of 
post-conflict livelihoods in Swat. The complex interactions of assets, their 
enhancement, and likely post-conflict impacts from infrastructure development on 
livelihoods‟ revival will be investigated. This methodological technique was not 
found in literature studying post-conflict livelihoods. Hence this study will 
contribute to the literature not only in terms of understanding post-conflict 
impacts on assets and household livelihoods but also in determining revival 
options for livelihoods with increased wage opportunities in Swat.  
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In summary, this study, starting from a global perspective and then focusing on a 
recent region-specific conflict and its household impacts, aims to provide deeper 
understanding of conflicts and their repercussions. Its conclusions discuss 
maximising the benefits of post-conflict resettlement policies and minimising the 
negative impacts, such as reducing the chances of recruitment to militant 
organisations. This study will provide input to the government of the selected 
research country on post-war policy formulation with maximum integrated 
economic benefits. 
1.7   Thesis Arrangement 
Chapter Two analyses global conflicts and their links with income, well 
established development indicators and political rights, followed by a similar 
investigation into subsets of Muslim majority countries. The occurrence of 
conflict in the probit econometric model is taken as dependent variable, while 
proxies for income, development indicators, and political rights are used as 
independent variables. Chapter Two concludes with results for different sets of 
countries, which leads to a focus on a particular conflict that turned to civil war in 
Swat. 
Chapter Three and later chapters are devoted to the conflict in Swat and its effects 
on livelihoods. Chapter Three discusses the selected country for research, 
Pakistan, and the background of dictatorships in nurturing radical religious ideas. 
It traces the background of the emergence of the Taliban across the country and in 
Swat particularly.  
Chapter Four presents the details of the field study, which provided the required 
household data for studying post-conflict livelihoods in Swat. This chapter 
describes the questionnaire, research sites in conflict affected Swat district, data 
entry and collection details. 
Chapter Five, using descriptive statistical analysis of household survey 
information, estimates the assets (human, natural, social, physical and financial), 
and losses for post-conflict households. The losses are quantified and income and 
changes in expenditures are estimated. Chapter Five also examines the post-
conflict coping strategies of households. 
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The findings in Chapter Six originate from a cluster analysis that grouped 
households with distinct livelihood patterns. The econometric analysis estimates 
the effects of five core capitals on making various household livelihood choices in 
the post-conflict period. The significant effects of various assets help in modelling 
their interactions and role in increased livelihood opportunities emerging from 
positive shocks in Chapter Seven.  
Chapter Seven is about post-conflict livelihood revival possibilities, which 
previous chapters established were much affected by the conflict. It observes the 
linkages of assets in determination of livelihood choices resulting from positive 
interventions to the regional economy. This chapter further discusses the 
economic constraints that could create motivations to join the militants. It 
identifies, using simulation modelling, the alternative opportunities in 
employment associated with increased wages. Such opportunities can facilitate 
labour movements tending towards profit-orientated sectors of Swat‟s economy. 
Chapter Eight summarises the overall conclusions from the thesis, presents 
recommendations, and specifies the limitations of this research, which may 
facilitate future research with similar objectives.  
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Chapter Two 
Economic Development and Freedom: Is Their Denial Linked to 
Violent Conflicts? 
2.1   Introduction 
Violence is omnipresent in the world around us. Theories abound on the 
determinants of global civil violence. However, two particular lines of reasoning 
have received more attention than others: one approach concentrates on conflicts 
of ideas, culture, and religious beliefs, which tend to cause violence among groups 
or against states. The other approach considers deprivation and grievances 
resulting from income differences and poverty, and denial of political rights as 
root causes of rebellion and violence (Gurr 1970; Sen, 2008). Violence, when it 
initiates and spreads across a region and transforms into a nationwide concern, 
hinders economic development. Its consequences include destruction of 
infrastructure, losses to human and other capitals, and to social and political 
institutions. Violence results in physical and psychological injuries and casualties. 
Violent conflicts make countries and their people insecure and vulnerable to 
intervention, by both state and non-state actors (Blattman & Miguel, 2009; Collier 
2006, 2007). Conflicts create internal challenges for the government and the 
people, and trap a country in poverty, if the country is already less developed and 
has scarce resources. This mostly is the case, as countries at the bottom of the 
world income distribution have several times more violent internal conflicts than 
countries at the top (Blattman & Miguel, 2009).  
 
With this background, this chapter addresses conflict as a serious human and 
developmental concern at the global level. It investigates contemporary reasons 
for public policy failures or interventions, which may cause or prevent conflicts. 
This chapter thus addresses the first key research question of this thesis, which is 
to probe links and the role of key economic and developmental indicators in 
quality of life with the occurrence of intrastate global conflicts. The research 
objectives in this chapter further include exploring the relationship between lack 
of democratic freedom and occurrence of conflicts. Extended econometric testing 
investigates these relationships in a subset of Islamic countries. 
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The analysis and discussions in this chapter explain connections between selected 
variables including income, economic development and lack of rights with the 
occurrence of conflicts of varying intensity, for different sets of countries. These 
include sets of countries at a global level, and specific subsets of Muslim majority 
countries. This extensive analysis covering the onset of conflicts will 
systematically lead to investigation of the post-conflict effects, at a micro, 
household, level. Subsequent chapters will thus focus on a particular conflict: the 
recent violent conflict in Swat, Pakistan and on its various effects on households‟ 
livelihoods, to address the remaining key research questions.  
 
This chapter focuses on conflicts, instead on civil wars as found in most of the 
literature on the economics of conflict. This study takes the following definition 
of conflict from Conflict Barometer (2008, p.1), which is described in more detail 
later in the chapter: 
(Conflict is) the clashing of interests (positional differences) over national values of some 
duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of 
states, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and achieve their goals. 
 
In contrast, the definition of the term „civil war‟ has strict quantitative restrictions, 
including 1000 or more battle-related deaths in one year, and also requires having 
the state as a party.
7
 Some severe conflicts, such as that between Al-Fatah and 
Hamas in Palestine, and that for regional dominance between Liberation of Tamil 
Tigers Elam (LTTE)-East versus LTTE in Sri Lanka will not be categorised as 
civil wars, since the states were not parties in either case.   
 
This chapter analyses global violent conflicts from 2000-2009. This analysis uses 
parameters which depend purely on public policies and their links with the 
occurrence of conflicts. This particular dimension, probing the reasons for conflict 
initiation, has been little studied, and no prominent econometric study is available 
which exclusively focuses on the covariates based on public policies. This study 
                                                          
77
 Small and Singer (1982 p. 210) defined a civil war with these characteristics “any armed 
conflict that involves (a) an internal military action (b) national government participates as a party 
(c) both sides effectively resist. Further, violence should be sustained and reciprocated, and war 
exceeds deaths (more than 1000 in a year).”  On basis of this definition, The University of 
Michigan produces datasets on civil wars at the global level. 
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thus seeks to fill this gap for the first decade of this millennium. In total, 160 
countries with populations of at least of one million are analysed in the cross-
country analysis. Muslim majority countries (e.g. Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, and 
Nigeria) were the hosts of many of the global violent conflicts during the study 
period and beyond. Western countries regard the recent decades of rising global 
insecurity as due to „Islamic terrorism‟, which is rooted mostly in the Middle East 
and South Asia, and these countries have waged joint efforts to curb its origins in 
recent decades (Hiro, 2013). This cross-border terrorism, which is considered to 
originate from Muslim countries, is usually an offshoot of violent internal 
conflicts. Thus the focus was made specific to the Muslim majority countries to 
understand the links to the occurrence of conflict, and whether these links are 
substantially different from or similar to the reasons for conflict in the countries in 
the larger global sample. This extended analysis uses similar parameters and 
methodology as used in cross-country global analysis, and probes relationships 
with violent conflicts. These parameters include per capita income, economic 
participation, public health, educational provision and attainment. This study with 
its selected methodological technique and time-period contributes to the empirical 
literature on conflicts and civil wars in Muslim majority countries.  
 
The significance of democratic governance and political freedom is also included. 
The positive association of democracy with development, despite some cynical 
views (see Barro, 1994, 1999; Minier, 2003), is quite well established.
8
 The next 
section reviews these linkages in more detail. This sets the boundaries of this 
chapter, which finds links between democracy, development indicators, and 
violent conflict.   
2.2   The Literature Review 
2.2.1 Dialectics of Growth and Governance 
The significance of the role of effective voice and public participation through 
elected representatives in the decision-making process is discussed by many 
researchers. The connections between democracy and development are explored 
                                                          
8
 Many studies support the linkage of democracy with growth and development: for example, 
Barsh, (1993); Baum & Lake (2003); Lipset (1959); Sen (1999, 2003); Scully (1988); Olson 
(1993). 
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in literature ranging from philosophy to political science to economics (Fedderke 
& Klittgard, 2013). The economic argument remains that democratic governance 
has more potential to decrease inequality with redistributive growth. Within the 
research tradition of cross-national quantitative studies, a seminal work is Martin 
Lipset‟s (1959) essay. The theoretical inspiration of this work is from 
modernization theory, in which society, economy and politics are systematically 
interrelated. Lipset (1959) argues and concludes that economic development and 
democracy positively correlate. 
 
Olson (1993) finds more economic benefits overall when governments safeguard 
the rights of property and individual rights. Scully (1988), studying the role of 
institutional frameworks on the growth and efficiency of economies, establishes 
that politically open countries that abide by the rule of law and private rights grow 
three times more than countries which do not strictly follow laws, and do not 
safeguard private rights. These politically open countries are two and a half times 
more efficient as producers than countries which deny political freedom. Barsh 
(1992) and Bardhan (1993) support the positive correlation of political and civil 
freedoms with development. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), whose focus is 
Africa, conclude that political and economic development failures are responsible 
for civil wars in the war-torn continent. They find a higher prevalence of poverty 
and failed political institutions to be the basic reasons for civil wars in Africa. 
Simultaneously, improvement in Asia‟s economic and political indicators has 
decreased the risk of civil wars. Alternatively, Baum and Lake (2003), studying 
the indirect effects of development indicators on economic growth, find public 
health, particularly life expectancy, and education intimately interlinked with 
sources of growth. 
 
Focusing on terrorism and exploring connections between a democratic 
environment and terrorist activities, Quan (2005) finds that democracy has a 
positive effect on reducing transnational terrorism. Increased citizen satisfaction 
lies in the redress of grievances, participation in the political process for 
safeguarding genuine interests and expression of dissent in peaceful manners. 
Bloomberg and Hess (2008) identify a deterrence of terrorism where development 
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and democracy, along with globalisation, have the potential to create peaceful 
environments for low-income countries. These factors can decrease both domestic 
and transnational terrorist acts. In addition, higher income is a deterrent to 
domestic terrorism in both rich and poor countries.   
 
In alternative explanations, some studies dispute the links between political 
freedom and economic development. Barro (1994, 1999), for example, is sceptical 
about the positive relationship between freedom and development, particularly 
when high levels of freedoms are present. Minier (2003) also considers that 
growth-orientated institutions can be established in non-representative 
environments, even in authoritarian states. However, Sen (1999) observes that 
there is no convincing evidence that authoritarian governance is beneficial to 
economic development. Statistical studies as discussed earlier find no conflict 
between political rights and economic performance as democracy and liberty have 
their own importance in economic developmental processes. In another study, Sen 
(2008) identifies poverty and gross inequalities as good grounds for rebellion, 
even violent rebellion. 
  
The above discussion largely finds positive links between development and 
freedom and as Fedderke and Klittgard (2013) conclude, political rights matter for 
economic growth. Sen (2003) observes the links between rights and conflicts, and 
suggests that it is important to examine the connection between political and civil 
rights and the prevention of conflict. If conflicts originate because of deprivation, 
grievances, and suffering, governmental response to the acute suffering of the 
people depends upon the pressure that people exert on the government. This is 
where the exercising of political rights (voting, criticizing, and protesting) can 
make a real difference. Blattman and Miguel (2009) consider that correlates of 
intrastate conflicts are well established. The likelihood of conflict increases with 
weak institutions, absence of equity and political freedom, and risks increase with 
poverty and income shocks. The next section reviews some literature that focuses 
on the economic causes of conflicts.   
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2.2.2 Deprivation and Inequalities 
Many researchers have probed the links between economic deprivation and 
income inequalities and violent conflicts. One of the earliest explanations of 
individual motivations to join rebellions comes in the work of Gurr (1970). He 
argues in his frustration-aggression theory that when frustration is prolonged and 
felt with intensity, it results in anger and ultimately violence. People living on the 
proverbial edge are sensitive to declines in economic goods and frustration is a 
strong motivating force for violence. Sen (2008) explains the complex reasons for 
present and past violent conflicts, and distinguishes two approaches towards 
violence. One approach concentrates on the culture of societies, and the other on 
the political economy of poverty and inequality. Cultural theories look at violence 
in relation to modes of living, religious beliefs and social norms, and regard 
contemporary global violence as a “Clash of Civilizations”.9 He regards this 
approach as extremely limited and an extraordinarily crude way to understand the 
motives for violence. He notes: 
“[This approach] serves as a major intellectual barrier to focussing more on prevailing 
politics and to investigating the processes and dynamics of contemporary incitements to 
violence.” 
Explaining the other approach, which prioritises economic causes, and sees 
poverty and inequality as the root causes of violence, he refers it as a „momentous 
approach‟ that challenges the simple cultural explanations. The injustice of 
inequality can create intolerance, and suffering from poverty can provoke anger 
and fury, forming a plausible connection between poverty and violence. 
 
In contrast, two recent studies (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004) apply a 
rationalist
10
 model to civil wars and explain the initiation of civil war as a function 
of the opportunity to organize rebellion. They state that conflict reflects 
competition in capturing valuable natural resources, which is different from being 
a response to collective grievances. Collier and Hoeffler look at the opportunity 
                                                          
9
 The „Clash of Civilizations‟ theory basically argues that people‟s religious and cultural identities 
will be the primary source of conflict in the post-cold war world. Samuel P. Huntington proposed 
this theory in 1992.    
10
 Grossman, (1991) and Hirshleifer (1995) introduced the rationalist model of crime, which 
models rebellion as an industry that generates profits from looting. Further, this theory holds that 
rebellions are motivated by greed. The model assumes too that subjective perceptions develop on 
each side that fighting could result in long term gains and violence is perceived to be more 
profitable than peace.  
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cost of rebellions. Low costs give a greater labour supply for wars, which is easier 
in poor countries where educational levels are low, and there are high numbers of 
unemployed youth. Inequality, according to them and to Feoron and Laitin (2003), 
plays no part in adding to the risk of civil war. Murshed and Tedkpeddon (2009) 
criticise their views, citing greed (economic opportunity to fight), and loot seeking 
as reasons for civil wars. They observe that the alternative hypothesis of grievance 
(justice seeking), which focuses on ethnic and religious exclusion, political 
repression, and horizontal inequality cannot be dismissed. They support the long-
standing position taken by Gurr (1970) that relative deprivation, and the related 
grievances it produces, results in internal violence. Sen (2006), in the same 
context, argues that a sense of injustice can nurture discontent over longer periods. 
The leaders of rebellion movements can evoke memories of destitution to make 
new recruitments, as social disparities and exclusion are not easy to forget.  
 
Humphreys (2003) looks at the economic factors that make some societies 
susceptible to conflict. He cites poverty as the main igniting factor and pro-growth 
policies as the main deterrents to conflicts. He notes that if statistical data do not 
find a relationship between inequality and conflicts, it may be because researchers 
are not working with the right data sets. Econometric research mostly uses overall 
inequality in a country, but what matters for conflict is the inequality between 
regions and groups known as horizontal inequality. Stewart (2010) agrees with 
this notion and finds positive relationships between horizontal inequalities and the 
incidence or intensity of violent conflicts. For example, Magdalena (1977) 
examines the Moro rebellions in the Philippines and finds a strong link between 
the relative deprivation of Muslims in differential returns to education and 
intensity of conflict. Murshed and Gates (2003) use inequalities of assets and 
human development as an indicator when studying the conflict in Nepal. They 
find a strong positive relationship between regional deprivation and the intensity 
of Maoist rebellions in the various districts of Nepal. The greater the degree of 
inequality in a district, the greater is the intensity of conflict.   
 
The linkages between poverty, hunger and violence in African countries are 
explained by Fisman and Miguel (2008, p. 149). They state that lack of rain leads 
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to declines in income from agriculture, thus giving way to violence and war. A 
similar logic applies to other income shocks in Africa that include a drop in 
commodity prices. For instance, Rwanda heavily relies on coffee export, and 
when the world prices of coffee plummet, so do most Rwandans‟ incomes. This 
acts like a drought, leading to an unexpected decline in income that leaves people 
desperate and violence-prone. Murdoch and Sandler (2002) observe that violent 
conflict is not solely confined to a nation in turmoil. There are strong negative 
spillover effects in neighbouring countries, including disruptions of trade, 
increased risk perceptions of foreign investors, collateral damage from 
neighbouring battles, and resources in the economy are spent to assist refugees. 
2.2.3 Terrorism: Conflicts and Civil Wars 
Terrorism remains a very significant and realistic concern in both conflict-affected 
and in other potentially target countries. Violent conflicts are associated with 
terrorist activities, which occur beyond the conflict areas and spread across the 
country. Terrorism as a violent phenomenon links strongly with internal conflicts. 
This sub-section reviews some literature about such links and explains the varying 
nature of terrorist activities (domestic and cross-border). Compared to violent 
conflicts, terrorism can have different triggers, which may be economic, socio-
political, geo-political, and religious. Sambanis (2008) argues that civil wars may 
lead to terrorism and vice versa and there are cases when civil war occurs with or 
without terrorism. Militant-dominated areas during internal conflicts are very 
conducive to terrorist training and recruitment (Moore, 2010). Terrorism has two 
dimensions: within the country and cross-border attacks. Domestic terrorist 
attacks result as a strategic extension of internal violent conflicts, to create 
internal fear, damage, and overall insecurity. The cross-border terrorist acts are 
usually a reaction of internal conflicts to targets outside the borders whom the 
militant organisations regard as directly or indirectly responsible for internal 
conflicts and other domestic problems (Abadie, 2006). The attacks of different 
radical Palestinian groups in Israel and other Western countries, and Al Qaeda‟s 
terrorist acts including the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States are 
such examples. Another recent incident was the attacks on main city destinations 
in Mumbai, India, which were carried out by outside perpetrators in 2008. 
However, a clear-cut distinction between domestic and international terrorism is 
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hard to make. Domestic perpetrators usually have international connections. For 
example, the Taliban in Pakistan link with Al Qaeda and other organisations,
11
 
while Al Qaeda has links in many countries (Franco, 2009; Zaidi, 2008). These 
complex connections sometimes result in targeting foreign installations and 
people at domestic destinations. For example, the bombing in Bali, Indonesia, was 
conducted by a local militant group, which resulted in the killing of many 
foreigners in 2002.  
 
As discussed above, one significant empirical result in the civil war literature is a 
robust link between per capita income and violent civil conflicts. While studying 
terrorism, particularly cross-border terrorism, I observed that some studies do not 
find evidence of this link with per capita income. Exploring the determinants of 
terrorism in Palestine, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) determine that poverty, 
educational attainment, and terrorism have little direct connection. They find that 
Palestinian suicide bombers and members of Hezbollah‟s militant wing are not 
economically disadvantaged or uneducated. This study mentions Angrist (1995) 
who argues that the civil unrest of the late 1980s coincided with increased 
unemployment rates in Palestinian youth (however, this point is not probed in 
detail). In another study, Krueger and Laitin (2007) find that developing countries 
with political repression are the source, while economically well-off countries are 
the targets, of terrorist activities. They determine that country-level Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and illiteracy are not good predictors for terrorist 
origins. The data used is based on a U.S State Department data set for „significant‟ 
terrorist events ranging from 1997-2002. This study acknowledges that the data 
has not only limitations in its range but also in its description of international 
terrorism.
12
 Within-country terrorist acts, including suicide bombings, have 
increased tremendously in the past decade in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, 
Russia, and in a number of war-prone African countries. Terrorist attacks in 
wealthier countries have decreased or are non-existent due to a much-increased 
                                                          
11
 The Taliban in Pakistan operate under different organisations, the largest being The Tehrik-e-
Taliban (TTP), however, these have links in Afghanistan and other countries, under the more 
formalised leadership of Al Qaeda  
12
 Abadie (2004) also questions the adequacy of the U.S State Department‟s dataset and mentions 
that former U.S defence secretary Colin Powell admitted errors and omissions in the construction 
of this data.  
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focus on security measures. Abadie (2006) notes that international terrorism 
represents a small fraction of world-wide terrorist activity. Moreover, the 
determinants of international terrorism may not be necessarily informative about 
domestic terrorism. If domestic incidents are taken into account from an updated 
dataset, the findings about the origin and targets (now mostly domestic) may be 
quite different.  
 
Sambanis (2008) identifies regime type as more important than income in 
explaining terrorism, whereas income is more significant in the explanation of 
civil wars. He suggests that measures that can prevent civil wars are also 
reasonable deterrents for terrorism because of their inter-linkages. Economic 
development strategies that increase per capita income and education might help 
to reduce terrorism, particularly in cases where terrorism is a strategic extension 
of a civil war.  
2.2.4 The Literature Focusing on Muslim Countries 
As mentioned in the introductory section, many Muslim countries in the Middle 
East, South Asia, and Africa are victims of violent conflicts. Not only does their 
internal violence have domestic repercussions, it also results in terrorist activities 
both within the country and sometimes directed at targets in other countries. The 
post-2001 literature finding links between Islam and militancy is largely focussed 
on anti-Western violence (more emphasis remains on anti-U.S actions), and 
terrorism. There are few studies which focus on intrastate conflicts in Muslim 
countries. However, these conflicts, as discussed earlier, facilitate and result in 
increased terrorist activities.  
 
Espisito (2002) tracks the origin of terrorist ideology in different Islamic sects. 
Mamdani (2002) probes the historical and cultural roots of terrorism in Muslims, 
in answering the question, „Why do they hate Westerners?‟ Fair and Shepherd 
(2006) study the support for terrorist attacks from a dataset of 14 Muslim 
countries. They conclude that younger persons and people who for some reasons 
consider the existence of Islam in danger are supportive of terrorist acts. However, 
the authors themselves are doubtful about the phrasing of some questions and 
conclusions drawn from the survey-based data which they use in their study.  
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Studies finding links between development indicators, civil wars, and terrorism in 
the Muslim countries include Testas (2004) who probes the determinants of 
terrorism and regards his study as an extension of the research of Krueger and 
Maleckova (2003), which is confined to Palestine. He uses a larger sample of 37 
Muslim countries, and includes additional variables like political repression and 
civil war, and their connection in fostering terrorist activities. He concludes that 
education is a positive determinant of terrorism, while income is more significant 
for onset of civil wars than terrorist activities. Alternatively, MacCulloch and 
Pezzini (2010) probe the factors of support for rebellions and terrorism and find 
negative correlation between GDP growth and revolutionary support. This study 
further explores the effect of religious belief on people‟s taste for revolt and finds 
that being religious lowers a person‟s chance of revolt in freer countries, while 
this effect totally disappears in non-free countries.   
 
Exploring another dimension, Toft (2007) identifies reasons for Islam‟s higher 
representation in religious civil wars than other religions from 1940-2000. He 
argues that political elites disguise the issues of contention (economic and 
political) as religious issues that help them get domestic and external support. It is 
more effective in Islam with the concept of jihad (holy war). Noting a trend, he 
identifies that developed countries take back the money paid for petroleum 
purchases to Arab countries by selling arms, which creates more insecurity and 
increases the likelihood of civil wars. Comparing democracy in Arab and non-
Arab Muslim countries, Stepan and Robertson (2003) establish that though Islam 
is common in the two subsets, a remarkable difference exists in terms of 
democratic and electoral successes (much higher in the non-Arab subset). They 
further observe that authoritarian Arab countries (most have wealth from oil) 
spend a higher percentage of GDP on security than any other region in the world, 
surpassing even NATO countries. This plays a role in the prevalence of conflicts 
in these countries, which subsequently reinforce and prolong authoritarianism in 
the region.  
 
The relationships between democracy, dictatorship, and development somehow 
remain a contested area among researchers. Some even argue for „developmental 
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dictatorship‟ (see Gregor, 1979).13  However, most of the empirical findings on 
the subject as discussed above support and establish the idea that democracy 
creates a favourable atmosphere for developmental processes. Most significantly, 
there is no fundamental conflict between political rights and a successful 
developmental process.  
 
The study period covered (the first decade of the 21st century) in the upcoming 
cross-country analysis of the onset of conflicts had high incidences of global 
intrastate conflicts and civil wars. The forthcoming analysis is at the global level 
and extends to the subset of Muslim majority countries. This unified approach was 
found lacking in the literature reviewed. This chapter, adopting a unified 
approach, with variables representing contemporary reasons and with a focus on 
an understudied period, thus contributes to the literature examining the 
determinants of global conflicts. The definitions and data used are described in the 
next section.   
2.3   Definitions and Data  
For the investigation of the occurrence of conflicts, 160 countries are included, 
with populations of at least 1 million in mid of study period, 2005 (excluded were 
North Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong due to unavailability of data for key 
variables). Sub-section 2.3.1 specifies the econometric model used.  
This analysis adopts the definition of conflict from Conflict Barometer (2008), an 
annual publication on global conflict analysis.
14
 This publication classifies 
conflicts as crisis, severe crisis and, in the most extreme form, civil war, 
represented by intensity levels 3, 4 and 5, respectively. The Heidelberg Institute 
for International Conflict Research (HIIK)‟s classification differs from the 
quantitative classifications of conflicts, which considers war to exist when there 
are 1,000 or more battle-related deaths in a year.
15
 An absolute quantitative 
                                                          
13
 James Gregor (1969) regards Fascism as a mass-mobilising developmental dictatorship in which 
economic policies are consistent with modernisation and promote swift economic growth through 
rapid capital accumulation by large profits. However, these are the product of supressed wages and 
salaries.    
14
 This is annually published by The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 
(HIIK) 
15
 This concept remains vague: as Sambanis (2004) notes, does it mean battle deaths or also 
civilian deaths? 
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distinction of wars in practical terms is difficult to make (what if there are 999 
deaths in a year or if there are different estimates which give different mortality 
figures?). Most importantly, it is very difficult to count the exact number of 
victims during a conflict, particularly in developing countries with limited or 
sometimes concealed information (Mayer, 2006). The second category of 
quantitative estimates regards civil war as minor if the number of deaths in a year 
is 25 to 999, and these remain out of sight in many studies. Conflicts can 
sometimes be very severe but may not exceed 1,000 deaths in one year and will 
remain in the minor category in quantitative estimates. This criterion may lead to 
the apparent incidence of more cases of civil wars in more populous countries. For 
example rioting in Nigeria or a civil war in India is much more likely to generate 
large number of casualties than a similar event in smaller Fiji or Cyprus. 
Sambanis (2004) observes that annual data on deaths and displacements are not 
available for most civil wars, making it quite difficult to study escalation and 
conflict intensity. HIIK‟s qualitative classification identifies a crisis when at least 
one party uses violence: a severe crisis occurs when violence is used repeatedly in 
an organized way. Civil war is thus an aggravated form of severe armed conflict 
in which violent force is used in continuity, and in an organised and systematic 
way. The conflicting parties exercise extensive measures and the extent of 
destruction is massive and prevails over an extended time. Interstate conflicts that 
may have other causes, like historical territorial claims, are not included in this 
analysis.  
 
In total, 365 political and ideological conflicts were active in 2009 (at the end of 
study period). Of these, 31 conflicts were fought out with massive violence, and 
termed civil wars (Conflict Barometer, 2009). Figure 2.1 shows the rise and 
decline of conflicts in the post-WWII era. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows that democracy remains the dominant form of governance at a 
global level, with the highest number of countries following the system in 2005. 
Then a mixed trend of decrease and increase follows for this governance system, 
during the second half of the decade.  
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Figure 2.1: Global Conflicts of Low, Medium and High Intensity 
                   1945-2009 
 
   Source: Conflict Barometer 2009, p. 4 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Political Systems Worldwide - 1945-2009 
 
     Source: Peace and Conflict (2012) Executive Summary, p. 19 
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New conflicts emerged during this period, and there was resurgence of armed 
violence in countries where conflicts were previously dormant or of low intensity 
for quite some time. For example, in 2007 the conflict between rebel groups in 
Colombia and the conflict in Myanmar intensified. In 2008, conflict in Chad 
escalated between various rebel groups, while in Pakistan civil war between the 
Taliban and the state forces intensified. In contrast, a few armed conflicts ended 
during these years, in Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives, and one each in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Chad.  
 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the variables. Appendices 1 and 1A 
provide lists of the countries where conflicts were reported, and are analysed. 
Appendix 2 provides detail about the data sources.   
  
This study used various predictors for income, economic development and 
political rights in different regression models. For example, in model 3, the United 
Nations Human Development Index (HDI) has been used, instead of GDP per 
capita.
16
 The HDI has a 0-1 range. The closer the index is to 1, the better is the 
country‟s performance in human development. The measure of (or absence of 
political) freedom and democratic rights is Freedom House‟s Political Rights 
Index (PRI). In conformity with Abadie (2006), the political rights index is used 
instead of the Civil Liberties Index: the same organization publishes that index. 
These two measures however, are highly collinear as is evident from various 
years‟ scores reported by Freedom House: the empirical results do not depend 
upon which one is used in the regressions. In model 7, instead of political rights, 
the Political Terror Scale (PTS) is used.
17
This scale is in contrast to the freedom 
and liberties measures, and absence of rights leads to human rights violations and 
political terror, largely by state institutions.    
 
 
 
                                                          
16
  This follows Abadie‟s (2006) approach, using HDI in place of per capita income for 
determining the roots of terrorism. 
17
 Amnesty International and U.S State Department code PTS from the yearly country reports on 
human rights practices.  
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Table 2.1:  Data Description and Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Definition Obs. Mean Min Max S.D 
Conflict 
Occurrence 
Conflict Barometer Reports-
2002-2009- Heidelberg 
Institute for International 
Conflict Research  
160     
Economic Variables   
GDP per capita 
(PPP) 
GDP per capita for the year 
2000 in PPP $ -In theory 1 PPP 
$ has the same purchasing 
power in the economy as 1 US 
$ has in the U.S economy 
(HDR, 2008)  
 
157 8399.5 290 50061 9278.5 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
Human Development Reports 
United Nations – 2000 & 2002. 
HDI has three components; it 
measures the well-being of 
people on the dimensions of 
income, health and education 
153 0.69 0.28 0.94 0.19 
Lack of democracy                                                                                                                              
(PRI) Lack of 
political rights 
Freedom House U.S. Index of 
Political rights – PRI has a 1 – 
7 range, where the lowest score 
denotes the presence of most 
political freedom and vice 
versa. The average is taken for 
2001 -2009 
160 3.59 1 7 2.1 
(PTS)Violation of 
human rights and 
political terror  
Repression and violation of 
human rights by state 
authorities: it ranges from 1 to 
5. Lowest with secure rule of 
law and highest with 
widespread terror to whole 
population. Average values.  
156 2.4 1 5 1.12 
Development – Quality of Life 
Under 5 mortality 
rate 
UNICEF- Child mortality 
statistical tables. Base year 
values 
157 64.4 4 257 
 
65.83 
School Life 
Expectancy (SLE) 
United Nations Statistics 
Division‟s composite index 
for educational opportunities 
in a system 
 
              
147 11.4  3 20 3.49 
Youth 
unemployment 
percent -Age 15 -
24 
The data are for the base year 
2000, if not available then 
closest to the base year. UN 
Statistics and (KILM), ILO 
115 17.9 3.2 58.6 
 
 
11.52 
Public Institutional competitiveness 
Corruption 
perception Index 
(CPI) 
Transparency International. 
The score ranges from 1-10. A 
high score indicates the country 
is considered fairer with less 
corruption. Average values. 
160 3.9 1.4 9.5 2.1  
2a – For the years 2000 and 2001, Uppsala Conflict Data is used, as HIIK‟s reports for these years are not 
available in the English language. Sierra Leone is included for the year 2000 from this data set. b – for 
Afghanistan, Mauritius and Liberia the GNI per capita (PPP) is taken from World Development Indicators 
2b –Number of observations vary for variables as data is unavailable for some countries e.g. HDI data is not 
available for all 160 countries 
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Among the developmental variables, survival and health for children under five 
years of age is used for the base year, 2000. Child mortality is regarded a sensitive 
indicator of the quality of life and has a strong correlation with income per capita. 
It is a proxy for overall economic development and a country‟s capacity to deliver 
core services (Goldstone et al, 2000, p. 14). Sen (1998) suggests that in judging a 
person‟s advantages and deprivations, we have to shift our attention from an 
exclusive focus on income to things that people have reason to value intrinsically. 
This establishes a case for concentrating on the characteristics of living and 
mortality. (It is to be noted that an increase or decrease in mortality has strong 
economic causes). The mortality rate is used as a proxy for quality of life, 
opportunities, and income in some models. The values for the base year 2000 are 
to assess the notion that violent conflicts destroy infrastructure including health 
services, which results in worsening health indicators.  
 
School Life Expectancy (SLE) is an index that provides an estimate of the number 
of years of education that a child can expect to receive upon entering school. 
Youth unemployment for those aged 15-24 years is a proxy for economic activity 
and economic participation by young people. Some studies regard this age group 
as most vulnerable to rebel recruitment (see Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). The 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) developed by Transparency International is 
published every year, and is based on various informational sources from the 
countries it ranks. It represents a proxy for institutional strength and fairness. The 
CPI defines corruption as misuse of public power and resources for private 
benefits. The data used for income and development variables are for the base 
year 2000 or the closest available yearly data figure.
18
 However, for a few 
variables, average values are calculated and utilised e.g. lack of democracy and 
proxy for institutional strength. Table 2.1 provides these details.   
 
                                                          
18
 Data for some key variables like literacy, HDI and GDP per capita for some African countries 
and others like Afghanistan and Iraq is not available for all years. This approach was found most 
practical for this study.  
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2.3.1 Model Specifications 
A binary Probit model is used where Y represents the presence/absence of conflict 
and the vector of regressors X from the data is assumed to influence the 
occurrence of conflict. A general specification of the model is:  
 
                                                                                                 
where Pr denotes probability and Φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
of the standard normal distribution. The parameter β is typically estimated by 
maximum likelihood. A country is coded 1 if conflict is reported during the study 
period, otherwise 0. This follows Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) and Sambanis 
(2001). They observe, however, exclusively the civil war's onset. The covariates 
in different models are proxies for economic status, democracy, developmental 
goals, quality of life, and institutional strength.   
 
Four groups of countries are analysed. The selected 160 countries for global 
analysis are classified in two groups. One consists of 87 countries where conflicts 
of level 3, 4 and 5 are reported by HIIK and are coded as 1 in the model. The 
second group comprises 45 countries (among 87 countries) where severe violent 
crises or civil wars (level 4 and 5) occurred during the ten-year study period, and 
are coded as 1. This separately observes the links between explanatory variables 
with varying intensity of conflicts. A similar classification forms the two Muslim 
subsets. Following a similar empirical technique, 42 countries with populations of 
more than 1 million and with a 50% or more Muslim population is analysed. This 
forms two Muslim subsets of 29 countries with conflicts of level 3, 4 and 5, and 
17 countries which were identified as having severe crises and civil wars during 
the decade.  
 
Tables 2.2 to 2.5 report the empirical results with marginal effects. Marginal 
effects are an informative way to summarise how change in a response like 
increased income or literacy relates to change in a predictor. Marginal effects or 
partial effects measure the effect on the conditional mean of Y that will be 
produced by 1-unit change in one of the regressors Xk, holding all other Xs equal 
at mean values. In Probit models, if the coefficient of X is statistically significant, 
 
 
37 
 
the marginal effect explains that a one unit change in the value will affect the z 
score of the Pr (Y=1) by the value of the respective coefficient (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2009). Halloran (2010) notes that marginal effects provide a good 
approximation of change in Y that are produced by a change in predictor X 
variable, for nonlinear econometric models. With binary dependant variables, they 
provide some of the same advantages the Linear Probability Model (LPM) does. 
These give a single number that expresses the effect of a variable on Pr (Y=1). 
2.4   Results and Discussion 
To address any possible multicollinearity issues, correlation analysis was 
performed before finalising covariates for the different models. For example, as 
mentioned in the previous section, the under-5 mortality rate has strong 
correlations with income per capita: these are not used simultaneously in any 
single model. Similarly, income and net secondary school enrolment were found 
to be strongly correlated, and are included separately in the models. This 
correlation result in this data set is in agreement with Collier and Hoeffler (2004). 
However, in the analysis of a purely social and human phenomenon like the 
occurrence of conflict, there may be many things which move in the same 
direction and correlations may not necessarily explain the cause. Finally, the 
selected variables do not have strong correlation coefficients. Models 1 and 2 in 
Table 2.2 analyse the effects of per capita income and democracy, from low 
intensity conflicts to the extreme form, civil war. The expected signs show that 
the predicted probability of 1 percent increase in log per capita GDP (PPP) is 
associated with a 0.224 reduction in the probability or a 22.4 percent decrease in 
chances of occurrence of conflict, given that all other variables have equal values 
at their means. The probability associated with income is very significant. In 
model 2, one unit increase in the political rights score, which indicates less 
democratic freedoms, increases the chances of conflict by 9.3 percent. Column 3 
notes the fundamental argument that countries must aim at development and more 
freedom. The Human Development Index 
 
alongside the index of lack of 
democratic freedom is included in this model. Both freedom and human 
development are significantly associated with violent conflicts and have the 
expected signs. A higher HDI value for a country and the presence of more 
political rights decrease the chances of conflict. This finding makes sense against 
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the background of relevant studies, such as Sen (1999), who considers that 
addressing major developmental concerns like poverty, authoritarianism and poor 
economic opportunities, as well as systematic social deprivation, is fundamental 
to minimising social tensions and related larger risks, such as mass violence.  
 
Models 4 to 7 observe the significance of different development indicators. In 
column 4, school life expectancy and youth unemployment remain insignificant 
while per capita income and democracy reflect strong links with the probability of 
occurrence of conflicts. However, during data collection and analysis, it was 
observed that there might be data shortcomings, particularly for the 
unemployment data.
19
 This aspect of unemployment data will be discussed further 
in the concluding paragraphs of this section.  
 
In model 5, infant mortality rate, democracy, and school life expectancy are 
included, as proxies for quality of life (health), freedom, and education. The 
results indicate that lack of democracy and higher under-5 mortality rates have 
statistically significant links with conflict risks. In model 6, the explanatory 
variables are political rights, youth unemployment, and adult literacy rates. Less 
democratic rights and lower adult literacy rates significantly increase the chances 
of conflict. Thus low adult literacy at a global level increases the probability of 
more conflicts. In the last column of Table 2, when the variable „political terror‟ is 
included, adult literacy rate and adult unemployment rates have no explanatory 
power. Political terror and human rights violations are in contrast to democratic 
freedom and increased repression has significant links with violent conflicts. For 
example, the PTS scores for some countries with an average range of 4 to 5 
include: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Chad, Israeli occupied territories, 
Congo, Iraq and Somalia; all host to high intensity violent conflicts, and mostly 
having a history of authoritarianism.  
 
The corruption index is significant for this global set of countries. Corruption, as 
CPI values in the data show, is prevalent in authoritarian societies and in well-
                                                          
19
 Data was taken from key indicators for Labour Market (KILM) a source of ILO, and United 
Nations Statistics Division but that in many cases relies on individual country surveys done by 
host organizations.  
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developed democracies like India (CPI average is 3.1). In developed countries like 
Italy, Greece and South Korea, it averages 5 or even lower (the best score is 10). 
It is an indicator of public institutional performance, weak institutions, and misuse 
of public power for private gains. However, the index itself is defined as being 
based on perceptions about prevailing corruption resulting from surveys, but this 
is found to be the most used global index of corruption in the relevant research 
studies (Lambsdorff, 2002). 
 
To sum up the findings in Table 2.2 for models 1 to 7, the effects of per capita 
income, the index for developmental process (HDI), and democratic rights on 
conflict risk are highly significant. Infant mortality significantly associates with 
conflicts when the two manifestations for quality for life (health and education) 
are grouped with democracy. The link between infant mortality and conflicts was 
not found in the studies probing relationships of various covariates with conflicts 
as discussed earlier in the chapter. The quality of public institutions in terms of 
the corruption index matters for the outbreak of conflicts in the last model along 
with political terror.  
 
The results do not suggest strong linkages of conflicts with unemployment. 
However, this study observes that though the data set used is from credible 
international data sources, it is mostly collected and reported by individual 
countries, and may have measurement errors. For example, for Burundi, Benin 
and Chad the adult unemployment rates are reported at just 1 percent by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), sourced from household surveys 
performed by the respective domestic institutions. This is close to full 
employment, which is doubtful for conflict-ridden developing countries. 
Comparing some more data, the unemployment percentage for Australia and 
Bangladesh (9.4 and 9.3), and Pakistan and Norway (both 7.5) are almost the 
same according to the data source used. This seems implausible, particularly when 
high intensity conflict continues e.g. in less developed Pakistan, substantially 
reducing economic growth and investment.  
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A few countries with a reported unemployment level of 1 percent (having 
conflicts) were omitted from the sample data. However, the possible lack of 
accuracy in the unemployment figures may be a shortcoming in this analysis. One 
drawback of unemployment data, which the United Nations Statistics Division in 
its 2009 reporting identifies in the technical notes, is significant. It notes that 
national definitions of unemployment may differ from the recommended 
international standard definition. The national definitions vary from country to 
country. Such contradictions make inter-country comparisons more difficult, as 
international organisations use variety of types of source to obtain information on 
unemployment and there remain differences in the scope and coverage of such 
sources. Moreover, many conflict-ridden countries do not report unemployment 
data e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Rwanda, Sudan, Chad and Angola. Finally, it 
was also observed that in some countries, data on either adult unemployment or 
youth unemployment were not available.  
2.4.1   Countries with Severe Conflicts and Wars 
The second global set consists of 45 countries among 87(with conflict of levels 3, 
4 and 5). In these countries conflicts in severer forms (levels 4 and 5) were present 
or civil wars occurred. These are analysed separately with similar modelling 
techniques. Table 2.3 presents the results of this analysis. Models 1 to 3 have 
similar significant results to those presented in Table 2.2. The index for quality of 
life (HDI) has a very high probability value of 0.62 for decreasing the conflict 
risk. Models 4, 5 and 6 are in contrast to the earlier analysis; democratic rights are 
the only significant factor which links with the high intensity conflict risk. In 
models 4 and 5, one unit increase in political rights score (shows decrease in 
rights) increases the probability of occurrence of severe conflict by values of 
0.059 and 0.049 respectively. Model 6 has similar findings as political rights are 
significant, but column 7 gives an unexpected result. Along with political terror, 
which is highly significant, increases in adult literacy rate decrease the probability 
of severe conflict at statistically significant levels. However, the probability value 
(- 0.002) is quite low as compared to other significant values.   
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Table 2.2:    Probit Analysis for Onset of Conflicts – 2000 -2009 
     Sample consists of Countries with all levels of violent conflicts 
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Violent Conflict 
Models (1) (2)   (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) 
Log of per capita GDP (PPP) 
 
-0.224*** 
(0.039) 
  -0.289*** 
(0.095) 
  
 
 
Democracy – Political Rights 
 
 0.093*** 
(0.020) 
 
0.055** 
(0.023) 
0.076** 
(0.035) 
0.073*** 
(0.025) 
0.106*** 
(0.031) 
 
School Life Expectancy 
 
   -0.051 
(0.034) 
-0.00 
(0.023) 
  
Youth Unemployment           
(15-24) % 
 
    0.001 
 (0.00) 
  0.00 
(0.00) 
 
Adult Unemployment Rate 15 
plus 
      0.015 
(0.018) 
 
Under 5 mortality rate 
 
     
0.002** 
(0.00) 
  
 
(0.002)  
Human Development Index 
 
   
- 0.893*** 
0.274 
(0.274) 
 (.0 1)   
 
 
   (0.274)     
Corruption Perception Index 
 
      -0.080** 
(0.035) 
Political Terror  
 
      0.288** 
(0.143) 
Adult Literacy rate 15 plus      -0.005* 
(0.00) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
Observations 
 
157 159    152 108 143 115  124 
               Note: Standard errors are in parentheses - *** , ** , * , indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % level 
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Table 2.3:  Probit Analysis for Onset of Conflicts – 2000-2009 
      Sample consists of Countries with Severe Crises and Wars 
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Violent Conflict 
Models (1) (2) (3)     (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) 
Log of per capita GDP 
(PPP) 
 
 - 0.151*** 
   (0.031) 
    -0.654 
(0.056) 
   
Democracy – Political 
Rights 
 
 0.078*** 
(0.017) 
0.052*** 
 (0.019) 
  0.059*** 
(0.022) 
  0.049**  
(0.020) 
0.064*** 
(0.021) 
 
School Life Expectancy 
 
   0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.027 
 (0.019) 
  
Youth Unemployment  
(15-24) % 
 
   -0.003 
(0.00) 
 -0.002 
(0.003) 
 
Adult Unemployment Rate 
15 plus 
 
 
 
     0.006 
(0.00) 
Under 5 mortality rate 
 
     0.00 
  (0.00) 
  
Human Development Index 
 
  -0.623*** 
  (0.211) 
    
Adult literacy rate 15 plus        -0.002 
(0.001) 
 -0.002* 
(0.02) 
Corruption Perception 
Index 
 
      -0.030 
(0.041) 
Political Terror  
 
          
0.183*** 
(0.047) 
 
    (0.047) 
Observations 
 
157 159 152 108 143 114 124 
        Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % level
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The findings of model 6 in Table 2.2 and of model 7 in Table 2.3, that a minimum 
level increase of literacy can decrease the chances of severe conflicts, seem 
logical in the global context. More education potentially leads to better 
employment opportunities, and can create barriers to recruitment into the militant 
organisations. Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009) conclude in this regard that 
recruitment becomes an easier option for young unemployed males, in a setting of 
widespread poverty and scant education. 
2.4.2 Results from the Muslim Subset: All Levels of Conflicts 
This sub-section extends the above analysis and focuses on countries with 
majority (more than 50 percent), Muslim populations. A similar empirical 
technique applies and the same explanatory variables are part of this analysis. 
According to the adopted definition of conflicts in this chapter, 87 countries had 
conflicts of intensity levels 3, 4 and 5. The number of Muslim majority countries 
having conflicts of these intensities is 29, out of the total 42 selected Muslim 
countries. Among global conflict-affected countries, 33 percent were Muslim 
majority countries (29 out of 87), engaged in violent conflicts and civil wars. 
Table 2.4 presents the findings of this analysis.  
 
Models 1, 2 and 3  have similar significant results as in the global analysis 
(consisting Non-Muslim and Muslim sets-Tables 2.2 and 2.3),  but have different 
likelihoods for outbreak of conflicts, the highest being for HDI in model 3 
alongside lack of democratic freedoms. The strong effects of human development 
achievements are validated by the data, which includes African Muslim countries 
such as Chad, Burkina Faso, Somalia, Niger, and countries in South Asia like 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan,
20
 which have low HDI standings. 
However, some exceptions in this subset are the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and Jordan with reasonable human development records. These 
mostly Middle Eastern examples are under monarchical or authoritarian rule, thus 
supporting the connection of less freedom with occurrence of conflicts.   
                                                          
20
 HDI is not available for Afghanistan for the study period but other relevant indicators for 
development are quite low. 
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Models 4 to 7 contain two exceptions of interest. In model 4, income is 
statistically not distinguishable from zero. The sample includes 16 oil- and 
resource-rich Arab countries, and their high incomes may be influencing this 
finding. Stepan and Robertson (2003) identify that not a single Arab country has a 
per capita income less than US $ 1,500, while 33 percent of non-Arab Muslim 
countries do. In model 7, adult literacy has a statistically significant effect on the 
probability of occurrence of conflicts. Prevailing and past Muslim attitudes of 
negating non-religious education (sometimes a cost-based decision), contribute to 
the low literacy, which results in low paid jobs or unemployment. Among recent 
Islamic ideas, Wahabism
21
  has spread across many Muslim countries since the 
1970s. The spread of these ideas is mostly facilitated and financed by the Saudis. 
One of its results was the establishment of thousands of madrassas and large 
enrolments in these seminaries. The preference for madrassa enrolment originates 
both from ideological beliefs and because of the free mode of learning. Madrassas 
stick to a pre-scientific curriculum and act as recruiting places for militant 
Islamists (Hoodbhoy, 2011). 
2.4.3 Muslim Sub-set with Severe Crisis and Wars 
Numerically 17 and proportionally 40 percent of Muslim countries experienced 
severe conflicts or civil wars during the study period. Table 2.5 presents the 
empirical calculations of the analysis. Models 1 to 4 provide similar findings as in 
the previous analysis. Political rights with a positive sign significantly affect the 
probability for occurrence of conflicts. Lack of democracy remains statistically 
significant in all the models, when used as a predictor. Typically, as Stepan and 
Robertson (2003) conclude, lack of democracy is a phenomenon in the Arab 
Muslim countries; it is not that all Muslim countries lack democracy. Electoral 
freedom and political rights are present in non-Arab Muslim countries like 
Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia, in west-African Senegal, and in low-income 
Bangladesh and Pakistan.   
 
                                                          
21
 It‟s a sect in the Muslim population and has strict religious views. More details are given in 
Chapter Three. 
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Model 7 finds that a lower corruption index (indicating more corruption) in public 
institutions and use of public offices for private gains, significantly increase the 
likelihood of civil wars in Muslim countries. Other determinants in this model are 
statistically insignificant. Of 17 countries having severe crises or wars, 14 Muslim 
countries have a CPI lower than 3. This can be questioned as a reverse causality; 
wars destroy institutions, and affect quality of public services, and the weakened 
governance structure can lead to public dissatisfaction. Once this dissatisfaction is 
widespread and regimes and institutions are widely perceived as incapable, 
conflicts can be prolonged for years, and that is usually the case in this subset of 
countries. However, it is relevant to ask the question: while war affects 
institutions and these can be inefficient in conflict-affected countries, why do they 
have lower CPI values? The answer probably lies in non-adherence to legal norms 
in these countries (e.g. judges are empowered to apply personal interpretation of 
Sharia law in Saudi Arabia), and in biased judicial systems that favour the 
powerful. In some Arab countries there are separate judicial mechanisms for 
nationals and foreign residents. Moreover, low paid public jobs in less developed 
countries and an absence of accountability mechanisms (which contribute to the 
lower value for the corruption index), may become possible motivation for unfair 
practices and misuse of power.   
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Table 2.4: Probit Analysis for Onset of Conflicts – 2000-2009 
Sample consists of Muslim Countries with ≥50 percent Muslim Populations. 
With all Levels of Violent Conflict 
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Violent Conflict 
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) 
Log of per capita GDP (PPP) 
 
-0.101*** 
 (.0240) 
  -0.395 
(0.030) 
    
 
Democracy – Political Rights 
 
 0.060*** 
(0.013) 
0.043*** 
  (0.013) 
 0.030** 
   (0.132) 
0.045*** 
 (0.015) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
 
School Life Expectancy 
 
   -0.001 
 (0.011) 
-0.006 
 (0.015) 
  
Youth Unemployment      
(15-24) % 
 
   -0.00 
(0.00) 
   -0.00 
  (0.00) 
 
Adult Unemployment Rate 
15 plus 
      0.003 
(0.003) 
 
Under 5 mortality rate 
 
     
0.001* 
(0.00) 
  
 
Human Development Index 
 
    -0.397*** 
  (0.146) 
    
Adult literacy rate 15 plus       -0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
    (0.02) 
Corruption Perception Index 
 
        -0.075*** 
   (0.057) 
Political Terror  
 
          0.043 
    (0.02) 
 Observations 
 
157 159 152 108 143 115 124 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses - - ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % level 
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Table 2.5:  Probit Analysis for Onset of Conflicts – 2000-2009 
    Sample consists of Muslim Countries with ≥50 percent Muslim Populations 
   With Severe crisis and Wars (Level 4 and 5) 
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Violent Conflict 
Models (1) (2) (3) (4)      (5)    (6) 
 
(7) 
Log of per capita GDP (PPP) 
 
  -0.04*** 
  (0.017) 
  -0.217 
(0.300) 
   
Democracy – Political Rights 
 
 0.032*** 
(0.010) 
0.021** 
   (0.009) 
        0.025** 
       (0.119) 
     0.021* 
    (0.01) 
  0.02** 
 (0.009) 
 
School Life Expectancy 
 
   0.008 
(0.112) 
    -0.00 
     (0.10) 
  
Youth Unemployment 
 (15-24) % 
 
   0.002 
 (0.016) 
     0.00 
   (0.00) 
 
Adult Unemployment Rate 
15 plus 
      0.003 
(0.002) 
Under 5 mortality rate 
 
          0.00 
     (0.00) 
  
 
 
 
Human Development Index 
 
      -0.190* 
    (0.104) 
    
Adult literacy rate 15 plus          -0.001 
   (0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Corruption Perception Index 
 
       
 
    -0.028** 
(0.013) 
Political Terror  
 
           0.036 
     (0.024) 
Observations 
 
157 159 152 108 143       115 124 
          Note: Standard errors are in parentheses - ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % statistical level
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2.5   Conclusions  
What links with the occurrence of armed conflicts? Sorting out the precise 
answers is difficult. Each conflict is as different as the society that produced it. 
Conflicts may have multiple layers of causality: grievances, personalities, hatreds, 
beliefs, mistakes, and so on. This chapter probes violent conflicts and their 
connections with a range of income and developmental parameters. It explores 
these connections purely in terms of public policy mistakes. The results and 
discussion provide more opportunity to identify possible interventions, and to 
decrease the chances of conflict. We listen to the news and see that wars are going 
on in poor countries. If observed more closely, these are the countries which also 
deny democratic participation. Sometimes violent conflicts occur in places like 
the Basque region of Spain and Northern Ireland, which are not poor, or in India 
and Sri Lanka, which have records of democratic achievement. Therefore, we may 
have to find determinants beyond simple cross-country analysis.  
 
Country-level data in cross-country analysis has its limitations. For example, the 
data on income is not reflective of the conditions in a particular war-prone area. 
Poor countries can also have horizontal inequalities as identified by Stewart 
(2000); inequalities between groups and regions are not reflected in national 
incomes and accounts. Sambanis (2004) observes that individual and group-level 
conflict factors such as poverty or ethnic hostility are imperfectly tested at the 
national level. 
 
Since World War II, Europe and North America have been prosperous and 
democratic, and have developed well-functioning welfare-based institutions along 
with achievements in human development. These countries successfully created 
domestic economic and social environments which offer better opportunities for 
all. Except for some very rare incidences, they have had no large-scale conflicts or 
intrastate wars. Their success forms contemporary plausible connections between 
economic development, democratic rights, and conflicts. However, some 
researchers on armed conflicts may find income, poverty, inequality and 
democratic rights irrelevant in conflict-stricken poor countries, which are mostly 
battlegrounds for internal conflicts, and instead advance civilizational and cultural 
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clashes or greed-based motivations as reasons for violence. Such reasons differ in 
studies on the subject and in this analysis too.  
 
Economic development and democracy are mutually reinforcing and parallel 
phenomena. About five decades ago, Martin Lipset‟s (1959) arguments 
established the wide reach of their combination. Sen (1999) considers freedoms 
important for the development process for two distinctive reasons. Firstly, these 
help to evaluate the needs of the people. Sometimes the lack of substantive 
freedoms relates directly to economic poverty, which constrains people in their 
freedom to satisfy hunger, to achieve sufficient nutrition, to obtain remedies for 
treatable illnesses, or to be adequately clothed or sheltered. Secondly, freedom 
makes development effective. Economic opportunities, political liberties, social 
inclusion, and quality of life are positively influenced in a democratic 
environment (Sen, 1999).  
 
Summing up, there is no unexpected contradiction in the overall research 
hypothesis and econometric results in this study that link conflict to multiple 
public policy shortcomings in the economic development process. Violent conflict 
is found to have strong roots in contemporary factors, such as poverty and lack of 
democratic rights. This study observed the handicaps associated with accurate 
data availability for some variables like unemployment data, for a cross-country 
analysis. Further, this chapter establishes that it matters how we classify conflicts. 
It gives varying strength to the explanatory variables. Health infrastructure 
matters more than educational opportunities in countries with low to high 
intensity crisis, while minimum educational attainment negatively links with 
conflicts in countries with wars. This finding is contrary to some research on 
terrorism, which concludes education is a positive determinant of terrorist acts. 
Nevertheless, this chapter also explains that terrorism is both strongly linked to 
and can be different or isolated from civil wars. The all-encompassing gains of an 
unbiased and successful development process have strong potential to minimize 
the probability of conflicts, as mentioned earlier with regard to the post-WWII 
developmental progress in Western countries. Conflicts may occur sometimes in 
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democracies, but as the findings establish, lack of democracy has significant links 
with the onset of conflicts.   
 
Analysis of the Muslim subset produces more or less similar results, but there are 
some exceptions of wider interest. The developmental index has significant value 
in decreasing the chances of conflict in Muslim majority countries. Moreover, 
corruption in model 7, contrary to the global sets, solely explains the occurrence 
of conflicts. High income decreases the conflict risk significantly in model 1 for 
both subsets. When income is combined with lack of political rights in model 4, 
although it has the expected sign, it is statistically not distinguishable from zero. 
Political rights are notably lacking in the Middle East and in Africa, and their 
denial creates violence-prone environments. The Muslim world has many 
dictatorships and kingdoms, some of which have been sustained for decades. For 
continuity of authoritarian rule they rely on some welfare initiatives, which they 
provide with the wealth obtained from natural resources. Nevertheless, there is 
another side: not every country under dictatorial rule is rich in resources. Navia 
and Zweifel (2003) find links between the type of regime and infant mortality 
rates, and quantitatively estimate that infant mortality rates are higher in 
dictatorships, as compared with democracies. Further, well-functioning 
democracies perform better in development indicators than countries under 
benevolent dictatorships.  Sen (1999) explained that democracies tend to move to 
break the underdevelopment traps, as they invest more in social services than 
dictators do. The fundamental roots of violent conflict may lie here. In the vicious 
circle of poverty and deprivation, when voices remain unheard for long periods, 
hardly any other choice is left for the deprived than to be violent. 
 
As mentioned earlier, every conflict is different, and so are the people involved in 
and affected by it. Therefore, the determinants and particularly the consequences 
can be different. The global analysis in this chapter for multiple sets of countries 
finds some distinctive results for each in explaining the determinants of conflict 
risks. The findings provide the motivation for this thesis for studying the effects of 
a particular conflict at the micro, household level. This thesis next will focus on 
the recent violent conflict which became civil war in Swat district of Pakistan  
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Chapter Three 
Extremism and Emergence of the Taliban in Pakistan 
3.1   Introduction 
The Taliban in Pakistan, who interlink with Al-Qaeda and several other militant 
groups in neighbouring Afghanistan, forcefully occupied most of Swat district by 
early 2009. Hashim (2012) notes that during their occupation the Taliban enforced 
strict laws, killed opponents, changed the social environment, and gained almost 
complete administrative control. As a result there was a huge decline in economic 
and business activities in the district, and thousands lost their jobs. Within Swat, 
the Taliban were able to organize, recruit fighters, and subsequently effectively 
increase their influence in adjoining areas (Torwali, 2013), resulting in enormous 
repercussions on the short and long-term development prospects of the country, 
on its internal security, and on both regional and household economies.  
 
Within this context, the remainder of this thesis is devoted to the analysis of the 
recent violent economic shock which became a civil war in Swat, and its impacts 
on households‟ livelihoods. This chapter provides a background description of the 
relevant aspects for this region-specific micro-conflict analysis. For example, the 
description of authoritarian military regimes, their reliance on religious ideology 
to prolong their rule and the resultant rise in radical thought is helpful in 
understanding the rise of religious radicalism in Pakistan.  This chapter further 
explores other significant economic and social region-specific characteristics that 
resulted in the rise of religious militancy across Pakistan and particularly in Swat. 
These interconnected factors were not explored in any single earlier research 
study on militancy in Swat. The description of economic and social characteristics 
of militant-dominated areas (including Swat), which are different from other 
regions of the country, will broaden the understanding of militancy, and the 
Taliban occupation. Qualitative and some quantitative aspects of the damage that 
the Taliban occupation caused to local households, the local economy, 
infrastructure and social environment are also summarized in this chapter.  
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The details provided and the conclusions reached in this chapter support the 
research in this thesis in multiple ways. The economic, political and social 
exclusion of the people in Swat contributed to support and recruitment for the 
Taliban. The discussion investigates how the Taliban achieved initial recruitments 
and later lost public sympathies in Swat. That understanding provides the basis for 
a later chapter (Chapter Seven) that explores possibilities for reviving post-
conflict livelihoods in Swat, using dynamic simulation modelling. The field visits 
undertaken by the author for this research in Swat provided the opportunity to see 
the post-war damage in person. These visits helped to obtain various opinions 
about the military‟s role in maintaining post-war peace and the need for other 
sustainable solutions, and are the source of some of the details provided in this 
chapter. This directly acquired information is useful in providing concrete 
explanations of the different quantitative and econometric results obtained in 
subsequent key chapters (Five, Six and Seven), of the thesis.       
3.2   Key Facts about Pakistan 
Pakistan‟s 67-year history is a mix of authoritarian military rulers, wars and civil 
unrest. It has had four military rulers, and the same number of major wars with 
neighbouring India. It remained involved in a long proxy
22
 war with Afghanistan, 
and had many intrastate conflicts, in which government forces acted against 
civilian insurgencies. Other than the on-going intrastate conflict with the Taliban 
forces, there is another civil insurgency in the south-western province of 
Balochistan, where state institutions are at war with secessionist organizations.
23
  
 
Pakistan is located at the junction of South, Central and West Asia, and borders 
Afghanistan, India, China and Iran. Table 3.1 presents some of the economic 
development and demographic indicators of Pakistan. Pakistan is the sixth most 
populous country and second largest after Indonesia in the Muslim world. The 
Human Development Index (HDI) ranking of 146 lists it among the countries with 
the lowest human development records. The adult literacy rate of about 55 percent 
                                                          
22
 A war instigated by a major power which does not directly involve itself. These use third parties 
as substitutes to fight for their goal. 
23
 Baloch nationalists organized in different groups are fighting against the government. 
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in Pakistan is below that of less developed and war-torn African countries like 
Sudan and Rwanda.
24
 
Table 3.1:   Significant Economic and Development Indicators of Pakistan  
Indicators   
Population  179.2 Million 
GDP current US $  231.2  Billion - 2012 
GDP per capita  2,424 PPP US $ - 2005 
Export of goods and services* 14 Percent of GDP 
Human Development Index (HDI) Rank 146  
Under 5 mortality rate  87 (Per 1000 live births) 2009 
Adult literacy rate  54.9 Percent 
Population below the poverty line 21 $ 1.25 PPP - Percent 
*Major exports are cotton and textiles 
Source: Human Development Report, 2013, Asia Pacific Human Development Report 2012 & 
World Bank indicators 
 
The horizontal or regional indicators of development are more uneven than the 
national averages. For example in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) (formerly called 
North West Frontier province), whose district is Swat,  agricultural farm holdings 
are very small, and the proportion of farms less than one acre is 45.5 percent of 
the whole country total (KP, Government, 2013). The same source notes that there 
is one doctor per 1225 persons in Pakistan on average, while for KP there is one 
doctor per 6221 persons. Similarly, the gross primary enrolment rate and literacy 
ratio in KP are far less than the average national statistics.  
Pakistan gained independence from British colonial rule in August 1947, largely 
because of a Muslim rights movement spearheaded by Muhammad Ali Jinnah.
25
 
The new states of Pakistan and India were formed from United India. The initial 
scarcity of resources and the burden of refugee settlement from India into West 
Pakistan forced early rulers to seek western aid from the beginning. 
Internationally the old colonial patterns were breaking down, and the US (post-
World War II superpower), was looking for allies in its cold war against the 
USSR. The US–Pakistan alliance suited both parties well. The US got a 
strategically located ally, and it brought much-needed financial aid to Pakistan. 
From the beginning, keeping a large defence establishment
26
 with a high defence 
                                                          
24
 Sudan and Rwanda respectively have 70 and 71 percent adult literacy rates (HDR, 2012) 
25
 M.A. Jinnah, called Qaid-e-Azam (the biggest leader) was the founding leader of the country, 
and a staunch democrat throughout his political career 
26
 The military remained involved in an arms race with neighboring India, even to the extent that 
Pakistan became a nuclear power. The military not only consumed financial resources but its role 
  
 
54 
  
expenditure and a strong state apparatus became the key objectives of the 
Pakistani state (Siddiqa, 2007).  
Other than the military, the big landlords who owned most of the agricultural 
holdings were also the beneficiaries of resource distribution and of different 
policies, as growth focused on facilitating the agricultural economy. These 
policies naturally resulted in uneven income distribution across different regions. 
 
Different ethnic groups co-exist in Pakistan, and often have economic grievances 
against each other.
27
 Instead of genuine redress of the issues they raised, religion 
was highlighted as a collective identity to create a nationalist outlook, ignoring 
geographical and cultural identities, and their grievances. Moreover, religion 
became a slogan to help satisfy the complaints of diverse ethnic groups, 
particularly about uneven economic development in different provinces. It was 
stressed that Pakistan was founded as an Islamic ideological state. This approach 
automatically brought religious parties to the centre stage of politics, and 
increased their influence on the social system (Khan, 2005)  
3.2.1 Military Interventions and Dictatorships 
In 1958, only 11 years after Pakistan‟s independence, the military was strong and 
politically influential enough to stage a coup, and assume direct power. Pakistan 
had its first major war
28
 with India in 1965 during military rule. The second 
military rule immediately followed the first and lasted from 1968-1970. Ayub 
Khan (the first military dictator), had to surrender after a country-wide political 
movement initiated by students and political activists alike, against his 
government‟s authoritarianism, the economic hardship imposed, and in a quest for 
democratic rights. Public sentiment subsequently forced General Yahya Khan (the 
second military ruler), to hold the first parliamentary elections in Pakistan in 
1970. 
Political parties with developmental and democratic orientations won the majority 
of the seats. The military remained reluctant to transfer power until Bangladesh 
                                                                                                                                                               
expanded to build an economic entity too. The military‟s five allied giant welfare foundations run 
thousands of businesses including huge industrial establishments.  
27
 The break-up of East Pakistan in 1971 (now Bangladesh) is one major example. 
28
 In 1948, the first interstate conflict was started in Kashmir, which both countries call disputed 
territory: the scale of this war was confined to Kashmir areas 
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got independence after the 1971 Indo-Pak war.
29
 The military directly intervened 
to curb political insurgency, which was demanding transfer of power in the former 
East Pakistan. This unfortunately had huge repercussions for the civilian 
population. The reaction to the military‟s intervention not only transformed the 
resistance movement into a war of liberation, but also caused hundreds of 
thousands of civilian deaths. Rizvi (2000) observes it also caused genocide by the 
military, and displacement of several million people. Huge damage to property 
and infrastructure occurred. In addition, the military used civilian armed groups, 
including Islami Jamiat Talaba (Islamic Gathering of Students), the student wing 
of the political party Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Party) in the civil war against the 
nationalist Awami League (People‟s League) to curb its activists and supporters 
(Khan, 2005). This was the first major reliance by the state on religious groups 
and parties for political policy objectives, which proved costly later. The 
involvement of public policies with religion in setting state priorities and policies 
will inform the concluding sections of Chapter Seven, which explain the various 
motivations for recruitment to militant religious organisations.  
 
A geographically broken Pakistan started its first period of democracy and a 
civilian interlude that continued until 1977. General Zia-ul-Haq seized direct 
control by imposing martial law in July 1977. He instantly allied with ultra-right 
parties to gain some legitimacy for his rule. The parties with which he allied were 
vocal against the socialist slogans of the overthrown Zulfikar Ali Bhutto‟s 
regime.
30
 These rightist groups historically had limited voter support and 
declaring the democratic electoral process un-Islamic was very expedient for them 
(Ahmad, 1983). General Zia turned out to be the most suppressive ruler, and his 
dictatorship lasted for 11 years (1977-1988). His era, as Nancy Hayden (2005) has 
described it, was an „epochal‟ stage31 in the evolution of religious radicalism in 
Pakistan. 
                                                          
29
 India directly intervened on the pretext of stopping civil war in neighboring East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) 
30
 Most socialist ideals were during his initial years of power: later he even enforced legislation to 
satisfy the demands of Islamic radicals.  
31
 Nancy Hayden used the phrase „epochal evolution‟ to describe the phase of rapid progress in the 
evolutionary process of the terrorist organizations.  
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Pervez Hoodbhoy, an eminent Pakistani scientist and writer, explains that the 
process of incorporating religious immoderation (which is still on-going), was 
widely initiated after General Zia took power. This process involves profound 
efforts to culturally split Pakistan from the Indian subcontinent and drive it 
towards the Arabian Peninsula. For this to happen, a severe version of Islam, the  
Salafi/Wahabism
32
 of Arabian lands and Deobandism
33
 of South Asia, is replacing 
the kinder, gentler and more loving Islam of the Sufis and saints who had 
inhabited the area for hundreds of years (Hoodbhoy, 2011). 
Islam remained a state religion since the inception of Pakistan but was not 
visualised or enforced in the stricter ways which General Zia pursued. There were 
public floggings for minor crimes. Those who did not fast in Ramadan (the month 
of fasting) were punished, and jihad (holy war, literally meaning “effort” in 
Arabic) was declared mandatory for every Muslim. Hoodbhoy (2011) identifies 
Pakistan‟s sufferings of today as mostly self-inflicted, originating from an 
education system (transformed during Zia‟s regime), that like Saudi Arabia‟s 
system, provides an ideological foundation for future jihadists and violence. Hiro 
(2012, p. 160) observes that revisions of the curriculum were done at the expense 
of historical facts. Rizvi (2000), explaining the governance concept of General 
Zia, notes that a self-created form of governance was introduced.
34
 General Zia 
declared himself accountable only to God and unchallengeable in an Islamic state. 
Interest-free banking was initiated and zakat (a compulsory tax) on bank accounts 
was promulgated. His allied Islamic religious parties were encouraged to launch 
an ideological onslaught on the existing electoral systems, human rights, and 
freedom.  
                                                          
32
 Salafi is the term for Muslims used since the middle ages: today it relates to Salafiya including 
Wahabis. It is strict and puritanical; it also considers Jihad against civilians a legitimate expression 
of Islam. 
33
 This sect originated in colonial India in late 19
th
 century. Their major beliefs are that Muslims 
should have their own style of learning, madrassas (religious seminaries). They oppose all kind of 
shrines, and take a very restrictive view of women in Islam. To them national boundaries are not 
acceptable and religious frontiers are acceptable. They believe that Muslims have a sacred right 
and duty to go to any country and wage Jihad to protect Muslims.  
34
 He was elected President after a controversial referendum. Majlis-e-Shoora (the Islamic 
parliament or group of advisors), with unelected members, formed the parliament, and national 
assembly elections were conducted on a non-party basis in 1985.  
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3.2.2 The Proxy Afghan War 
The Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution in 1979 changed 
the regional strategic environment. It brought a lot of Western, particularly US, 
interests into the region. Marwat (2005) notes that General Zia decided Pakistan 
would become the frontline state of resistance against the Russians in 
Afghanistan. This resistance was backed mainly by the US. Pakistan was 
experiencing a difficult economic situation, and there was international isolation, 
particularly after the Carter administration‟s sanctions in 1978.35 The major 
stakeholders in the civil war in Afghanistan promised economic and military 
assistance to Pakistan, in return for its active cooperation in the Afghan resistance. 
Western countries who opposed the Russian invasion were led by the US along 
with the oil-rich Gulf countries. The Gulf countries‟ leadership for militant 
resistance to the Russians lay in Saudi Arabia, who believed it to be jihad.
36
 
Moreover, this cooperation favoured General Zia: he was no longer asked 
internationally to revive democratic processes in his country.  
  
 It is well known that the Afghan mujahedeen (people doing jihad) resistance 
against the Russian invasion was foreign funded (by the US,
 
the Saudis and other 
Gulf states),
37
 and was facilitated in many ways by the Pakistan army (Rashid, 
2008).
38
 This formed a Washington-Riyadh-Islamabad nexus for years to come, 
for a unified cause and struggle, in pushing back Russia from Afghanistan.  
 
                                                          
35
 Economic and military aid was suspended by the US because of the ongoing nuclear programme 
in Pakistan. 
36
 Jihad is explained briefly in the previous chapter; literally it means struggle or effort. In 
religious terms it is the duty of Muslims to fight against those who do not believe in Allah. 
Different Muslim sects have different interpretations of this concept. Some moderates believe that 
internal jihad, meaning the spiritual struggle for a righteous living, is a better form than the 
external physical concept. Some Muslim scholars call it a struggle for a just moral and social 
order. President Habib of Tunisia used the word as a struggle for economic development of his 
country.  
37
 Hillary Clinton, former U.S secretary of state publicly acknowledged that the US and Saudi 
Arabia funded Islamic militants and their Wahhabi brand of Islam for fighting against the Russians 
in Afghanistan and supported the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. Retrieved from 
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x13046f_hillary-clinton-speaks-out-about-us-links-with-
taliban-and-others_news 
38
 The Pakistan army trained mujahedeen, funded them, stored and distributed arms and 
ammunition which were supplied by other stakeholders. Most of its operations were covert so 
specific details are difficult to obtain.  
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The civil war in Afghanistan made the neighbouring Pakistan, host to millions of 
Afghan refugees. By 1990, as Marwat (2005) notes, the number of registered 
refugees was 3.2 million, with approximately another 0.5 million unregistered.
39
 
He further comments that the refugee camps soon became more than a place of 
shelter, and that learning of jihadi concepts and military training of mujahedeen 
started in these camps. Among the international organizations providing relief 
efforts were Middle Eastern organisations, some of which promulgated very strict 
interpretations of Islam among refugees, particularly the young. To encourage 
militancy, a special curriculum was taught in schools for refugee children, aimed 
at raising their motivation and sense of „duty‟ for militant actions and jihad. 
Books and ideological material were distributed free of charge. Ultimately, jihadi 
ideas penetrated to different parts of tribal areas in Pakistan, crossing into 
neighbouring Afghanistan. For resistance against the Russians, more than 
weapons were supplied by the U.S. An investigative report in The New York 
Times by Stephens and Ottaway (2002) revealed that the U.S spent millions of 
dollars to supply Afghan schoolchildren with textbooks filled with militant 
Islamic teachings.
40
 These supplies were part of covert attempts to encourage 
more resistance to the Soviet occupation. Apart from jihadi lessons, these books 
as part of the school system‟s core curriculum included abundant drawings of 
guns, bullets, soldiers, and mines. Figure 3.1 is a page from one of those books, 
and is self-explanatory.  
 
When jihadi ideas were being spread in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of 
Pakistan, as Zaidi (2008) observes, little or no thought was given to their after-
effects. This included religious radicalization of tribal people, which through 
different militant groups started spreading radical ideas across Pakistan. The 
Soviet Union started withdrawing from Afghanistan in 1988, so American 
interests also waned. General Zia died as his plane exploded mid-air during the 
same year. However, his followers in the military and allied intelligence 
organisations continued to support the radical Islamic militants, this time for 
another „holy cause‟: to fight against India in Kashmir (Khan, 2005). Such 
                                                          
39
 Currently, as of June 2013, there are 1.6 million registered and about 0.6 million unregistered 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. This is after repatriation efforts to return refugees to Afghanistan 
(United Nations Commission for Refugees, UNHCR) 
40
 It was titled “The ABC‟s of Jihad in Afghanistan”: Courtesy USA.  
  
 
59 
  
interventionist policies ultimately resulted in complex multiple outcomes, some of 
which are discussed next.  
 
Figure 3.1 
 
  Source: Marwat (2005) 
3.3   Emergence of the Taliban  
The Taliban had initially been students of madrassas (religious seminaries), in the 
KP and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan; many of them were born in the Afghan 
refugee camps. The name talib means an Islamic student who seeks knowledge. 
Mullah (religious preacher) on the other hand, is one who delivers Islamic 
education. By choosing the name Taliban (plural of talib) they distanced 
themselves from the politics of the mujahedeen (most of their leadership was from 
Mullahs), and the war lords in Afghanistan. They further conveyed that they were 
running a movement for spreading virtue in society, rather than running for power 
(Rashid, 2002). The Taliban movement came to prominence in 1994. At that time 
Afghanistan had disintegrated and was witnessing a civil war between warlords 
and various ethnic groups. The Taliban‟s first military endeavour was the support 
of Mullah Omar in conquering Kandhar province. In the next few years they 
conquered most of Afghanistan.
41
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 Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were the only two states who recognized the legitimacy of the 
Taliban government in Kabul. 
  
 
60 
  
The madrassas in Pakistan (later the main recruitment points) increased greatly 
during General Zia‟s rule. They were run and encouraged by Islamic 
fundamentalist parties and were generously funded, both locally and from affluent 
Middle Eastern countries. Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam 
(JUI), the religious and political party with Deobandi faith, controlled most of 
these. By 1971, there were 900 such religious schools in Pakistan. However, at the 
end of General Zia‟s rule there were 8,000 registered madrassas and 25,000 
unregistered ones across Pakistan (Rashid, 2001).  Here, young Pakistanis and 
Afghans were provided free food, shelter, education, and military training. These 
young, mostly Pashtun
42
 warriors and madrassa students had no idea about 
mathematics or other sciences, history or new branches of knowledge. They 
studied only Islam as interpreted by their madrassa-qualified teachers. Much of 
their faith was based on a code of centuries-old tribal customs called pashtunwali, 
and was reinforced by learning in Deobandi madrassas. They were mostly the 
orphans of the Afghan war, who while living in refugee camps had no roots or 
identity, were jobless and economically deprived (Rashid, 2001).  
 
The spread and impact of these ideologically orientated and militant students was 
not confined to Afghanistan; Pakistan started becoming a target of increasing 
religious radicalism too. Hoodbhoy (2011) notes that the madrassas deeply 
influenced the big cities and their civic environment. For example until a few 
years ago, Islamabad, the Pakistani capital was a quiet, orderly and modern city, 
an abode of affluent people and foreign diplomats. Now, it has scores of 
madrassas among which 30 are unregistered and illegally constructed.
43
 However, 
in big cities the presence of militants is not as visible and dominant compared to 
the border areas of Pakistan with Afghanistan, where they openly interfere in the 
economy and in social matters. Some relevant details about the border areas, 
which are the major initial and current abode of the Taliban and their allied 
militants, are given next.   
                                                          
42
 An ethnic population which is in the majority in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan: it 
also has a sizeable presence in Balochistan. 
43
 This number was provided by the interior minister, while answering a question in the parliament 
of Pakistan. Retrieved from http://www.dawn.com/news/1073802/islamabad-has-30-unregistered-
seminaries-na-told 
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3.4   Geography, Economic and Governance Structure:  
        Militant Dominated Areas 
The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is 2640 kilometres long; much of it 
is so remote and mountainous that it is virtually inaccessible. It consists of narrow 
valleys, desert plains and barren wastelands. Militants, not only the Taliban, but 
also from other countries find it safe to live and regroup in the border areas. The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-led International Security Assistance 
Forces (ISAF) directly intervened in Afghanistan, to dismantle Al Qaeda and 
remove the Taliban government from power, in early 2002. Subsequently, 
thousands of the Taliban fighters and their senior leadership Shura (religious 
council) found sanctuary in Pakistan‟s adjoining Federally Administrated Tribal 
Areas (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as well as in the Balochistan province (see 
Figure 3.2). The Pashtun ethnic group has an overwhelming majority in most of 
these areas of Pakistan (Johnson & Mason, 2007).  
 
Figure 3.2: Pakistan-Afghanistan Border and the Pashtun Majority  
                   Areas 
 
 
Source: Johnson and Mason, 2007 – p. 4 
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The region‟s trading routes and passes have connected Central and West Asia to 
South Asia for many millennia. The political and legal structure of the region 
started to assume its contemporary structure in the early nineteenth century, when 
the British East India Company was expanding toward northwest India. Pakistan 
and Afghanistan inherited their border (the Durand Line), and the complex 
governance structure of the border areas from the British Empire‟s Frontier 
Crimes Regulation (FCR).
44
  
3.4.1 Political and Economic Facts about FATA  
Constitutionally the President of Pakistan rules FATA through the governor of the 
province. The provincial government has complete responsibility for the 
development and provision of basic services like health and education. FATA has 
no representation in the provincial assembly. The real administrative authority in 
FATA is the political agent, a representative of the federal government. Rubin and 
Siddique (2006) note that the political agent has absolute powers ranging from 
revenue collection to the implementation of development schemes and the hearing 
of civil and criminal cases, and can award judgements and punishments, which 
have no right of appeal. In August 2011, the government of FATA introduced its 
first reforms in 100 years. These included extensions of the Political Parties Act in 
the area that allowed candidates to contest the elections on a party basis. Earlier 
they contested independently and could not join any mainstream political party. In 
addition, for the first time convicts were given the right to appeal. 
 
The economic situation in the border areas is worse than in other regions of 
Pakistan. The civil war in Afghanistan and now in Pakistan has spanned more 
than three decades and has transformed the economy of these areas. Once based 
on subsistence agriculture, the economy has turned to largely unregulated cross-
border trading of goods, including drugs and arms. The overall literacy rate of 
17% in the tribal region of Pakistan is the lowest, at 29.4% for men and about 3% 
for women. Only 102 colleges (equivalent to western high schools) exist in the 
area (Government of FATA, 2013). The strong religious leanings, limited 
available formal education opportunities and low income reinforce demand for 
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 Frontier Crimes Regulations were promulgated as statutory law under the British viceroy Lord 
Curzon in 1901. 
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enrolment in and growth of madrassas. Slightly more than 500 doctors operate in 
the area, a level of one doctor for more than 7,500 people: some areas do not have 
any kind of health infrastructure. Infant and maternal mortality rates are 
continuing to worsen (Yusufzai, 2008). Since 2001, health and education facilities 
have further deteriorated, doctors are not willing to work in the region, and 
schools remain consistent targets of the Taliban. The per capita annual income is 
half than that of the country‟s already low average of about US$2,400. No aid 
agencies or non-governmental organizations (NGO) can work in the region, as the 
legislative structure does not allow for this. Development indicators for the area 
are hard to estimate as coverage of national surveys is limited in the militant-
dominated region. The unemployment rate averages 60 to 80 percent (ANP, 
2008).  
 
The large influx of militants from Afghanistan eventually resulted in their gaining 
control of the region. Their control resulted in widespread assassinations, terrorist 
attacks, and severe fighting with government forces, which made the border areas 
more radicalised and troubled, and the population more vulnerable (Revill, 2007). 
The military attempted to regain control, but this only resulted in a lot of 
casualties, including civilians. The military later followed the policy of making 
„peace deals‟ with militants, but those deals did not last long. It was in FATA that, 
as Zaidi (2008) observes, Islamic militants strengthened themselves, re-organized 
and took fresh recruitments directly, and from the madrassas. This new militia of 
the Taliban under the influence of Al Qaeda includes militants of different 
nationalities. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Movement of the Pakistani Taliban) 
or TTP was formed in December 2007. It soon started spreading outside FATA.  
 
Figure 3.3 next shows the Taliban dominated and captured areas in early 2009. 
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Figure 3.3:  Map of Conflict Regions in Pakistan 
 
                  Source: bbc.co.uk from www.swatvalley.com.pk 
3.5   Swat Valley and the Taliban 
Swat was a renowned tourist-friendly northern mountainous region. By early 
2009, Swat was turned into a Sharia (the Islamic system of governance) state in 
Pakistan based on the Taliban‟s model of governance (Hiro, 2012). The district 
headquarters of Swat is Saidu Sharif, which lies 260 kilometres north of 
Islamabad. Mingora, the twin city of Saidu Sharif, is the biggest urban hub and 
centre for trading, social and cultural activities. The total area of Swat district is 
5,337 square kilometres and its estimated population in 2010 was 1.8 million. 
Around 15 percent of its population lives in urban areas, while the majority 85 
percent rural population is involved in agriculture (mostly orchard farming), 
mining, tourism-related activities and forestry (KP-Government, 2013). 
 
It was in early 2006 that news reports such as that of Hasan (2006) claimed that 
Al Qaeda and its leadership had established their operational headquarters either 
in Dir district or in upper Swat.
45
 In the following months the Tehrik-e-Nifaze 
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 Kumar (2007) writes that these news reports were published in both the American and Pakistani 
press.  
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Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM)
46
 meaning „the movement for enforcement of the 
law of Prophet Muhammad‟ started asserting its influence with multiple activities 
in the valley. TNSM remains a close ally of the TTP and includes its many trained 
fighters in their ranks, planning and operating jointly (Zaidi, 2008). Its leadership 
adopted a novel strategy for radical preaching. They utilized FM radio stations in 
inciting people to revolt against the current governance system, which they termed 
„un-Islamic,‟ and to establish an Islamic state. Up to 30 radio channels backed the 
jihadi teachings and anti-government ideas. The TNSM leadership had other goals 
to pursue than religious preaching, including gaining complete control of the 
district. They therefore started a campaign to wipe out dissent, alongside other 
militant activities, which included recruitment of local people and militant 
training. Their activities extended to armed attacks on business locations and 
blowing up infrastructure like power supplies, bridges, government offices, and 
female educational institutions (declaring them un-Islamic).  
 
Military forces repeatedly intervened to remove them and to restore order, but 
with no success. These military missions resulted in some agreements in which 
the government agreed to enforce sharia while the Taliban made commitments to 
conditions such as ending suicide bombings and attacks, and cooperating with 
efforts to restore peace and order in the region. However, these agreements did 
not last long, as the militants did not close their training centres, and activities 
including damage to lives, property and infrastructure continued.   
3.5.1 Background of the Taliban Occupation 
Swat has a history that dates back more than 2,000 years. Due to its location, it 
was a stopping point for many invaders of South Asia, coming from Central Asia. 
It was a centre of Buddhism in 8
th
 century. Modern Swat remained a princely 
state, which was recognized by the British in 1926. After the independence of 
Pakistan, it remained a part of Pakistan. However, its rulers, called Wali (heirs), 
had considerable autonomy. It was merged with Pakistan in 1969, and was then 
ruled under Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) regulations. In 1994 
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 TNSM was created in the early 1990s to implement Sharia. Following the 9/11 attacks its 
activities were banned in Pakistan. Its leadership, along with 5,000 to 10,000 fighters crossed into 
Afghanistan. Sheikh (2009) notes that they fought alongside the Taliban against the US-led 
coalition.  
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the supreme court of Pakistan declared the PATA regulations ultra vires to the 
constitution. This decision took powers from local influential landlords known as 
Khans, and thus created a legal and administrative vacuum, which government 
could not adequately fill with its own civil and legal structure.   
 
Figure 3.4: Swat District of Pakistan
 
Source: http://www.latimes.com 
 
 
PATA regulations were unable to deal with the changing social, political, and 
economic dialectics of the region. Hussain (2007) observes that these regulations 
were authoritative and favoured the local elite by totally ignoring the changing 
socio-economic structure of the society. Looking at the causes of the Taliban‟s 
occupation, Khan (2009) argues that society in Swat is visibly divided on an 
ethnic and class basis. There are political and social gaps between the landowners 
and the newly emerging middle class. Anthropologist Fredric Barth (1959) who 
studied the area for his Ph.D dissertation writes, “Swat is deeply divided between 
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elite groups and common people”.47 Many landless people in recent years 
migrated to other parts of the country or to the Middle East for better income, but 
even with increased incomes the social divisions and exclusion remained 
embedded in the system. In addition, complexities in legal disputes were 
aggravated by an inefficient judicial system. The judicial system overall in 
Pakistan is lethargic, particularly in civil matters. Provision of speedy justice 
(according to sharia) for civil and criminal matters was among the first slogans 
used by the TNSM. The Islamic movement promised to end the dominance of big 
landlords, and offered sharia law as an answer to public grievances and 
particularly as a speedy solution to land disputes.  
3.6   The Taliban’s Rule in Swat 
When TNSM began its militant presence in Swat, the provincial government was 
with JUI,
48
 which was a close ally of General Musharraf, the then ruling military 
dictator.  Revill (2007) notes that the leadership of the province remained fully 
sympathetic to the Taliban and their efforts to introduce their version of Islamic 
Shariah law in the region. From 2007 onwards, however, the federal government 
rejected many demands of the militants, such as TNSM‟s call for banning polio 
vaccination for children, which it considered un-Islamic. However, it was 
increasingly evident that the government‟s authority had weakened. The Taliban 
were succeeding in enforcing their rule in Swat district and adjoining areas. 
 
Khan (2009) identifies that the Taliban advanced by engineering a class revolt for 
the landless or small landholders, and for people seeking justice in a painfully 
slow justice system. The militants organized these people into armed groups that 
became their troops (Perlez & Shah, 2009). The Taliban initially pushed out a few 
big landlords in upper Swat (Matta area) and seized control of their lands.
49
 They 
targeted the uneducated in remote villages for recruitment, who were mostly 
                                                          
47
 Barth‟s (1959) thesis is titled „Political leadership among Swat Pathans.‟ Some excerpts from 
his thesis are referred to in a blog, How can Anthropology help us understand Swat and the 
Taliban, Retrieved from http://www.antropologi.info/blog/anthropology/2009/how-can-
anthropology-help-us-understand-swat-and-taliban 
48
 JUI was in tacit alliance with General Musharraf, not only at the provincial level but also at 
national level. It was the official opposition party to the Musharraf-backed ruling party but for its 
support at central level, it had full command and authority in KP province.  
49
 Known as Khans and are the most privileged landlords under the land settlement plans and 
PATA regulations in Swat.  
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unable to differentiate between the religious teachings of the Taliban and the 
militancy associated with the practical implementation of their version of Sharia 
(Farooq & Ziad, 2011). The slogans of quick justice and efficient Islamic 
governance initially got support from the people. In response to the leadership‟s 
calls for funds, people responded generously and even sold their belongings. 
Women sold their precious ornaments to fund construction and running of 
madrassas, and the Islamic movement of the Taliban (Khan, 2009). As the Taliban 
insurgency gained momentum, the movement became more radicalised. Women‟s 
education, music, movies and internet became taboo under the new open-ended 
sharia and leadership. They burned music and barber shops (cutting hair 
fashionably and shaving beards was termed un-Islamic). The Taliban later 
bombed or burnt female educational institutions. Hundreds of schools became 
their target and were destroyed. In their justice system, petty crimes like theft 
were awarded capital punishment. Political opponents, security personals, and 
independent journalists were killed and executed by beheading (the kind of 
execution otherwise only performed in Saudi Arabia). Taliban hanged the 
decapitated bodies in the main city centres (Torwali, 2009). In addition, the 
physical infrastructure was targeted; bridges, telecommunications, power supplies 
and government buildings were destroyed.  
 
Household economic activities and assets were much affected. Orchards, the key 
to Swat‟s agriculture, were damaged and houses suspected to have been serving as 
safe havens to opponents were demolished. Other than orchard farming, Swat‟s 
economy relies heavily on tourism, which came to a complete halt. Businesses 
related to tourism suffered severely, and this had implications for livelihoods. 
Many businesses such as hotels, restaurants and thousands of different kinds of 
shops were completely closed. During field visits and discussions for this study, I 
was informed that those who stayed in business not only had income losses, but 
jobs were curtailed, and wages decreased. The resulting civil war and 
displacement resulted in even more damage to household and local economies, 
and in negative repercussions for sustainable livelihoods. The quantitative 
description of such losses, based on field studies conducted in post-war Swat, is 
provided in later chapters. 
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As the initial promises of equity and justice failed to materialize, and the system 
the Taliban introduced received little recognition, they started losing public 
sympathy and support. Meanwhile, the government in Pakistan changed, through 
democratically held elections in February 2008. Shortly before the election, the 
Pakistan People‟s Party (PPP), which won the elections, lost its chairperson and 
twice elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, in a suicide and 
shooting attack in December 2007. Media across the country announced that the 
TTP had accepted responsibility for the attack. In May 2009, the army intervened, 
and a full-scale civil war started between the Taliban and the military forces. It 
resulted in the biggest internal displacement of the population in recent history. 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (2009) estimated that 
more than 140,000 families were displaced from Swat district.  
 
 After the civil war, the Taliban retreated and fled Swat. The district is now 
controlled by a civilian administration with active support from the military. This 
post-conflict era is the setting of my study into the livelihoods of conflict-affected 
households. Since there is now more stability and livelihood options may be 
expanding, studying livelihoods in this context is expected to make a useful 
contribution to the post-conflict literature.     
3.7   Post-War Swat  
The years of turbulence and later severe rains and floods in 2010 had a 
devastating impact on the physical infrastructure in Swat. During various visits by 
the author for the sake of this research, the first in October 2010, the renowned 
tourist resort of Swat was in a devastated condition. The signs of destruction were 
quite visible. The road network was severely damaged, and bridges that were a 
major physical and communication link between many towns were either partially 
damaged, or destroyed. The presence of more than 30,000 military troops had 
altered normal lives after even the retreat of the Taliban from Swat (Duparq, 
2011). Their presence was different from living in military cantonments. It was on 
the streets, and in markets, searching villages for the Taliban and sometimes in 
armed combat with suspected militants. Vigilant military check posts were present 
at the entry points of all towns. The military personnel questioned individuals 
crossing these borders, both pedestrians and those in vehicles, about their origin 
  
 
70 
  
and destination. This practice increased normal travelling time significantly. 
There were hardly any signs of normal life or activities after sunset. Such an 
environment in the longer term may not be very conducive for the revival of 
tourism and related businesses in Swat. The local people have clear ideas about 
this and they talked about the need for solutions, which exclude heavy military 
involvement in their daily lives. With these background facts, this thesis will, in 
Chapter Seven, concentrate on the possibilities for improvement in livelihoods in 
Swat, focussing on the largest pre-war economic sectors, agriculture and tourism.  
 
Military units have worked for the restoration of schools, and have built bridges 
and roads. The government finances the bulk of the reconstruction work, while 
some international donors have also contributed. During the author‟s discussions 
with locals some people acknowledged the military‟s post-war contribution, 
however they did not approve of their methods and expressed regret that military 
troops did not listen to people‟s viewpoints at checkpoints or during searches. 
There was a general complaint that military check points do not relax procedures 
even for travelling children or in medical emergencies. These steps may be 
essential from a security viewpoint, but are in contrast to the democratic freedom 
and rights which will be discussed in the last chapter of the thesis that sums up 
major conclusions.  
3.8   Conclusions 
The historical role of the Pakistan army has been questionable in upholding the 
Constitution and democratic institutions in the country. There are also logical 
questions about their involvement in nurturing religious extremism for getting 
direct or indirect institutional benefits at the cost of other realities and future 
directions. The extent of the strength and threat of the Taliban in Swat, however, 
could only be controlled by strong intervention by security forces and their 
commitment to sustain post-war peace. The post-war era has seen many public 
commitments by the army leadership to uphold democracy, and to the fight 
against the spreading threat of militancy and terrorism. That has so far taken more 
than 50,000 lives in Pakistan. It has shaken its developmental and economic 
priorities, created panic across the country and resulted in the loss of international 
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confidence and trust in the country‟s potential as a dynamic and progressive 
nation overall.  
 
Inside Swat, people have mixed reactions to the army‟s continued presence and 
activities. The perception as observed during the field visits is that it is far from a 
permanent solution to terrorism and militant thoughts. Further, it will not be 
tactically or financially possible to keep such a large field presence of troops over 
a long period. The presence of around 30,000 military personnel in the district has 
not been able to fully stop targeted incidents of terror and killing. October 2012‟s 
attack on schoolchild Malala Yousufzai
50
 and her schoolmates is one such 
example. By presenting a diary on the BBC‟s website, she became the voice of all 
the girls who wanted to be educated during the Taliban rule and afterwards. 
Malala became a symbol of a new generation‟s resistance to the Taliban‟s open-
ended sharia principles. She survived a struggle for her life after she was critically 
wounded when shot at point blank range on her way home from school. Other 
incidents of targeted attacks on members of Aman (peace) committees still take 
place in Swat.
51
  
 
While Swat now is in much better shape than it was in the recent past, the scars 
that the war has left require concentrated analysis, and practical reconstruction 
and rehabilitation of households and people. A household analysis of post-conflict 
effects on assets and post-war sustainable livelihood choices constitutes the later 
chapters of my thesis. In addition, my simulation modelling aims to find possible 
revival strategies for improving household livelihoods. The next chapter discusses 
the details of the field survey undertaken in Swat to collect data on conflict-
affected households. The subsequent chapters will analyse this data to obtain a 
deeper understating of these effects.  
  
                                                          
50
 She has been awarded Nobel Peace Prize for 2014, for her contributions for children‟s education 
(particularly female) not only in Swat, but throughout the world. 
51
 These committees have support from the government forces, to resist or help as much as they 
can against militants in their respective areas.  
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Chapter Four    
Survey Design and Field Research Instruments 
4.1   Introduction 
The remaining key research questions of this thesis focus on war-affected 
household livelihoods in Swat, Pakistan. These research questions focus on 
livelihoods and include descriptions of household asset portfolios, empirical 
investigation of the role of assets in forming post-conflict livelihoods and 
determination of what positive interventions in Swat‟s economy may enhance 
post-conflict livelihoods.  This analysis required collection of primary household 
data from Swat district. This chapter thus addresses the issues that relate to the 
field research conducted for household data collection in 2010 and 2011, in Swat 
district. It describes the significance of the household survey, which seeks 
quantitative and qualitative information, and also describes the direct benefits 
gained from primary household information. It discusses the design of the survey 
instrument for this study (the questionnaire) and its relevance to the remaining 
research questions of the thesis. Moreover, this chapter explains the selection of 
war-affected research sites in Swat. In addition, it describes field survey details, 
including the pilot study, and concludes with survey data entry, processing and 
quality control methods.  
Figure 4.1 summarises the methodological steps followed in the remainder of this 
thesis, based on the household survey information. Household survey data will be 
used to describe the livelihood attributes of sample households. Later this data 
will also help in grouping these households into clusters with similar features. 
Household clusters will be econometrically analysed to determine how different 
capitals (human, financial, physical, social and natural), affect the adoption of 
various post-conflict livelihood strategies in Swat. Cluster and econometric 
analysis will identify livelihood groups for the simulation modelling in Chapter 
Seven. The variables for the model will be based on the survey data and on 
relevant findings from the livelihood analysis. The dynamic simulation model will 
attempt to explore the interactions between capitals and inter-sectoral labour 
allocations depending upon profits per worker in the major sectors of Swat‟s 
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economy. The thesis will conclude with overall conclusions and policy 
suggestions.   
 
Figure 4.1- Household Survey Data from Swat: Links and Significance 
  
 
 
4.2   The Field Survey Approach  
The foundation of the field research undertaken, and of the research methods in 
the forthcoming analysis, lie in the sustainable livelihood framework (SLF) 
proposed by DFID (1999; 2000). The SLF refers to two main methods for 
exploring livelihoods; these include various participatory methods and sample 
surveys. Participatory methods have strengths in terms of gathering qualitative 
information, such as understanding the historical, social and environmental 
context of the livelihoods. The participatory approach consists of different 
methods including timelines, seasonal calendars, preference ranking, and wealth 
ranking. Sample surveys are useful particularly for the following reasons (DFID, 
2000): 
 
 
Thesis concludes with policy 
implications 
Simulation modelling 
for the labour 
allocations 
Household 
survey data 
from Swat 
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 These generate quantitative data on specific livelihood attributes (for 
household economic information, distribution of assets, livelihood 
strategies in a population and their outcomes over time, and access to 
services)  
 Sample surveys make measurements relatively more precise by making 
uniform definitions about the participants 
 Sample surveys are useful in describing the characteristics of large 
populations based on a small sample, and thus reduce costs and resource 
requirements impending 
 
The next key research goals for this thesis require an understanding of the 
quantitative post-conflict effects on household assets and livelihoods in Swat. 
Household sample surveys were best suited to obtaining the information needed to 
meet my research objectives. Surveys facilitate the gathering of detailed 
household livelihood information in both quantitative and qualitative terms. A 
variety of indicators of human capital can be assessed with surveys, including 
economic participation, educational attainment and health status.  These also help 
in getting data about natural assets, like land use, its degradation, forests, and the 
availability and use of water. Sample surveys are also a very effective method of 
assessing personal and household assets; items that enhance income, housing 
quality and available facilities are easier to evaluate. Access to productive 
physical capital, both private and public physical capital and personal 
consumption items (food and non-food) can also be easily identified in a survey. 
To gauge the availability of financial capital, its sources and usages, and 
individuals‟ savings behaviour, survey questions remain an effective source in 
gathering information from households. Income data may be influenced by the 
time of the year at which it is collected, particularly when the sample population 
is rural and relies on agricultural related income sources, which are usually 
seasonal. Consumption data is collected to enhance the reliability of income data 
and to make it more effective.  
Despite their strengths, sample surveys are sometimes regarded as costly and 
slow. Asking questions about intra-household issues can be sensitive. However, 
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such issues can be better managed when trust is established between the 
enumerators and members of the community (DFID, 2000).  
4.2.1 Income and Expenditure Survey-Based Research in Pakistan 
Income and expenditure household surveys are a typical practice worldwide to 
investigate various aspects of income and poverty. A number of research studies 
in Pakistan and in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (whose district is Swat), 
have been based on household survey data. This section briefly reviews some of 
these studies.  
A large-scale income and expenditure survey, the Household Integrated Economic 
Survey (HIES) has been conducted since 1963 at irregular intervals by Pakistan‟s 
Federal Bureau of Statistics. It provides data on household income, consumption 
expenditure and patterns at national/provincial level with urban and rural 
breakdowns. Various researchers have used this data to examine the income-
poverty relationship, and to understand their different dynamics. Naseem (1973) 
found that inequalities increased both in the Gini coefficients of expenditure as 
well as in income during 1971 and 1972. Burney and Khan (1991) examined 
household consumption patterns separately for rural and urban households. They 
observed that expenditure elasticity for different commodities varies with income; 
also behavioural differences exist in consumption patterns between urban and 
rural households. Haq (1998) used Sen‟s welfare index and observes that 
consumption increases without significant change in inequality among different 
income groups while disparities among groups are higher in non-food 
consumption expenditure. Studies like those of Kemal (1997) and Sayed and 
Sayyid (1999) observed poverty trends using data from HIES surveys over several 
years.  Using the same data source, detailed work was carried out by the Mahbub 
ul Haq Human Development Centre (MHHDC) (1999) on poverty in Pakistan. 
The centre created a new indicator based on lack of education, health and income 
(poverty of opportunity). It estimates that half of the country‟s population is poor 
while women are the most deprived in all indicators.  
To compare poverty with other data sources, Arif, Ali, Nasir and Arshad (1999) 
conducted a countrywide household survey under the project Micro Impacts of 
Macroeconomic Adjustment Policies (MIMAP). They generated data sets for 
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income and expenditure patterns, and for health, child mortality rates and 
nutritional status of the vulnerable population. About 1500 households, mostly 
rural, were surveyed for socio-economic characteristics including information 
about income, wages, assets, and household consumption.  
 
A recent study by Nasir, Tariq and Rehman (2011) conducted in four cities of the 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa analysed the impact of foreign remittances to households on 
the educational performance of their children. Shahbaz (2008) studied the 
meaning of vulnerability and risk in various contexts in the rural settings of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He concluded that inadequate and limited access to 
livelihood assets in that mountainous region increases the population‟s 
vulnerability and exposure to shocks and risks. Steimann (2005) did a 
comprehensive survey in 2004 to generate a database for rural households in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He gathered information about household rosters, 
availability of and access to different capitals, and the income and consumption 
patterns of households.  The survey also collected information about the 
experience of any crisis in the pre-survey year, and about the types of coping 
strategies used. Steimann (2005) concluded that though most people relied on 
agriculture-related activities, the per capita yield was very low and the income 
level of the people was the lowest compared to other parts of the country. Very 
poor infrastructure and the rough terrain further contributed to people‟s limited 
access to human, physical, social and financial assets.  
 
During the literature review, I found no econometric research focused on the 
livelihoods of conflict-affected households in Swat. The remaining research 
questions of this thesis seek to fill this significant gap. The answers to these 
research questions will contribute to the post-conflict livelihood literature, in 
particular to the affected regions in Swat. Details about the survey instrument and 
data collection are provided next.  
4.3   Questionnaire Design 
During the process of designing the questionnaire, I consulted different sources 
and investigated relevant formats. The useful guidelines in the detailed manual 
accompanying the World Bank‟s Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) 
  
 
77 
  
that describes planning and implementation of surveys by Grosh and Munoz 
(1996) were followed. The LSMS is recognized as a powerful tool for analysis of 
household economic decisions, welfare and the effects of economic and social 
policies on households. The structure of the Household Integrated Economic 
Survey, conducted by the government of Pakistan, was also reviewed. In framing 
the wording of the questions to be asked, the general format of the questionnaire 
used in a study on sustainable livelihoods in Vietnam by Tran and Lim (2011) was 
consulted. Most importantly the detailed guidelines provided for the SLF by 
DFID (1999; 2000; 2001) were followed.  Some of the studies which used similar 
kind of surveys in different settings were also consulted; these include Alwang, 
Jansen, Siegel & Pichon, (2005); Khan (2008); Lopez (2008); Sreedevi (2006); 
Steimann (2005); Tran & Lim (2011).   
The questionnaire for this research includes questions about demographics, 
income and expenditure patterns of the households. The questions also seek 
detailed information for the five core capitals (human, physical, financial, social 
and natural), which the households possess. The SLF regards sample surveys as a 
purposeful instrument to collect quantitative data for household asset distribution 
and activity profiles. Income data from different sources helps to construct an 
income portfolio. To mitigate the seasonal impact of agricultural income, details 
about food and non-food spending were included as suggested by DFID (2000, p. 
10).  
Besides information from the questionnaire, case studies (see Chapter One) were 
conducted to understand post-conflict effects on households. These studies 
complemented the questionnaires in getting information in a different way from 
the key informant interviews. The process involves asking semi-structured 
questions to collect a mixture of qualitative and quantitative details. The 
individuals and households represent different livelihood circumstances so that a 
wide range of experiences can be compared. DFID (2000) suggests that case 
studies broaden the understanding of how human, physical, social, financial and 
natural assets interact, and these interactions consequently formulate livelihood 
opportunities and strategies.  
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Questionnaire customization (some questions were specifically framed in the local 
context) was done, including taking care to consider the eldest household member 
as the household head, and dealing with reluctance to provide names of female 
household members (if shown). It was done by using a coding system, after 
careful consideration of local customs in the selected research areas. The pilot 
study (see details later in Section 4.6) held in late 2010 facilitated the above 
amendments and modifications. The questionnaire was then finalized. A 
description of its topics and major content coverage is given next.  
4.3.1 Questionnaire Content 
The questionnaire starts with a section on identity and other demographic 
variables for the household head and all other members. The remaining sections 
sought the following details:  
Livelihoods and Capitals  
a) Livelihood activities and human capital, its exclusion (gender specific) and 
questions about the valuation of human capital based on its returns 
b) Social capital, its trust and reach through horizontal and vertical linkages, 
and its role after the shock 
c) Natural capital and resources - degradation during the conflict (revival in 
the post conflict period) 
d) Physical private productive capital in the local context, also access to and 
availability of basic public services 
e) Financial capital, access to and availability of credit, including savings  
Income and Employment 
a) Household economic activities in the post-conflict period 
b) Livestock production as a complementary source of income 
c) Non-farm self-employment description 
d) Economic activities after the conflict period (disrupted or affected) 
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Expenditure 
a) Household expenditure - type and amount of food expenditure during the 
previous week (pre-survey period)  
b) Type, frequency and amount of  annual non-food household expenditure  
c) Educational expenses for each household member participating in 
education  
d) Health expenditure of household members 
e) Housing/Shelter-damage and reconstruction costs in the post-conflict 
period 
Vulnerability - Expectations 
a) Vulnerability context – response to risks and shocks  
 
The relevant information required for subsequent econometric analysis and 
simulation modelling, exploring the post-conflict effects on livelihood choices and 
opportunities was included in the questionnaire. The questionnaire content 
indicates that questions about the possession of capitals (human, social, natural, 
physical and financial) were included, and damage estimates in quantitative and 
qualitative terms were requested from the respondents. Market prices of various 
food crops, including horticultural products for agriculture-based households and 
other income-generating products, and output variations in the post-conflict era 
were collected. Data on land holdings were gathered and any recent diversion in 
expenditure patterns (food, education, health, housing etc.) in the post-conflict 
period was asked for. In addition, questions about coping practices and strategies 
during vulnerable periods were included.  
 
The questionnaire was translated from English to Urdu,
52
 Pakistan‟s national 
language, to assist the interviewers and respondents, who understood Urdu well. 
The survey was conducted in the five tehsils
53
 (Babozai, Barikot, Charbagh, 
Khwazakhela and Matta) of Swat district. The respondents were from rural, semi 
                                                          
52
 Translation of questionnaire was not merely linguistic, transcoding‟. It followed „equivalence of 
sense‟ in a triangular approach advanced by Garcia-Landa (1981). 
53
 In Pakistan, a tehsil is a small administrative unit, which is an entity of the local government. It 
is the second lowest tier and comprises various union councils making up towns and villages. 
Several tehsils make up a district.  
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urban and urban backgrounds; the same questions were administered to all 
households.  
4.3.2 Questions and their Linkages 
The following are a few examples of how the various questions interlink and 
provide information about income, livelihood assets, losses, and post-conflict 
household strategies.  
 
i. The questions relating to human capital give the researcher a clear idea 
about the household members‟ employment, or if they were not part of the 
labour force, then the reasons for unemployment. The questions about 
health and educational expenditure link human capital and household 
expenditure in the post-conflict period.  
ii. The status of the financial capital of a respondent provides information 
about the requirements for credit and saving behaviour. Its shortage will 
compel borrowing for various reasons. Questions about its availability and 
sources connect it to social capital. This information informs about the 
availability, quality, and quantity of financial and social capitals.  
iii. Questions about physical capital can provide links with income loss, and 
reduction in physical capital may lead to the adoption of low-return 
livelihood options.  
iv. Questions about coping strategies, estimated losses and time to recover 
from losses tell about households‟ possible substitution capabilities in the 
re-settlement environment.  
v. The section about access to markets and sources of information reveals the 
outcomes for various labour sectors including available information for 
change in labour allocations. This also asks about the constraints on better 
income-earning livelihood strategies.  
The above examples provide the aims of the survey instrument; the next section 
describes the study areas and the selection procedure used.  
4.4   Selection of Study Areas in Swat 
For ease of geographical understanding, Swat is commonly divided into two parts, 
lower and upper Swat. The lower part consists of two major urban centres. One is 
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Saidu Sharif, which hosts most of the public administrative structure and offices 
for law enforcement institutions, and the second is Mingora, the main trading and 
business centre. Upper Swat comprises areas like Matta, Khwazakhela, Bahrain 
and Charbagh which are the hub of agricultural and orchard farming, and have 
many attractive tourist destinations. It was the upper, mostly mountainous areas, 
which the Taliban initially occupied and undertook recruitment in, and from 
which they later spread horizontally to other parts of the district.
54
 Saidu Sharif 
and other lower Swat habitats were comparatively less affected during the 
conflict. However, there were frequent targeted attacks on various locations and 
houses. The most severe episodes of casualties and damage to houses, agricultural 
land and destruction of orchards during the civil war took place in upper Swat. 
Taliban occupation and the subsequent civil war resulted in up to 90 percent 
displacement of households in many areas.  
For the purpose of this study, as mentioned in the previous section, five out of 
seven tehsils of Swat were selected as research sites. The far northern Bahrain 
(which includes the famous tourist destination, Kalam) and the Kabal tehsil were 
excluded. The former is 60 kilometres from Mingora. Dilapidated roads, military 
check posts and unavailability of public transport after sunset makes it difficult for 
commuters to make one-day return trips. The latter, at the time this survey was 
conducted, was inaccessible and unsafe due to on-going targeted military 
operations and occasional combat.  
Among the research sites, at the shortest distance from Saidu Sharif is Mingora 
(two kilometres) and the farthest, Khwazakhela town, is 31 kilometres away in 
upper Swat. The damaged roads, military check posts, and mountainous heights 
made the travelling time many times greater than for the same distance on normal 
roads. The selection of five tehsils and respective study areas gave reasonable 
coverage for the survey within the Swat district, and identified diverse income and 
employment patterns. The vulnerability context and varying nature of the 
household responses could be difficult to understand without including sample 
households to cover a range of different geographic areas in these five tehsils.  
                                                          
54
 Details are in chapter three 
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Figure 4.2 provides a map presenting the geographical locations of the major 
towns. This map does not cover the seven recently constituted tehsils. Before the 
civil war, Swat consisted of two tehsils, Matta and Swat, which were increased 
later to seven, to decentralise the administrative set-up. Most available maps are 
for the two former tehsils.  
 
Table 4.1 provides basic details about the research locations. 
Figure 4.2:  Map of Swat District 
 
4.5   Units of Study and Sampling Frame 
In conformity with credible income and expenditure surveys all over the world 
and particularly in the North-Western region of Pakistan, a household was 
selected as the basic unit of analysis rather than an individual. However, within 
the households, data for all individuals and both genders were collected. Khan 
(2008) suggests that it clearly looks more logical to consider the household as the 
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basis of income and poverty-related studies, but for analytic purposes it is 
imperative to have data that relates to individuals within a particular household. 
Household members are fundamental units that take part in income generation and 
other activities, experience utility, and strive for its maximization.  
 
 
Table 4.1: Research Locations in Swat  
Tehsil Research 
Areas 
Semi 
urban/ 
Urban 
Areas 
Village 
 
Distance 
from 
Mingora 
Kilometres 
Percent 
of 
Sample 
Displacement 
during Civil 
War-  
Approximate 
percent  
Babozai Mingora Urban  0 31.2 60 
 Qambar Semi  
Urban 
 2  80 
 Shahdara Urban  1  90 
 Rahimabad Rural √ 1  90 
 Kokarai Rural √ 11  90 
Barikot Barikot   18  11.4 90 
 Ghalagai   15   90 
 Odigram   7   90 
Charbagh Charbagh Semi 
Urban 
 17 15.2 90 
 Gulibagh Rural √ 20  90 
 Allabad Rural √ 19  90 
Khwazakhela Khwazakhela Semi 
Urban 
 31 16 90 
 Baboo Rural  36  90 
Matta Matta Urban  22 26.2 95 
 Kharorai Semi  
Urban 
√ 20  95 
 Gowalarai Rural √ 23  95 
 Baidara Rural √ 24 Total 95 
 Bodigram Rural √ 26   100 95 
Source: Author‟s field survey in Swat (visits and group discussions) and Government of Pakistan‟s 
data 
The household, which is identical to the Pashtun concept of „kor‟ (meaning home 
in the local Pashtu language), is defined in this research (following SLF) as a 
group of people living together under a common roof. They use a common 
fireplace (kitchen) have meals together, and share income (contributing to the 
common household budget) and expenditure in that common place. 
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The Legal Dictionary defines the head of a household as “An individual in a 
family setting who provides actual support and maintenance to one or more 
individuals who are related to him or her through adoption, blood, or marriage”. 55  
In the context of Swat, the head of a household is the person whom other 
members and the community recognize as the main point of reference. Most often 
it is the eldest male member in a household in Swat. Otherwise, the eldest son is 
considered as the head, mainly for social and income earning purposes. Within a 
household, in the case that the eldest member is a female parent or guardian, she 
is considered as the final authority in most of the household‟s strategic decisions. 
It may not be necessary that the household head is working and providing 
maintenance and complete economic support to the family. It is a widely accepted 
family tradition that parents in old age usually live with their eldest son, forming a 
joint family structure, while the son is the bread winner of the household.       
4.5.1 Sampling Frame 
One important initial constraint in surveying the post-conflict area (Swat) was the 
author‟s complete lack of knowledge of Pashtu, without which particularly the 
rural people in Swat are unlikely to communicate with strangers. To overcome 
this, help was required in the local setting. It had to be managed with a limited 
budget for a comprehensive survey, in a challenging environment. 
 
The Environment Protection Society (EPS) is the biggest local operational Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGO) in the area. EPS operates in Swat district and 
also in adjoining areas, with a range of programmes. It works in collaboration 
with international organizations like the World Bank, the World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF) and ADB, in relief efforts for conflict-affected households, and for 
other programmes in pre-conflict period. The management of the EPS agreed to 
collaborate in administering the survey and in field data collection. It frequently 
uses household survey information for its pre, post or mid-programme 
evaluations. The survey frame it uses is based on the voting list prepared by the 
Election Commission of Pakistan for the national and provincial assembly 
elections of February 2008.  
                                                          
55
The definition is taken from the online Legal-Dictionary, Retrieved from http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Head+of+Household 
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 Casley and Lury (1987) observe that a common drawback during empirical 
research in developing areas is the accuracy of the lists prepared by public 
officials. They mention the following shortcomings in such documents: 
 
 Units which do not belong to the population are sometimes included (over-
coverage) 
 Units which belong to the population are excluded (under-coverage) 
 The same units are listed more than once  
However, as the elections in 2008 were held after a nine-year rule by a military 
dictator, there was intense interest and enthusiasm for enlistment and 
participation, so the compilation of the voters list was taken as the most accurate 
of the available documents. It was also the most recent available sampling frame 
information, as no household census had taken place in Pakistan since 1998. 
A multistage sampling design was used. In this sampling design, after an initial 
selection of five tehsils, two to six localities or villages were randomly selected 
depending upon the tehsil‟s population. Finally, households were randomly 
selected for interviewing.  This created a sample as Deaton (1997, p. 10) suggests, 
in which sample households are geographically grouped (tehsil-wise in Swat), 
instead of being randomly distributed over space.  
 
The enumerators were given a list of EPS partner households in the selected urban 
areas and villages in each tehsil and they initially approached those households for 
a positive start and to build the local community‟s trust in the research and 
eliminate any apprehensions they might have had about the survey. This initial 
confidence-building approach, though time consuming, gave this survey an 
advantage in that that the rate of refusal to participate in the survey was less than 
two percent. In areas where there were no EPS partner households; selection of 
units was made after discussion with the locals. This happened in a few remote 
areas of Khwazakhela and rural Matta. Very remote and scattered rural dwellings 
were excluded as access was difficult and involved much travelling, which was 
impractical in terms of both time and money. The percentage of households 
interviewed in five tehsils, Barikot, Babozai, Charbagh, Khwazakhela and Matta, 
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was in approximate proportion to the population of each tehsil (Table 4.1). For 
example, the most populous tehsil is Babozai
56
 and more than 31 percent of the 
sample households were interviewed there. It is to be noted that any updated 
population data for the tehsils, particularly after the huge displacements, was 
unavailable. The proportional representation in the sample was adjusted after field 
discussions and in conformity with the available sample frame.   
4.6   Training of Enumerators and Pilot Study 
Five enumerators were hired locally, who had working experience both with 
NGOs and in conducting household surveys in the region. They were trained for 
two days at the premises of EPS in the basics of the SLF and on the importance of 
quantifying poverty with an asset-based approach. The questionnaire and its 
contents were thoroughly explained, and the trainees gave some useful 
suggestions to make it more relevant in the local context. Enumerators were 
further instructed in sound interviewing techniques. They were informed about the 
content and use of the participation consent form, the nature of the study and 
about the rights of the respondents.  
It was communicated to them that the following steps were to be followed once 
participation was confirmed: 
a) Arrange a pre-interview appointment, and record it in a notebook. It is not 
good to miss an arranged appointment. 
b) A private and quiet place increases the probability that respondents will 
provide the most honest answers. 
c) Brief explanation of the survey is very important; it helps in confidence 
building and getting the best possible answers, that will help the researcher 
to better understand the income, asset poverty and post-conflict effects. 
d) Questions should be asked exactly the way they are written. This makes all 
interpretation easier.  
e) It is a voluntary service for the respondents, so politeness and respect must 
be maintained. 
f) The interviewer must wait until respondents complete their answers. 
                                                          
56
 It includes the populous areas like Mingora, Saidu Sharif, Qambar and Shahdra, which are urban 
and semi urban. These areas were also the centre of Taliban activity during their occupation.  
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g) When answering is lengthy or unclear, ask again in slightly different 
words. 
h) If the interview is refused or left incomplete, simply try the next 
appointment. 
The research conformed with the University of Waikato Human Research Ethics 
Regulations and was approved by the Ethics Committee of Waikato Management 
School.  
The training session was followed by a pilot study in November 2010. A random 
pilot study of 50 households in Swat was conducted to investigate the 
practicability of the questionnaire in Mingora and other areas including Islampur, 
Qambar, Ghalegai, Khwazakhela and Matta. Following the suggestion of Glewwe 
(2005), the pilot study was conducted in both urban and rural areas. The 
successful completion of the pilot study made us very optimistic about conducting 
the complete survey. It provided useful insight and feedback about the survey 
questions; the wording of a few questions was modified
57
 and the household head 
(as discussed earlier) was redefined in the local cultural context.  
The enumerators initially did two interviews per day in different localities; this 
familiarized them with the questions and the content. Each interview took 
approximately two hours to complete. The respondents‟ willingness to participate 
was encouraging. The interviewing team members were locals, knew Pashtu and 
were familiar with local customs and culture. The enumerators had no language 
barrier and that facilitated gaining the instant confidence of the respondents and 
helped in explaining the questions in the local language (if required). As 
mentioned earlier the listing of EPS partner households was vital to getting the 
excellent response rate achieved. Participation in the survey was voluntary, but 
the refusal rate was less than two percent. One apparent reason for the motivation 
to participate was the relevance of the introduction and questions to the most 
critical experiences in the lives of the affected populace. The full survey was 
completed in October, 2011. In total 304 households were approached during the 
survey, which resulted in 296 completed questionnaires.    
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 For example, instead of acres, the locally used unit of land, the jareeb, was included.  
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4.7   Data Management and the Quality Control 
The collected field data were tabulated using Microsoft Excel spread sheets. The 
data were carefully checked for typographic, transcription and other errors. In 
addition to quality control performed during the data collection stage, the 
following checks were performed in the data editing phase. Procedures suggested 
by Munoz (2005) were followed.  
Range checks: It was ensured that the data contained values within the domain of 
valid values. For example the answer to a question, if it contained multiple 
numbers as answers, was one of the given numbers.  
Consistency checks: It was carefully checked that answers in different sections 
were consistent with the household description and with other external references. 
For example, informal education, particularly in madrassas, is free of cost. Hence, 
if a respondent had reported a madrassa as regular educational expense in his/her 
household, this was excluded from the total expenses of the household. In some 
cases, households reported electricity consumption despite the fact that they did 
not have electricity connections, in the section on availability of public goods and 
assets. Such responses were cross-checked with information from other surveys to 
determine whether or not the particular area had an electricity supply.    
Skip checks: During the data entry phase, I verified that skip patterns were 
followed appropriately for different questions. For example, if a child less than 
four years of age was reported as being enrolled in a school, since it was unusual 
in the local context for a child of that age to be attending school, it was dropped 
from the list of members getting education.
58
 Similarly, in sections about social 
capital, some respondents had reported that they had not received help from 
anyone; however, in the section where they were asked if they had received 
financial credit, they reported in the affirmative. The answer was accordingly 
made consistent in the social capital section.   
Yansaneh (2005) advises that if observations for some variables concentrated in a 
small number of households do not appear credible, then those should be dropped. 
Some households reported high consumption yet low income sources if other 
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 Urban centres having more schools, some parents may send very young children to school, but 
in remote areas it is not the tradition. 
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sources like credit or selling of assets were not reported. These households were 
thus dropped for the analysis stage. Similarly, farm production and income of 
some households were not consistent with the reported land holdings. Other 
plausible missing values in data were imputed with nearest neighbour methods, 
which consider a „best guess‟ for a response when none is available (Yansaneh, 
2005). In total, 21 questionnaires were excluded from the analysis stage.  
There was a successful outcome (complete and usable data) for 275 households 
consisting of 2,288 persons in the conflict-affected population.      
4.8   Conclusions 
The household data from 275 affected households in Swat covers the asset 
portfolio, income and consumption (including food and non-food) and 
expenditure on health and education. Other than the recorded data, the visits and 
interactions with various people in Swat provided useful first-hand information 
that would be helpful in explaining key research findings in later parts of the 
thesis. This survey was conducted in remote, conflict-affected areas with damaged 
physical infrastructure, where the local economy was still struggling to revive and 
people were vying to pursue their pre-conflict livelihood patterns. It was a 
difficult environment for this study, and budget constraints made the task even 
more difficult. Except for some financing from the Department of Economics at 
The University of Waikato, the rest was self-financed. However, the remarkable 
cooperation of the EPS management and its staff was an asset in the successful 
completion of this initially difficult-seeming task. Enumerators travelled to distant 
places on dilapidated roads and used unreliable transport networks. Sometimes 
they walked up to three kilometres in mountainous locations to reach a particular 
place. The motivation of all team members was a significant factor in the 
successful completion of the fieldwork.  
The next chapter presents key survey findings and explains the demographic 
characteristics of the households and their asset distribution in Swat.  
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Chapter Five 
Description of Households and Assets in Swat  
5.1   Introduction  
This chapter provides descriptions of livelihood assets alongside the results 
obtained from the background statistical analyses of the household field survey 
information. The descriptive statistical analysis includes aspects of household 
demographics and patterns of possession of the various capitals (human, financial, 
social, physical, and natural). These assets help households to pursue various 
livelihood strategies. This chapter also includes analysis of the different sources of 
income, savings, and expenditure patterns (food and non-food), including 
expenditure for education and health in Swat. The detailed picture of post-conflict 
household livelihood assets presented in this chapter thus addresses the second 
research aim of the thesis that investigates the various forms of post-conflict 
livelihood assets in Swat. The answer to this research question provides insights 
for the later econometric and simulation analysis. For instance, the summarized 
results of the household assets portfolio facilitate the choice of parameters for the 
livelihood analysis in the following chapter, which uses cluster analysis 
techniques to investigate the role of assets in making post-conflict livelihood 
choices. Results such as educational attainment and its pattern in the context of 
Swat support the selection of the relevant covariates for human capital in the 
livelihood analysis.  
 
In addition, the findings from the statistical analysis of the survey data support the 
background discussion, selection of parameters and different assumptions for the 
simulation modelling described in a later chapter. Reasons for unemployment, the 
extent of damage to and loss of physical capital, both public and private, and 
findings about financial capital, particularly savings and credit, are significant in 
modelling the labour allocations in Chapter Seven. Finally, the results and 
conclusions from this chapter help in understanding the coping strategies of 
households, particularly in the one-year period following the conflict.  
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5.2   Household Demographics and Human Capital 
The sustainable livelihood literature often notes that the chief asset possessed by 
the economically deprived is their labour (DFID, 1999; Ellis, 2000; Scoones 
1998). Human capital in a broader sense encompasses the skills, knowledge, 
ability to labour, and good health that in combination enable people to pursue 
livelihood options and achieve their livelihood objectives. At a household level, 
human capital varies according to the household‟s size and skill levels. Scoones 
(1998) observes that human capital is a crucial factor for successfully adopting 
and pursuing different livelihood strategies. DFID (1999) regards human capital 
as a livelihood asset that is a building block in achieving different livelihood 
outcomes.  
Table 5.1 next, explains basic characteristics about the surveyed households, such 
as the age of household heads and mean household numbers in Swat. The mean 
age of the household head was 52.5 years. The average household size was 8.3 
persons. This was higher than the average household size of 6.8 in Pakistan, as 
determined in the last national census of 1998. The same source cites average 
household size in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as 8.0, which is quite close to the findings 
of this study for the Swat district. No national population census has taken place 
since 1998 in Pakistan. Therefore, any comparison of surveyed household 
demographics with current official documents is difficult.  
Households are categorized in terms of size, gender, age and educational 
attainment in Table 5.1, which indicates that 41.1 percent of households were 
larger than the mean value. This demographic characteristic is significant: joint 
family systems and very early marriages, particularly of females, are common 
social and cultural practices in Swat district. Moreover, having many children, 
particularly male, is considered economically advantageous for the future. This 
results in larger household sizes. During the survey, few female members were 
observed to be part of the active labour force. This could lead to an increased 
dependency burden,
59
 and decreases in per capita food and non-food consumption. 
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 It is explained as ratio of the young and old not in the active labour force (the dependent part) to 
those typically in the labour force (the productive part). Further, it is used to measure the economic 
pressure on the productive part. Wikipedia. Retrieved from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependency_ratio 
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Studying sustainable development in remote areas of Honduras, Jansen, Pender, 
Damon, Wielmaker and Schipper (2006) observe that household size and the 
dependency ratio had a negative direct effect on income per capita. Households 
having more dependents and larger families are likely to exhibit reduced income 
per capita and thus reduced consumption.  
Age is divided into four categories in Table 5.1. Young people from 0 to 15 years 
formed 32.9 percent of household composition, while the age group 16 to 24 years 
constituted another 24.6 percent of the population. This age group, as mentioned 
by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), is potentially the most likely to be recruited as 
fighters in militant organisations. In contrast, these household members could also 
be active workers in the labour market rather than fighters. The choices made may 
depend upon the wages or profits received, as discussed later in Chapter Seven. 
The third age group encompassing adults in the range 25 to 60 years had the 
highest representation in the population, 899 people and 39.3 percent of the 
population. This is economically the most active age group in the public and 
private sectors of Pakistan. In Pakistan, 60 years is the upper age limit for public 
sector jobs, and is the age of retirement. People older than 60 years represented a 
low proportion (3.2 percent) of the sample population. It is pertinent to mention 
here that overall life expectancy at birth is about 66 years in Pakistan (HDR, 
2013). Lack of adequate public health infrastructure, the high cost of private 
medical care, the declining percentage of public expenditure on health,
60
 and low 
incomes affecting food consumption are the factors that explain this low 
percentage presence of people older than 60 years.  
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 Pakistan‟s public expenditure on health is less than 1 percent (0.8 percent) of GDP (HDR, 
2013). The same source reports that the population below the income poverty line of $1.25 per day 
is about 23 percent. 
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Table 5.1 Household Demographics – Age, Household Size, Education and 
                  Gender in Swat 
 Mean Minimum  Maximum Std. 
Dev. 
Obs.  
Age of household 
head (years) 
52.5 25 90 12.9 275  
No of household 
members 
8.3 3 16 2.8 275  
 
Structure and Composition of Household Frequency Percent 
   
Households with 8 or fewer members 162 58.9 
Households with 8 to 16 members 113 41.1 
 
Total 275 100 
Female HH members 1053 46.02 
Male HH Members 1235 53.98 
Total 2288 100 
Age Composition (Years) 
 
  
0 to 15 753 32.9 
 
16 to 24 563 24.6 
 
25 to 60 899 39.3 
 
> 60 73   3.2 
 
Total 2288  100 
Educational Features 
 
Household heads who cannot read or write 
 
 
180
+
 
 
 
65.4 
Household members who can read or write only 1622 71.5 
Household members who cannot read or write 648 28.6 
Education 1 to 5 years (Primary) 520 22.9 
 
Education 6 to 12 years (Secondary) 
 
756 
 
33.3 
 
College/University and Technical Training 
 
298 
 
13.1 
 
Madrassa – Religious seminaries 
 
180 
   
7.9 
 
Other – Unspecified 
   
 4 
  
0.1 
Total 2269*  100 
*n = 2269 and + denotes 180 household heads are from 275 households 
Source: The author‟s survey data, 2010-11 
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About 65 percent of household heads could not read or write, but among all 
household members the basic literacy percentage was higher (71.5 percent). 
Despite the relatively high percentage of basic literacy, only about 13 percent of 
household members attained an education higher than secondary level, or any 
technical training. Another aspect of educational status is that about eight percent 
of family members were enrolled in madrassas, where they received religious 
education only.  
5.2.1 Reasons for Not Being Employed 
The total number of household members aged from 16 to 60 years was 1460. 
Among these, 510 or 34.9 percent were part of the active labour force one year 
after the conflict. The one-year period covered by the survey starts when 
displaced people had mostly returned to Swat, by around the end of 2009. The 
number of employed indicates that around two household members on average 
were actively employed among the surveyed households. One significant expected 
finding was that among the female members aged 16 to 60, which represented 29 
percent of the population, 93 percent of the females were full-time involved in 
household work, or stayed at home. Figure 5.1 provides the classification of all 
members (male and female) who were involved in activities other than being part 
of the active labour force; it includes their particular reported reasons for not 
joining the job market. Household members who could not find jobs included 
those who had skills and education but for whom relevant job openings were low, 
while members who lacked skills were not getting any kind of employment in the 
post-conflict labour market.  
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       Figure 5.1: Reasons for not Joining Job Market in Swat (numbers) 
 
         
         Source: Field survey in Swat 
 
5.2.2 Exclusion and Valuation of Human Capital 
The Taliban, from the very beginning, opposed female education and the 
operation of girls‟ schools, particularly at primary level in Swat. They considered 
this un-Islamic. In Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which are the current 
arena of on-going civil war; incidents of burning or blowing up of educational 
institutions, specifically girls‟ schools, are still common. Such actions aim to 
exclude girls from educational facilities and the opportunities which education can 
create for them. In 2009, the Taliban banned girls from going to school in Swat 
and gave their parents deadlines to withdraw their daughters from schools. Most 
parents followed the orders from the militants (Shahid, 2011). 
Considering this background, the survey questions also sought opinions from the 
respondents regarding the available educational infrastructure, and their views 
about girls receiving formal school education. Figure 5.2 explains the qualitative 
responses for the available educational facilities for girls. Figures 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 
indicate the perceptions of the population about formal female education, and 
their attainment in schools besides religious learning.  
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Figure 5.2: Are there educational opportunities like schools for girls available 
         in your area?  
                
 
 
Figure 5.2.1: Do you believe that girls must get a school education? 
            
 
 
 
 
Yes  
 87% 
No 
7% 
Few 
6% 
 Do not 
know 
0% 
Yes
No
Few
Do not know
Yes 
 86% 
3% 
11% 
0% 
Yes
No
Very basic
Do not know
  
 
97 
  
 5.2.2: Alongside religious education, should girls get formal education    
in schools? 
             
 
An overwhelming 87 percent of households responded positively about the 
adequate availability of educational opportunities, like schools for girls in post-
conflict Swat.
61
Similarly, 86 percent believed that girls should get a formal school 
education. The number was higher (97 percent) where they were asked about the 
household‟s view on whether girls, in addition to religious education, should get 
formal education in schools.
62
 These findings about not believing in any gender 
bias in education are different to some perceptions (initially reported by media, 
quoting political
63
 and religious leaders favouring the Taliban) that the social 
views of the Taliban had local public support. Participation of girls or women in 
education and economic activities was what the Taliban denounced most by the 
violent means. In total 710 schools were destroyed in KP province, and 600,000 
children missed one or more years of schooling, because of militancy and 
                                                          
61
 All educational institutions though were not functional in post-conflict period as hundreds were 
destroyed by the Taliban 
62
 However, few female members pursue higher education, as evident from Figure 5.1. Most 
women do household work, instead of being part of the educational system and employment 
opportunities.  
63
 For example, Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaff‟s (PTI, the Movement for Justice in Pakistan) chairman 
Imran Khan, whose party currently heads the provincial coalition government in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, supported the Taliban‟s sharia governance. Retrieved from 
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x15joc5_imran-khan-supported-taliban-s-sharia-law-in-sharia-
law-in-swat-valley-pakistan_lifestyle  
Yes  
97% 
0% 
3% 
0% 
Yes
No
Very basic
Do not know
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displacement in the province. In Swat district alone, 121 schools were completely 
destroyed and 280 schools were partially damaged (SPARC, 2011).  
The survey findings reveal that people in Swat think differently from the 
Taliban‟s views about education. Swat has historically been a very 
accommodating and religiously moderate area, where people of different sects and 
religions lived in harmony. Ahmed (2009)
64
 remarked that the Wali of Swat 
introduced compulsory education for boys and girls in the 1950s. He also invited 
Catholic nuns to open a girls‟ school in Swat. Buddhist civilization had 
considerable input in Swat, starting in the 2nd century B.C. The region‟s peace 
and tranquillity brought them there. The magnificent statue of Buddha at the 
entrance of Swat (destroyed by the Taliban), symbolised the peaceful spirit of the 
state and its rulers.  
Table 5.2 is based on answers about the significance of education and human 
capital to better living standards in Swat. Ninety four percent of the respondents 
believed in the positive relationship between education and better living 
standards. The proportions of those who reported adequate availability of jobs for 
the educated, and those who did not, or had another opinion, were quite similar 
(49 and 51 percent). This finding might imply that some educated household 
members are working in jobs for which they are over-qualified from an 
educational perspective, are underpaid or are helping in household activities as 
suggested in the earlier sub-section 5.2. Moreover, a sizeable 66.1 percent of 
households stated there were better employment opportunities with better 
education and improved skills. These results about employment were relevant and 
worthwhile for modelling labour allocations and subsequent inter-sectoral labour 
movements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64
 Akbar Ahmed, an anthropologist, talks in an interview about his PhD thesis completed in 1976 
titled: Millennium and charisma among Pathans: A critical essay in social anthropology. Retrieved 
from http://www.antropologi.info/blog/anthropology/2009/how-can-anthropology-help-us-
understand-swat-and-taliban 
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Table 5.2: Valuation of Human Capital 
                        Percentage  
 Yes No Not 
sure 
Do not 
know 
Does education help households to live an 
economically better life? 
93.8 0.36 4.3 1.4 
 
Do educated household members have opportunities 
to get jobs?  
 
 
49 
 
22.1 
 
24.7 
 
4 
Do those household members who have better 
education/skills get better jobs? 
66.1 8.7 19.6 5.4 
     
Source: Author‟s field Survey sin Swat-2010-11 
5.3   Social Capital 
Social capital is the social resources upon which people rely in pursuit of their 
livelihood objectives. These are developed through connections, either vertical 
(patron/client)
65
 or horizontal (between individuals with shared interests). These 
resources are further developed within different formalised memberships and 
relationships of trust that facilitate co-operation, which may provide the basis of 
informal safety nets (DFID, 1999). These relationships have positive impacts as 
DFID (1999) explains: through networks and connectedness, people increase trust 
and their ability to co-operate. This extends their access to other institutions. One 
of the economic functions of social capital is to decrease the transaction costs 
associated with formal mechanisms like contracts, hierarchies and bureaucratic 
set-ups (Fukuyama, 2000). Consequently, it enhances performance in economic 
relationships and can improve people‟s income and savings. Social capital can at 
best be scaled and described in broad qualitative terms. Ellis (2000) observes that 
most of the mutual benefits from social capital are hidden in human relationships 
and linkages. These can be discovered only by detailed anthropological research 
or their significance emerges only at times of some livelihood crisis, or during 
external shocks. The qualitative assessment of social capital and relationships for 
households in Swat is presented next. 
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 It is mutual relationship between an individual who has authority, better social status, wealth or 
some other personal resource (the patron) and another person who benefits from his/her support or 
influence (the client). Retrieved from 
http://www.webref.org/anthropology/p/patron_client_relationship.htm 
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In Swat, associations with more formal groups and organizations as categorized in 
Figure 5.3 are in agreement with observed behaviours, and as found during the 
course of field discussions. Formal groups and associations regarded as 
affiliations with different social and economic organizations, like trade unions, 
government sponsored organisations, clubs or associations, have a low percentage 
presence in Swat. The highest percentage association among relatively organised 
associations was with the political parties. About 47 percent of households 
reported having at least one member associated with a political party. Usually, 
political parties do not have very formalized partnerships with their members in 
Swat. The exceptions are the religion-orientated political parties, which are 
comparatively better organized, and keep closer relationships with their members. 
The survey also asked for associations with groups in the local context, such as 
mosques and street committees. Households who reported such associations had 
response percentages of about 20 and 7 percent respectively. These group 
formations mostly remain initiatives of the community, and usually participation 
in these is regarded as a duty to the community.  
 
Figure 5.4 reports the benefits that households perceived and associated with 
formal group membership. Answering the query about changes in the post- and 
pre-conflict intensity of and participation in social associations, 10 percent of the 
respondents said it had increased over the last 3 to 4 years, for 58.7 percent it had 
remained unchanged, while 31 percent expressed a decrease in their formal social 
connectedness compared to past years. Conflict and displacement in Swat affect 
associations, economic structure, and weaken existing social bonds and linkages 
in the affected areas.  
 
Other groups associations are mostly casual, but the strongest associations remain 
with family, networks of friends, and neighbours. These associations are mostly 
informal (except family, others are loosely structured), but are more deeply 
interlinked than any other network structure. 
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  Source: Field survey in Swat 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Benefits of Formal Group Memberships in Swat (percentage of 
households) 
 Source: Field survey data 
 
 
The survey questions for this section assessed the reliance on and trust in 
horizontal linkages during a household crisis, and further specifically asked about 
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such reliance during a financial crisis. The response percentages are given in 
Table 5.3. Among the sample population, there was a high expression of trust and 
confidence in horizontal linkages, which include family, friends, relatives, and 
neighbours. More than 66.5 percent expressed trust in many people for possible 
help during a household crisis. When asked about financial help, 43 percent 
answered that many people beyond the household could be asked for financial 
assistance. 
Table 5.3:  Social Capital: Horizontal Linkages in Swat 
Linkages and perceptions                   Percentage  
 
Trust and Help No one 1 or 2 3 or 4 Many 
people 
 
How many people are around, whom  
you trust in private matters, and can ask 
for help in a household crisis? 
 
2.1 
 
9.4 
 
21.8 
 
66.5 
 
 
Financial Help 
How many people beyond the household, 
can you ask for financial assistance in a 
crisis? 
4.3 23.2 29.4 43  
 
 
Table 5.4: Household Perception of Various Past and Present Inequalities 
                    (percentage) 
 
Horizontal Inequality (1 – 5 scale) None Some 
extent 
Neither 
less nor 
greater 
Great 
extent 
Huge 
presence  
 
Inequalities on the basis of income, social 
status, and ethnic or linguistic 
backgrounds exist in almost every area. 
To what extent are these present in your 
village/community?  
 
23.2 29.8 14.1 15.2 17.4 
Changes  in perception about  
inequalities 
Increased        Decreased                  No change 
 
Compared to 3 or 4 years ago, How would 
you rate various inequalities (including 
income) now? 
 
7.7                    49.4                               43 
  
*All 275 households responded to this section 
 Source: Field survey in Swat 
 
Table 5.4 provides percentage expressions of existing or past inequalities in 
various spheres (economic, social, ethnic and linguistic), which could be possible 
barriers to stronger mutual relationships. Around 33 percent expressed the 
  
 
103 
  
presence or existence of various inequalities among people in their everyday lives, 
to a large or very large extent. However, in response to another question, 43 
percent felt no change in various inequalities over the years. When asked about 
any increase now, 7.7 percent of respondents responded in the affirmative, while 
almost 50 percent reported a decrease in inequalities and poverty. This 
information is used in Chapter Seven in describing „push factors‟ to join the 
militants. People, who perceive poverty and inequality now, were almost having 
similar percentage than people who think otherwise. Some of the factors like 
financial with resumption of some economic activities (and even ideological), 
motivation for recruitment may have decreased after experiencing militant sharia 
governance practices.   
5.4   Natural Capital 
DFID (1999) regards natural capital as the natural resource stocks which are 
useful for livelihoods. Some of these include land, water, forests, marine 
resources, and air quality. Ellis (2000) noted that natural capital is not static, and 
is enhanced when it is under creative human control, resulting in increased 
productivity. However, conflict situations have negative effects, from the first 
fundamental shock to the people, to losses of natural capital. The greed hypothesis 
of Collier and Hoeffler (2002; 2004), in studies probing causes of conflicts, 
66
cites 
plunder of natural resources and capital as an important motivation to rebel and 
for subsequent violent conflict. 
 
Table 5.5 looks at some dimensions of natural capital in post-war Swat. It 
explains that for irrigation, more than 72 percent of households relied on canal 
water that originates from the River Swat. The civil war seriously contaminated 
the water as a result of heavy shelling and explosive materials. During field visits, 
local people told the author about several instances where bodies were found in 
river and canals. These factors and others such as closure of canals decreased the 
water supply substantially. This decrease was reported by 84.2 percent of the 
households interviewed. The war damaged crops: new crops could not be sown, 
orchards left unattended during the war and resulting displacement were 
immensely affected, and yields were severely reduced. More than 96 percent of 
                                                          
66
 See more details in Chapter Two 
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the population involved in agriculture reported losses in yields and production 
resulting from conflict. This finding valuably informs understanding of 
agricultural income losses and the livelihood strategy analysis that compares 
agriculture with other livelihood strategies in Chapter Six. Moreover, 89 percent 
reported that they did not receive any government assistance or contribution 
towards the revival of agriculture. Regarding job losses, 16 households reported 
job losses in forest-related activities, and 11 of these had not found jobs at the 
time of the survey.  
 
Table 5.5: Natural Capital, Resources and Post-Conflict Effects 
    
Type of water used for agriculture Frequency Percentage  
Canal water 138 72.3  
Rain water only  36 18.8  
Tube well  7 3.7  
Spring water  10 5.2 
 
 
Is available water sufficient for irrigation Sufficient Not 
sufficient 
Barely 
sufficient 
 51 % 54.4 % 14.6 % 
 
Irrigation water during and after 
conflict 
      
No change 
 
Increased 
 
Decreased 
 
Was your water supply affected during the 
conflict? 
 
11.7 % 
 
4.1 % 
 
84.2 % 
 
How is the water supply now for irrigation? 63.7 % 11.1 % 25.1 % 
 
Production/output and conflict    
 
Was your agriculture production affected due 
to the conflict and civil war?  
 
3.5 % 
 
0 % 
 
96.5 % 
 
Post Conflict Agricultural Expense and 
Support 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
Do you apply more fertilizers and spend 
more money on other inputs now? 
 
 
95.9 % 
 
4.1 % 
 
Any support received from the government to 
increase yield and agricultural production in 
recent years? 
10.9 % 89.1 %  
Source: Field survey in Swat 
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5.5   Physical Capital 
Physical assets comprise the basic infrastructure and producer goods that help to 
support livelihoods (DFID, 1999). Infrastructure consists of changes in the 
physical environments that help people to meet their needs and be more 
productive. It includes roads, telecommunications, irrigation systems and rail 
networks. In economic terms, physical capital is regarded as a „producer good‟ in 
contrast to a „consumer good.‟ Ellis (2000) differentiates between these two types 
of goods. The latter is purchased or consumed for its direct effect on material 
standards of livelihood, whereas a producer good is purchased and utilized for 
creation of output, and these goods harmonize the future flow of output. For 
example in Swat, consumer goods can be food and non-food items for household 
use, while producer goods in agriculture are tools, any machinery, or equipment 
useful for production processes.  
Physical assets in this research are assessed via two dimensions, one of which is 
private assets, which help to increase household farm and non-farm productivity. 
Such assets include affordable transport, secure housing, better sanitary 
conditions, economical energy sources, and access to information. Secondly, 
assets and goods are included that are part of the public infrastructure and provide 
basic utilities and services. These may reduce the cost and time involved in using 
traditional consumption items, and are useful in increasing productive output in 
the local context (Table 5.7). These include facilities: for example, piped drinking 
water is a highly sought-after utility in Swat. If it is not available, the mountainous 
areas make it quite difficult to bring drinking water from far-off springs. This was 
a household crisis during the conflict. Water carrying was mostly done by women, 
who were restricted by the militants from leaving their houses for social or 
economic participation.
67
 Moreover, the insecure environment discouraged 
women from going outside the house. War thus had effects on both dimensions 
(private assets and public utilities) of physical capital.     
This study considers the middle end mean market price (i.e., it excludes high-end 
brands and the cheapest products), as the basis of private physical capital 
valuation. This is for a workable and reliable assessment of assets, acknowledging 
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the fact that surveyed households had different income portfolios, which may 
affect their purchasing choices. It is pertinent to mention that accurate assessment 
of the value of physical assets is difficult: depreciation, origin, time of purchase, 
inflation or brand can influence the valuation. During the pilot study households 
were asked for values, and either they did not remember or found it difficult to 
accurately guess the current value (of the used items). This could lead to incorrect 
assessment for many households. The determination of an average asset price was 
considered practical for this study.    
Significance of physical assets varies with time and place, and the list of items in 
this section was formed with reference to the post-conflict livelihoods of sample 
households in Swat. The items included covered both rural and urban households. 
For example, rural households may not be keen to have a telephone line for 
communication compared to an all-season farm-to-market road. However, urban 
populations would be keen to seek such a utility. Similarly, possession of 
agricultural tools and equipment that rely for their functioning on electricity may 
not be desirable in the absence of electricity connections, and were not included 
e.g. tube wells. This source of irrigation, relying on electricity supply or on diesel 
fuel, is expensive to operate. Moreover, utilizing high priced fuel-intensive 
equipment like tractors and wheat harvesters on small farms is less feasible. The 
survey results verified that few households own these. Their value impact on 
physical assets is therefore separately calculated.    
Households reported owning few physical assets, and most agriculturally-
orientated households lacked productive input tools. For example, as Table 5.6 
describes, seven households reported having tractors while only 26 had insecticide 
sprayers, which are relatively cheap and productive agricultural tools. Common 
agricultural assets comprise basic tools for soil and crop cultivation and 
maintenance. The average value from a list of 19 items was found to be Rs. 
43,096 (US $490).
68
 If costlier items, which few households possess, like tractors 
and trolleys, ploughs and wheat harvesting machines are excluded, the value 
further decreases to Rs. 36,041 (US $ 409).  
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 Conversions to US dollar are made at approximate market price of PKR during mid-2011, 1 
US$ = 88 PKR 
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Table 5.6: Asset Description of Households in Swat 
 Productive Assets Number of  
Households 
Quantity* Percent of 
H.H 
 
Serial Machines and Productive 
Tools 
   
1 Motorcycle 26 28 9.5 
2 Bicycle 34 38 12.4 
3 Donkey cart 4 3 1.5 
4 Tractor 7 7 2.5 
5 Wheat Harvester 3 3 1.1 
6 Farming ploughs (Basic manually 
used) 
5 5 1.8 
7 Pesticide sprayer 26 26 9.5 
8 Tractor trolley 4 4 1.5 
 Other Household Assets    
9 Mobile phone 260 596 94.5 
10 Video camera/or other 29 34 10.5 
11 Television 143 171 52.0 
12 Radio 206 240 74.9 
13 Sewing machine 199 216 72.4 
14 Computer  81 86 29.5 
15 Refrigerator 109 112 39.6 
16 Water heater 24 35 8.7 
17 Water pump 90 92 32.7 
18 Fans 265 1143 96.4 
19 Pressure cooker 262 303 95.3 
*Some households reported having an asset in multiple quantities. For example, for fans, 
mobile phones or radio many households reported owning more than one, therefore quantities 
exceed the number of households  
Source: Field survey in Swat 
 
 
Figure 5.5 provides estimates of the change in household assets in the post-
conflict period and the effects on public services and utilities. More than 45 
percent of households‟ assets decreased while 18 percent reported an increase. 69  
The post-conflict asset losses or gains depended upon the adoption of particular 
livelihood strategies, substitution capabilities, and whether the household was 
located in a very active war zone and was displaced or not.  
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 Later Section 5.7 and Figure 5.8 describe specific changes in assets and in more detail 
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Figure 5.5:  Change in Household Assets and Quality of Public Services in 
                     Post-Conflict Swat 
 
 
Source: Field survey in Swat 
 
 
 
Table 5.7: Household Assets and Access to Public Utilities in Swat 
Serial Assets and Public Utilities Number  
of Households 
Percent 
1 Piped drinking water availability 158 57.4 
2 Electricity connection 266 96.7 
3 Natural gas connection 48 17.4 
4 Firewood availability 222 80.7 
5 Brick house 160 59.3 
6 Wooden or mud house 110 40.7 
7 Ownership of house 226 82 
8 Rented house 49 18 
9 Separate kitchen 237 86 
10 Toilet facility in house 233 84 
11 T.V. Cable connection 55 20 
12 Access to newspapers 141 51.2 
13 Pucca/Metalled road to a nearby town 234 85 
14 Access to nearby educational institutions 239 86 
15 Access to nearby health facility 231 84  
Source: Field survey in Swat 
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Table 5.7 elucidates details of basic household facilities and access to public 
utilities and services. A sizable number of households owned houses, but in the 
mountainous remote areas studied it is common to build small low cost kacha 
(mud) houses or a wooden house. Piped drinking water was available to 57 
percent and natural gas (comparatively a cheaper energy source), only to 17 
percent of households. Its unavailability compels reliance on costlier cooking and 
heating sources like liquid petroleum gas or the time-consuming and burdensome 
choice of fire wood collection. This collection is mostly carried out by women 
(who sometimes have to walk to forest areas and carry back the wood) thus 
affecting their other household activities.  
5.6   Financial Capital 
Financial capital is possibly the most versatile among the assets that households 
possess. It consists of the financial resources that people use to achieve their 
livelihood objectives. DFID (1999) explains that cash and equivalents are 
important, and these enable people to adopt various livelihood strategies. 
Financial capital consists of two main sources, one being available stocks like 
savings (cash and bank deposits) or other liquid assets such as jewellery and 
livestock. The second source excludes earned income. It may include money 
received from pensions, and regular transfers from state and remittances. 
Financial capital is most flexible since it easily converts into other capitals. It can 
also be used directly to achieve livelihood outcomes, for example, buying of food 
or non-food items (DFID, 1999)   
The next sub-sections explain the various sources of financial capital, including 
credit and saving behaviours in Swat. 
5.6.1 Remittances 
During the survey I observed that households receiving foreign remittance had 
more physical assets like computers and televisions, particularly if they were 
urban based. Moreover, better input management by these households was also 
observed if agricultural production was a complementary source of income. Table 
5.8 provides details about different sources of income and transfers (other than 
regular household income), and their quantitative classification. A sizeable 50 
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households received foreign remittance, and nine received money transfers from 
other cities; these income sources were not affected by the conflict. Only eight 
households reported getting one-time government assistance, 26 got financial 
support from NGOs during the resettlement phase, while six reported receiving 
zakat (public assistance) regularly. This information and other data about 
receiving government assistance for agricultural revival in section 5.4 will back 
up the discussion about the limited reach of post-conflict resettlement and 
rehabilitation assistance in Chapter Seven.  
 
Table 5.8: Source and Annual Money Transfers in Swat- (Pak. Rupees) 
 
Sources of Transfers Freq. Mean Minimum Max 
 
Std. Dev.  
Foreign remittance 50 84,260 12,000 300,000 63,979.8 
Domestic remittance 9 47,111.1 20,000 100,000 30,168.0 
Allowances 3 10,333.3 60,000 150,000 4,509.2 
Public assistance post -   
conflict and floods 
8 12,437.5 2,000   25,000 9,619.3 
NGO cash assistance 26 19,138.6 2,000   36,000 7,330.1 
Rent-Land/commercial 
property 
19 52,400 3,000 200,000 5,3730.5 
Rent-House 20 33,380 1,000 150,000 42,015.1 
Rent-Machine/vehicle 2 14,000 10,000 18,000 5,656.8 
Zakat  6 11,166.6 2,000  15,000 5,115.3 
Other sources 14 9,500 1,000  25,000 
 
8,748.6 
Total  157
a
 69,478.6 1,500 474,000 81,726.6 
a: Total households who had remittances/transfers in the 1 year period were 103, and 54 
households had more than one form of transfer.  
Source: Author’s field survey in Swat  
 
5.6.2 Credit 
Examining research focused on poverty, DFID (1999) found that financial capital 
and the availability of credit are least accessible to the poor. This shortcoming 
further enhances the significance of other forms of capital to them. Precise 
understanding of the reasons for seeking loans provides a better explanation of the 
characteristics of credit and its role in pursuing livelihoods. Among the 275 
  
 
111 
  
sample households in Swat, 205 (74.5 percent) needed and took credit in the post-
conflict year for varying reasons. Table 5.9 describes these reasons in detail. 
Relatives, friends and neighbours, in order, constituted the biggest source of loans 
for 87.3 percent of households in Swat. Shirazi and Khan (2009) note that 
Pakistan has few credit-supplying sources for the poor, which explains the need to 
seek loans from individuals, in the wider family: or from people known well by 
the loan-seekers. Further, it is very difficult to get credit during times of shock and 
displacement from any available formal credit sources. Credit markets often ration 
out low-income households, access to the credit markets decreases, and informal 
lending also drops (Ibanez & Moya, 2006).  
 
Explaining the major purposes of loans, more than 53 percent of households 
reported that loans had been taken to meet daily household expenses. This is in 
line with the low savings and income figures presented in the next sections. 
Negative impacts of conflict on income and employment constituted the reason 
for more than 75 percent of households, to seek credit as a means to sustain their 
livelihoods. It is represented in the first five categories of Table 5.10, explaining 
reasons for seeking credit. Moreover, more than 36 percent of households 
reported the short-term availability of credit among its disadvantages, while about 
27 percent of respondents said that getting credit was not easy. This is despite the 
fact that the majority got credit from informal sources such as social relationships 
including relatives, friends and neighbours, but in the post-conflict period even 
getting credit from these flexible and trustworthy sources was reported as more 
difficult.  
5.6.3 Savings  
Among the modes of savings, buying property like land or shops was reported as 
the preferred choice. This is a usual phenomenon in Pakistan, where interest rates 
for money kept in formal financial institutions are traditionally very low, and 
people choose other forms of savings. The survey observed that households who 
preferred to keep savings in banks were usually getting remittances from abroad. 
Less than one percent reported being members of committees at community level, 
which are a traditional source for keeping savings. Figure 5.6 next provides 
details, and the most significant outcome of this section was that close to 80 
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percent of households reported that they never had savings. This information was 
useful in the simulation modelling where labour in tourism businesses is treated as 
wage labour, rather than people setting up small businesses themselves (owner-
operators). The large number of „never had savings‟ supports the view that 
workers will be mostly wage workers, since they are likely to have difficulty 
setting up their own businesses, given their saving behaviour.    
 
          Table 5.9:  Sources, Purpose, and Disadvantages of Loan  
Sources Frequency Percent 
Bank 15 7.3 
Money lenders 1 0.5 
Relatives 108 52.7 
Neighbours 14 6.8 
Friends (Social relationships) 57 27.8 
Other sources 10 4.9 
Total 205 100 
 
Major purposes for seeking credit 
 
  
Daily household expenses 112 53.1 
Agricultural inputs 18 8.5 
Repaying some other loan 9 4.2 
Educational expenses 3 1.4 
Health expenses 17 8 
Buying land 4 1.9 
To repair or buy a house 8 3.8 
Running or starting a business 23 10.9 
Occasions (marriage, death etc) 17 8 
Repaying some other loan 9 4.2 
   
Total 211 100 
 
Disadvantages of credit 
  
 
 
High interest rate 
 
12 
 
6.1 
Is for short term 71 36.2 
Limited amount to utilize 27 13.8 
Not easy to get 52 26.5 
Condition to pledge 1 0.5 
Any other 33 16.8 
Total 196 100 
                Source: Field survey in Swat 
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Figure 5.6: Savings Behaviour of Households in Swat
 
 
5.7   Income and Employment Structure  
Figure 5.7 provides details about occupational choices of household members. 
About 26 percent were self-employed in agricultural activities and it remained 
their only income-earning source. However, more than 60 percent of households 
reported ownership of agricultural land. Thus, agriculture represented a major or a 
complementary source of income for 60 percent of the sample households in 
Swat, and was a choice for livelihood diversification. Similarly, complete 
engagement in small businesses accounted for around 24 percent of household 
working members. This finding conforms to the structure of Swat‟s economy, 
mostly relying on agricultural and tourism-based activities. These sectors also 
create most salary or wage based jobs, however, these jobs are mostly informal 
and without contracts or other associated employment benefits.  
Table 5.10 shows that agricultural annual income was the lowest in post-conflict 
Swat. The earlier findings in section 5.4 and in Table 5.4 provide the explicit 
reasoning, where more than 96 percent of households reported losses in yields and 
farm production, which directly resulted in post-conflict low agricultural incomes. 
Households having income from salaries and regular wage income had the highest 
average income earnings. These included households with income from foreign 
and domestic remittances. Many people from Swat work in Middle Eastern 
0
20
40
60
80
5.1 
0.7 2.2 
1.5 
12.0 
78.5 
Percent
  
 
114 
  
countries but because of their lack of higher education or other skills are mostly 
involved in low paid, labour-intensive activities. During the surveying process it 
was also observed that households with foreign remittance usually had diversified 
livelihood patterns, including agriculture and waged employment of household 
members locally.   
Figure 5.7: Employment Patterns of Household Members in Swat 
 
 Source: Field survey in Swat 
 
 
Table 5.10:  Annual Household Income from Main Employment Categories  
                     in Swat (Gross - Pak. Rupees) 
Income 
source 
Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Observations 
Agriculture 82,945.2 3300 572,700 
 
80,799.5 168 
Business 248,897.6 12000 840,000 
 
167,308.4 82 
Salaries and 
wage 
income 
316,946.9 30,000 1632,000 250,594.1 147 
a) 1 US $ = 88 PKR- Source: Author’s field survey in Swat 
In response to questions about income changes in the post-conflict year, 78.3 
percent reported a decrease in income. Moreover, 57 percent were unable to meet 
household expenditure with their own income and required extra money on more 
than four occasions to overcome the income-expenditure gap. Around 30 percent 
needed more money more than once in the post-conflict year, and only 11 percent 
10.5 
0.8 
13.8 
16.5 
7.6 
26.3 
24.5 
Daily wages
Agri - related job
Government jobs
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Other jobs in private sector
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did not feel such need. Figure 5.8 shows the strategies adopted to overcome the 
income-expenditure gap. Taking credit was the preferred option, while other 
approaches included the sale of physical assets and land, and decreased food 
expenditure.  
 
Figure 5.8: Post-Conflict Income Coping Strategies of Households in Swat 
 
 
Source: Field survey in Swat 
5.7.1  Consumption 
The interviews sought details for weekly expenditure on basic food items. These 
included details for the 11 most common consumption items in the local context.  
 
Table 5.11: Consumption Expenditure of Households in Swat (Pak. Rupees) 
 
Category  Mean Minimum Maximum 
 
Std. 
Dev. 
Observations 
Monthly food 
expenses 
 16,640.5 3,200 40,500 
 
5,478.9 275 
Yearly food 
expenses 
 199,686.1 38,400 486,000 
 
65,747.1 275 
Yearly non-food 
expenses 
 52,815.3 0.0 318,000 
 
38,355.3 275 
Other annual 
consumption 
 46,075.1 800.0 544,400 62,791.9 275 
a) 1 US $ = 88 PKR - Source: Field survey in Swat 
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Further non-food expenses, for which there was a detailed list, were also 
collected. These had two parts: the first one dealt with mostly those goods that a 
household regularly bought on a monthly basis. The other included goods and 
items which may be a once or twice per year expense. Table 5.12 above provides 
a summary of consumption expenditure for households in Swat.  
5.8   Education and Health Expenditure 
Supplementing human capital data, detailed information for educational and 
health expenditure in the post-conflict year was collected. Primary public 
education is mostly free of tuition costs in Swat. However, access to such 
facilities is difficult, particularly in remote mountainous and hilly areas. In 
addition, damage to and destruction of schools made access more difficult. 
Secondary and higher education including college level and any professional 
education are not free of tuition and other costs. For students living away from 
main urban centres these costs involve transport and accommodation expenses 
that make such education expensive and unaffordable for many households. 
According to Table 5.2, which reports participation and educational attainment, 
just 13.1 percent of households‟ educated members had been attaining higher 
education. The survey result reported that there were no changes in pre- and post-
conflict educational expenditure for about 17 percent of households, less than 1 
percent reported decreased expenses, while about 82 percent of households had 
increased educational costs. 
 
A similar situation exists for health facilities. Access to public health 
infrastructure involves a lot of waiting time, and often public healthcare centres 
lack facilities. Medical practitioners, medicines, and associated requirements were 
barely available in the post-conflict era. People had to opt for private health 
facilities, which are costlier in Pakistan. For health-related expenditures, and these 
included medicines, visits to doctors, hospitals or stay in hospital. For pre- and 
post-conflict periods, 2.1 percent reported a decrease, 5.1 percent said there had 
been no change for them, and about 93 percent reported an increase in their 
household‟s health costs.  This closely reflected reality, as seen during visits, in 
the visible infrastructural destruction and marginal operation of public health 
facilities in different areas of Swat. Either these lacked staff or were closed in the 
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post-conflict period. Table 5.12 provides details about education and health costs 
of the households surveyed. 
 
Table 5.12: Annual Educational and Health Expenditure of Households in 
                    Post-Conflict Swat (Pak. Rupees) 
   
Mean 
  
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Observations 
Educational 
expenditure 
 
 
 6,981.3  400 50,000 
 
6,520.5 233 
Health 
expenditure 
 34,379.2  950 449,450 
 
51,291.7 275 
Source: Field survey in Swat 
5.9   Conclusions 
This chapter explored the household demographics and the various capitals that 
households possessed in the post-war Swat district. The quantitative household 
characteristics and findings increased understanding about the research areas and 
strengthened the foundations for the livelihood analysis. ADB and World Bank 
(2009) estimated that 140,000 households were displaced from Swat district. This 
study calculated that mean household size was 8.3 in the sample population. If 
this household size of more than eight is assumed for the whole district, then more 
than 1 million people of Swat, or 64 percent of the total approximate population 
of 1.8 million
70
 in the district, had to leave their homes. They stayed either in 
temporary refugee camps, in rented homes, or with relatives and friends.  The 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) (2009) in its report on 
Pakistan estimates that 1.1 million people were uprooted from their homes by 
mid-2009 (at the peak of civil war in Swat).
71
 This study‟s estimate for the total 
number of displaced is quite close to that of the UNHCR reports. The data also 
revealed that the male to female ratio is quite high in Swat as compared to the 
provincial ratio. However, the available provincial household ratio is for 1998; a 
recent comparison is thus difficult to make.  
                                                          
70
 The estimated figure is from the Centre of Public Policy Research‟s profile on Swat district 
published in 2010. 
71
 UNHCR further reported that during the same year (2009), 2.7 million people registered with 
the government as having left their homes, from Buner, Lower Dir and Swat districts (the active 
war zones) 
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Fewer employment opportunities for educated household members was also one 
of the findings of this study. This finding is of interest in the simulation analysis 
presented later, showing the flexibility for households to transfer surplus, or 
underpaid labour across other livelihood activities without affecting the current 
employment patterns, if relative profits change across the sectors. The basic 
literacy percentage of around 72 percent of household members could be a 
positive factor for labour adjustment in other sectors.  
This study found a very high percentage of approval (opposed to the Taliban‟s 
views) regarding female education and about girls‟ rights to attend formal 
schooling, in addition to getting Islamic religious education. This finding has 
implications for further support or recruitment to the Taliban in terms of 
agreement with their ideological views. This finding makes it plausible to argue 
that recruitment at the rank and file levels of the Taliban cannot be solely on an 
ideological basis: income and employment are factors which cannot be ignored.  
Regarding social capital, the patterns of horizontal and vertical social linkages 
reveal more trust and reliance on family, friends, and other relatives. Among 
associations with more formal groups, affiliations of more than 40 percent with 
political parties are quite significant in the mostly rural settings of the survey 
areas. Moreover, affiliations with political parties are likely to increase if the 
democratic process in Pakistan remains uninterrupted. The survey questions did 
not ask about the name of the party with which the household was affiliated. But 
if affiliations are with those political parties which oppose the Taliban‟s style of 
governance, this could be a possible future barrier to recruitment as militants.  
Concerns about losses of natural capital and the degradation of natural resources 
are very high, particularly with regard to yield losses and increased input costs for 
post-conflict agriculture activities and production. This finding provides a logical 
explanation for the low post-conflict income from agriculture. It was observed 
during field visits that both the military and militants damaged orchards and 
crops, resulting in losses to production and income to the largest income-earning 
source of households in Swat.  
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A vulnerable situation exists regarding ownership of physical assets. Except for 
mobile phones and radios, which 94.5 and 74.9 percent of households respectively 
own, other useful household productive assets were either not owned or else 
marginal percentages reported ownership. This particularly applied to the 
agriculture-based productive assets in the listing, most of which do not have a 
high price in the markets. For example, not having machines like insecticide 
sprayers, and missing timely pesticide control actions, can result in crop damage 
and yield loss. Major losses to assets occurred during the conflict and households 
later had to sell further assets. Low income, particularly from post-conflict 
agricultural production and tourism-related businesses, can be regarded as a major 
constraint for asset accumulation. The livestock sub-sector that traditionally 
serves as a complementary income source was worst affected. Few households 
reported livestock ownership during the survey.   
Regarding credit and savings behaviours, some significant facts are presented. 
More than 74 percent of households took loans in the post-conflict year and 
among them more than 53 percent required loans to meet daily household 
expenses. Relatives, friends, and other people with close relationships, like 
neighbours, remain the major sources of credit. The low income and 
comparatively high expenditure in the post-conflict year did not result in any 
savings, and around 80 percent households reported having no savings. 
Agricultural income was the main (and only), source of funds for more than 25 
percent of households. It was the highest reported income source, but it also had 
the lowest earnings (in the post-conflict year), compared to other sources. The 
devastation of lands and orchards and less available financial capital to invest in 
agricultural inputs were apparent reasons for the low agricultural income in post-
conflict Swat. The mean household food expenditure was more than double the 
mean agricultural income. Opting for credit, selling assets, and decreasing 
expenditure on education and health were reported as strategies to fund basic 
household expenditure. On a suggestive note, this finding potentially stresses the 
need to revive agriculture. If agriculture is not revived with result-oriented 
policies, unemployed or low paid workers may develop motivation to join the 
militants. The revival of agriculture and related questions will be further probed in 
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the simulation modelling. The simulations will examine the likely impacts of 
growth in agriculture on wages and employment in the main sectors of Swat‟s 
economy.  
Post-conflict households had very high health expenses; 92.7 percent reported 
increases in health expenditure. These included visits to medical practitioners, 
purchase of medicines and expenses involved in hospital stays. Destroyed and 
damaged public health infrastructure and reliance on expensive private facilities 
are plausible explanations for the increased expenses. A displaced population has 
more likelihood of disease transmission in the refugee camps. Malnutrition, and 
the breakdown of health and social services, further worsens health conditions. 
Households with savings had to spend them on medical costs, but since savings, 
as found in this research, were often not available, reliance on other survival 
options as mentioned earlier, were the strategies of the affected households in 
Swat.  
The conclusions in this chapter help to clarify and develop questions. For 
example, infrastructure damage in the areas of health and education has 
significantly increased household expenditure. Infrastructural development is thus 
crucial to decrease household expenses, and to provide increased earnings from 
different employment sectors. Daily wage work mostly was dependent on 
tourism-related businesses and construction work, which were severely affected 
by the conflict. Infrastructural development can positively enhance job creation. If 
the percentage of people attending higher education and various skill-enhancing 
training increases, then more educated and skilled people can have options like 
moving to other sectors like tourism, within or outside Swat. These developments 
can enable households to successfully pursue their known livelihood strategies, 
and avoid falling into the poverty trap. The insights from this chapter are helpful 
for the next, focusing on how asset accumulation helps the adoption of various 
livelihood options. The combination of this household analysis and the effects of 
the five capitals on livelihood strategies will form the theoretical framework for 
the simulation analysis of labour allocations that later answers the final key 
research question.  
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Chapter Six 
Livelihoods and Post-War Legacies in Swat 
6.1   Introduction 
Violent civil conflicts have multiple direct and indirect implications that strongly 
affect households‟ livings, resources and assets, both during the conflict and for 
many years thereafter. The forced occupation of Swat district of Pakistan by the 
Taliban and subsequent civil war involving government forces and the militants 
was no different. Civil war ravages, but in which dimensions? Answers to such 
questions are more relevant when focussed by analysing a particular civil conflict 
and its aftermaths. Such efforts may be difficult: not every war zone is friendly to 
outsiders. Data collection and even visits to the sensitive areas sometimes are not 
allowed by government forces, and risks are associated with the likely presence of 
rebels. The emerging conflict literature, studying directly affected households and 
the micro impacts of violence, represents brave attempts to break such barriers to 
allow data collection in difficult circumstances. This micro approach focuses on 
region-specific analysis and emphasises the micro perspectives of violent shocks. 
These research efforts are likely to emerge as very relevant post-conflict studies.  
With this background, this chapter explores the third key research question of the 
thesis: how do the economic shocks caused by violent conflict affect the 
household asset endowment and impact household choices of post-conflict 
livelihood portfolios in Swat district of Pakistan. The study of Swat is worthwhile 
as there has been a gap in research exploring this recent hotbed of violence and 
the resulting post-conflict livelihoods. This chapter centres on the micro aspects of 
asset losses to households and analyses livelihood constraints and choices in the 
immediate post-war economy of Swat. This study on post-conflict livelihoods in 
Swat, applying household data and an econometric approach, is a pioneering 
analytical attempt to study the conflict in Swat involving the Taliban and state 
forces.   
As an initial step in the livelihood analysis, the sample households are segregated 
into groups according to their major income sources. This classification uses the 
information collected during the household survey in Swat. A statistical cluster 
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analysis is performed to validate this household classification. Clusters group 
individual household observations in distinct livelihood selections. The role of 
different capitals (human, financial, physical, social and natural), in the post-
conflict environment is investigated, as capitals decisively shape livelihood 
strategy choices. Livelihood strategies are distinct and can vary with given asset 
portfolios, thus for econometric analysis, which contains multi-category response 
variables, a multinomial logit model is used. Results and conclusions from the 
livelihood strategy analysis will inform the simulation model in Chapter Seven, 
which focuses on changes in labour allocations in the post-conflict economy of 
Swat. Further, these results help in suggesting credible and effective development 
interventions, targeted to improve the livelihood outcomes for conflict-affected 
households in Swat. These include infrastructural services development which 
may enhance livelihoods in the post-conflict regional economy.   
6.2   Micro Analysis of Violent Conflicts  
Violent conflicts are different from other external shocks: armed civil conflicts are 
regarded as endogenous to household behaviour. This particular characteristic 
makes conflicts quite different from other external shocks (Justino, 2009). In 
another study, Justino (2006) highlights that ignoring the fundamental role of 
individuals in conflict-related studies and even in conflict resolution strategies is 
an inadequate compromise. She observes that such shortcomings prevail in more 
extensive investigations of the livelihoods of individuals and their families in the 
absence of systematic data sets and detailed information on the context of 
conflicts. To document household post-conflict effects, Justino and Verwimp 
(2008) focus on Rwanda, a central African country that witnessed civil war and 
genocide for more than a decade, and probe household income and poverty. Their 
study concludes that previously land-rich and affluent households suffered income 
and welfare losses, including severe damage to houses and land, which decreased 
incomes per adult in the households. It also uniquely identifies that female-led 
households were more severely trapped in poverty in post-conflict situations.  
Badiuzzaman, Cameron, and Murshed (2011) identify households‟ livelihood 
decisions, particularly investment in children‟s education and cropping patterns, 
as a proxy for production–investment decisions in rural areas of post-conflict 
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Chittagong, Bangladesh. They conclude that increased perception of violence 
lowers the food and non-food consumption expenditure of households as a risk 
reduction strategy. This study observes the presence of a post-conflict, „phoenix‟-
type factor that affects income-based livelihood decisions, which are made under 
fear of renewed violence. This post-conflict phoenix factor operates for both short 
term and long term livelihood decisions. It results in increased land use and cash 
crop cultivation in the long term through efforts to increase human capital. The 
study concludes that such strategies may not avert the risks associated with 
conflict situations. Market prices of cash crops can be uncertain and may fall as 
these are more vulnerable to diseases, and returns from schooling years can be 
years in the future and depend on demand in the local labour markets. Similarly, 
Bozolli and Bruck (2009) identify the determinants of income and consumption 
for war-affected rural households in Northern Mozambique.  
In comparison, Douarin, Litchfield, and Wheeler (2010) probe the immediate 
post-conflict effects in rural Kosovo, and focus on how conflict alters the 
livelihood choices and overall welfare of affected households. The authors 
observe the effects on social and physical capital. They note that reliance on social 
networks becomes difficult as neighbours and friends are experiencing similar 
stresses and shocks. Further, the selling of physical assets provides limited returns 
when markets are flooded with goods, with other households doing the same. 
They suggest significant long term post-conflict interventions other than relief 
such as social assistance, which acts as a short-term tool. Their study stresses the 
need for long term post-conflict interventions such as rebuilding infrastructure, 
providing access to basic development outcomes and creating economic 
opportunities so that livelihoods can be rebuilt and strengthened again.  
Displacement is usually a factor in violent conflicts. Ibanez and Moya (2009) 
investigate post-conflict impacts on displaced Colombian households and argue 
that structural poverty strongly correlates with an insufficient asset base. They 
note that conflict resulted in heavy asset losses in the displaced population. In 
contrast the existence of a strong asset base is a good determinant of upward 
mobility. Displaced households leave behind physical capital, natural capital 
becomes vulnerable (particularly crops and livestock), and access to any available 
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credit markets declines. Besides deterioration in all kinds of capitals, the displaced 
population finds it enormously difficult to enter new labour markets. Displaced 
households lack formal references, assets or collateral, and thus credit is 
constrained. The study also indicates that recovering from shocks does not occur 
naturally with marginal initial conditions like lack of assets and restricted access 
to financial markets. Bozolli, Bruck, and Wald (2011) study the effects of conflict 
on self-employment and behaviour in the labour markets of rural Colombia. They 
find that high homicide rates and displacement from original habitats reduce self-
employment, particularly for those with self-employment in agriculture. Another 
significant aspect emerging from displacement is that people seek refuge or 
asylum in other countries. Zimmermann and Zetter (2011) highlight the lives of 
Somali refugees in two host countries, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
Refugees, they argue, have social pressures originating from connections in their 
host country, and exile, alongside social problems including drug use and divorce, 
leads them to economic exclusion and poverty.    
In a survey-based study, Gupte, Justino, and Tranchant (2012) identify the 
determinants of civil rights victimization in Maharashtra, India. The authors 
conclude that victimization is more common and severe in economically 
vulnerable households that have less community support and weak social 
interactions. Justino, Leone, and Solardi (2011) probe the aftermaths of conflict 
spanning 25 years, focusing solely on human capital in Timor Leste. They find a 
negative impact of conflict on primary school completion and a substantial long-
term loss of human capital among young males. The loss results from households‟ 
investment trade-offs between education and fundamental survival during 25 
years of Indonesian occupation and violence.  
Instead of focusing on households, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) identify the 
determinants of participation in civil war with micro level data in Sierra Leone. 
Arjona and Kalyvas (2009) focus their research on individuals to analyse the 
counterinsurgent phenomenon in Colombia. They compare the rebels, who fight 
against the state, and those individuals who decide to fight against the rebels. The 
authors find thes areas with weak state institutions and less capacity to deliver 
public services prompt more counterinsurgent recruitment. This conclusion is 
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similar to the phenomenon observed during the recent violent conflict in Swat and 
in the current active conflict zones of Pakistan. A common strategy adopted by 
state institutions, particularly the army, is to induce local people to organize and 
fight against the Taliban in tough terrains or in areas having minimum public 
institutional strength.
72
  
The micro conflict literature discussed above focuses on different war zones and 
multiple post-conflict repercussions for households and affected communities. 
These studies develop insights into the impacts on households in different war 
zones. These explain determinants of household well-being (the asset base), and 
establish that the capabilities of the vulnerable are severely affected when violent 
shock confronts households. Survival strategies become ineffective, and losses in 
capitals (human, physical, financial, social and natural) are not merely for short 
periods. With a limited capital base the likelihood of a household falling into the 
long-term poverty trap substantially increases. Displacement further aggravates 
unemployment, losses in education, health status and even food consumption. 
After returning home, asset-poor households without effective exogenous 
development and income-generating initiatives find it quite difficult to regain 
even their pre-conflict income earning potential.    
Identifying the gap in the literature on post-conflict livelihoods in Swat and 
contributing to micro conflict-based research, this study exclusively focuses on 
the role of the five core capitals in determining livelihood choices in post-war 
Swat. This study adopts the approach of identifying household livelihood choices 
via survey data using clustering techniques and probes the effects of asset 
endowment on livelihood choices and diversification options. The analysis in this 
chapter aims to understand post-conflict livelihoods and legacies, using primary 
household information from the war-torn Swat district. The Taliban occupation, 
with its militant Islamic ideology, re-shaped and altered the balance of power. It 
was the first forced occupation of its kind, which aimed to enforce solely sharia 
law regionally, thus creating a mini-state within the state system of Pakistan. It 
severely constrained people‟s assets and affected their abilities to sustain 
livelihoods in the altered economic and social systems. The Taliban, as discussed 
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in the previous chapter are opposed to education, and totally opposed to education 
for females. They burnt and destroyed hundreds of schools, and in Swat 
announced that female schools would be closed forever. Along with other 
determinants, this chapter explores the links between educational attainments and 
livelihood choices in the post-conflict district. The displacement of the population 
from Swat and adjoining areas was on an enormous scale
73
 (ADB & the World 
Bank, 2009). At the time of data collection, although most had returned, residents 
were struggling to achieve gainful livelihood outcomes. This study attempts to 
grasp the role of assets, alongside the nature of the constraints faced during the 
immediate post-war re-settlement phase, in making gainful livelihood choices in 
Swat.  
6.3   The Livelihood Strategy Concept 
Livelihood strategy is a portfolio of activities and choices that people make to 
achieve their livelihood objectives, including productive activities, investment 
strategies, management of assets and reproductive choices (Jansen et al. 2006). 
The choices people make are associated with how they use their assets, so this 
becomes an important part of household behaviour, and determines their well-
being. Ellis (2004) observes that there is wide agreement in the literature that 
secure livelihoods are dependent upon substitution capabilities among assets and 
livelihoods. A low substitution potential makes livelihoods more vulnerable, 
particularly in times of crisis and in coping with shocks. Assets are the building 
blocks upon which households undertake production, engage in labour markets, 
and participate in reciprocal exchanges with other households.  
The conceptual foundation of the livelihood strategy choice originates from the 
utility maximization rationale (Brown, Stephans, Ouma, Murithi & Barrett 2006; 
Khan, 2008). It assumes that in a given time period, rational households choose 
among various mutually exclusive feasible income-earning alternatives,
74
 with a 
set of given asset endowments, seeking to maximise their utility, where activities i 
= 1,…..,N. Then a simple revealed preference argument suggests that, where 
income distributions depend upon asset distribution, these can be ordered in 
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welfare terms following stochastic dominance criteria (Shalit & Yitzhaki, 1994).
75
 
Households choosing a low income livelihood activity face constraints, limiting 
that particular household‟s choice sets relative to those available in high return 
activities. Identifying low return activities and why households choose them is 
critical in understanding the dynamics of poverty.  
DFID (1999, 2000) provided the conceptual foundations of the sustainable 
livelihood framework (SLF) that was explained in detail in Chapter One. A very 
brief explanation of assets and vulnerability context is provided here. This 
framework identifies five core assets or capitals on which livelihoods are built. 
These include human capital including age, education and family structure; 
natural capital (e.g., land, climate and water); physical capital (equipment, tools, 
other facilities and access to public infrastructure); financial capital (credit, 
savings and transfers) and social capital (social resources, relations, affiliations 
and associations). The livelihood strategies in the SLF determine the use of land 
and labour allocations, investment in education, migration decisions and 
participation in strengthening social resources.   
The vulnerability context in this framework is the environment in which people 
exist. It has two aspects: one is external (the stresses and shocks that people have 
to face); the other is internal (the ability to cope and manage). Stresses are 
pressures, which are typically continuous and often predictable, such as seasonal 
shortages, rising population and declining resources. Shocks are unpredictable, 
and often traumatic and sudden, including fires, floods, earthquakes, diseases and 
civil violence (Chambers & Conway, 1991). Sustainable livelihoods are those that 
are able to avoid or resist the stresses and shocks or have the ability to bounce 
back to their previous state. 
A number of studies are based on the sustainable livelihood framework, and 
analyse household decisions with certain asset endowments. Notable examples are 
Alwang, Jansen, Siegel and Pichon, 2005;  Jansen, Pender, Damon, Wielmaker & 
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Schiffer, 2006; Ellis & Bahigwa, 2003; Ellis et al., 2003; Iiyama et al., 2008; 
Khan, 2008 and Tuyen & Lim, 2011.
76
  
6.4   Identification of Livelihood Strategies  
The first step in livelihood strategy analysis is to categorize or group the 
households. The formal definition of the clusters or groups is done mostly in an 
intuitive manner (Everitt, Landau, Leese & Stahl, 2011). Bonner (1964) suggests 
that the ultimate criterion for evaluating the meaning of such terms is the value 
judgement of the user. The choice of a particular group is not clear cut and 
depends upon knowledge of the subject matter and data-based appraisals. 
Livelihood diversification strategies can be represented in numerous ways as 
Barret, Daniel and Reardon (2006) identify - by Hefindhal or Simpson indices, 
Gini coefficients, asset portfolio returns, or asset distribution. Alternatively, 
groups can be classified by examining the time-based intensity for different 
livelihood activities (Lopez, 2008).  
The central idea in group-based identification is that there are common features 
that enable the agglomeration of individual observations into small groups based 
on similarity along pre-determined dimensions (Brown, et al., 2006). Items (or 
variables), or people in each cluster are similar to each other and contrast with 
those in other clusters. A common statistical technique for identifying such groups 
is cluster analysis, which is similar to factor analysis except that rather than 
grouping variables into a smaller set of factors, cluster analysis numerically 
groups people. It is based on their characteristics, and responses to various 
variables, and upon the similarities and differences in these responses (Field, 
2009; Johnson & Wichern, 2002). 
Several studies of the classification of livelihood strategies use the share of 
income as a group characteristic originating from various sources as a baseline 
criterion. For example, Barret et al. (2001) examine rural African households, and 
Iiyama et al. (2008) focus their research on rural Kenya. Woutrese and Taylor 
(2007) find income diversification evidence from Burkino Faso; Alwang et al. 
(2005) study livelihoods for three central African countries. Dercon and Krishnan 
(1996) probe household characteristics and barriers to entry into higher return 
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activities in Tanzania and Ethiopia, while Lopez (2008) analyses livelihoods in 
Ecuador, and Tran and Lim (2011) observe livelihoods in peri-urban areas of 
Vietnam. Some disagreements exist over income-based grouping: for example, 
Brown et al. (2006) suggest direct examination of households‟ asset endowments 
for analysing livelihood strategies. They consider the income earned and the type 
of activity undertaken by a household as a function of the assets it controls. Their 
argument, however, ignores the work of Dercon and Krishnan (1996), which 
suggests that an important determinant of income is the comparative advantage of 
households in particular activities, which results in higher outcomes. As a 
practical example, in farm-based activities, two farms of the same size, even with 
the same crops, may give different yields, depending upon farm management 
practices. The decisive factors could be the type of seeds used, or better timing 
practice for farm inputs like water, pesticides and fertilizers. In addition, 
household and village characteristics will also influence the income output with 
more or less similar asset portfolios. The livelihood classification in Swat for this 
study is first made using shares of income from one or more sources and from the 
total household income, calculated from the survey data.   
6.4.1  Livelihood Strategies in Swat  
The information collected during the field survey reveals that significant numbers 
of household members in Swat are involved in more than one income-earning 
activity. In addition, household members engage in different income earning 
categories. Table 6.1 provides details about the involvement of households in one 
or multiple income earning activities and their frequencies.  About 68 percent earn 
income for involvement in one major activity, and about 30 percent diversify their 
labour and resources in at least two activities. Among the households with 
remittance as an additional source of income, the other adult working members 
were engaged in agricultural production, either for domestic use or as commercial 
farming activity, particularly orchard farming which is a high income based 
livelihood option. Similarly, some households reporting salaries from public 
sector jobs also reported engagement in farming activities.  
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Table 6.1:  Number of Household Income Earning Activities in Swat 
Number of Income earning activities Frequency Percent 
One 188 68.4 
Two 82 29.8 
Three 4 1.4 
Four 1 0.4 
            Source: Author’s field survey in Swat 
Based on the quantitative description of income sources in the survey data, 
households are categorised into five major income and labour-specific strategies. 
Table 6.1 shows that about 30 percent of households were involved in at least two 
income-earning activities. Therefore some criterion needed to be established by 
which the major percentage of income from a particular livelihood choice 
classified the household as belonging in that particular livelihood group. 
Following several studies using income-based criteria for cluster classification as 
mentioned earlier in section 6.4, and following the numerical share approach of 
Lopez (2008), households with 60 percent or more total income from one source 
are classified into that dominant livelihood group. Households‟ remaining 40 
percent of income in that classification may be earned from diversified livelihood 
patterns. This criterion identifies the major income-earning strategies for 
households in Swat. These strategies are: self-employed in agriculture; self-
employed in business/trading; and formal wage employment that includes jobs in 
the public sector. Private jobs which include jobs in other cities or countries, and 
households that rely on daily wages, form an informal sector, which is without 
regular employment contracts. Table 6.2 summarizes the explicit employment 
classification for each livelihood group.   
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Table 6.2: Household Employment Classification in Major Categories in    
                  Swat 
Major employment 
category 
Subcategory Description 
 
Agricultural production Cash and staple crops Fruit and vegetable farming 
and production of wheat, rice 
and maize 
Self-employment in business Ownership of retail shops 
and services including  
production activities 
Retail stores for consumption 
goods, trading and service 
including tourism based 
businesses like hotels and 
restaurants, taxi drivers, 
handicrafts etc.   
Formal jobs Jobs in the government sector Stable wage work, had the 
least impact on overall 
income during and after 
conflict. People in teaching, 
working in government 
offices, hospitals etc.  
 
Private sector jobs 
 
Jobs in different sectors, 
usually less paid locally than 
public jobs, also includes 
remittance from within and 
outside the country 
 
Jobs in private factories and 
organizations, in other small 
business activities, NGOs 
 
 
Daily wage work 
 
Work without formal 
contracts and employment 
benefits in different sectors  
 
Labour work in construction, 
tourism, services and 
agriculture, on daily wage 
basis 
Source: Field survey in Swat 
To assign households into different livelihood groups, employment classification 
using the dominant income sources given in Table 6.2 was carried out. Among the 
sample households, three with multiple income sources did not meet the 60 
percent income source criterion, and were classified with the biggest income 
source as the dominant livelihood strategy. It was possible to use this 
classification with the survey data as total monthly salaries of household members 
in cases of wage employment were recorded. Similarly, for self-employment in 
business, quantitative information for all expenditures and income were collected 
to calculate the monthly profits. For agriculturally-based earnings, it is usually 
easy for farmers to recall the quantity and value of produce for different crops 
cultivated as there are not many in a yearly production cycle. During the field 
survey it was observed that the major subsistence crops in a yearly production 
cycle consist of wheat, rice and maize, while orchard farmers typically rely on 
apples, peaches, plums, persimmons, and apricots. The income from orchards was 
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more easily recalled as it was received once a year.  All types of relevant 
expenditure in the local context of agricultural production were recorded, and the 
resulting profit for each kind of crop was separately calculated.  
The household data was further analysed to inform the livelihood classification of 
Table 6.2. The mean, minimum and maximum income earned during the pre-
survey year is calculated and presented in Table 6.3, which also provides 
quantitative details of livelihood strategy determination and shows annual income, 
in order of numerically larger strategies first for the pre-survey year. According to 
the details in Table 6.3, agricultural production is the dominant livelihood choice 
of 33.1 percent of households; simultaneously the mean levels of income for those 
households are the lowest. Agriculture was observed during the survey as the 
most labour-intensive livelihood portfolio
77
 (both for subsistence and cash crops). 
It provides much subsidiary wage work such as planting saplings, pruning, 
harvesting, picking, weeding, packing, and drying of fruits. Although orchard 
farming in Swat historically had high per unit income per jareeb (there are 
approximately 10 jareeb per acre) as compared to other agricultural crops, the war 
and later the large scale displacement of households negatively impacted 
maintenance practices, and affected trees‟ fruit-bearing capacity and soil fertility. 
This resulted in low farm production in the post-war year. Self-employment in 
business constitutes the second major livelihood choice, forming the major 
income source of about 27 percent of sampled households. Swat, an all year round 
tourist destination, creates multiple business opportunities for the local 
population. During the post-war year, there were heavy rains and floods, and these 
further damaged the economic and physical environment. I observed during the 
survey that small entrepreneurs were struggling to revive business activities and to 
regain their pre-war dynamism. Most relied on tourist inflow, which was much 
less than pre-war years
78
. However, the return of displaced people and resumption 
in the inflow of visitors including tourists, contributed to some visible signs of 
business activities. 
LS 4 (private sector jobs) and LS 3 (public sector jobs) respectively are 
comparably high-return income activities. Foreign remittance-based jobs are 
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included in LS 4 as these had no direct war impacts, were uninterrupted, and thus 
seem to have higher income, compared to other livelihood groups. Similarly, 
public sector jobs were mostly discontinued during the war period but because of 
their formal structure this did not result in salary losses, as public servants were 
later paid salaries by their respective employers. The livelihood strategy (informal 
work) based on daily wages, showed visible post-war effects on income: the mean 
returns in this activity are higher than agricultural income, but the maximum 
returns are the lowest.  
 
Table 6.3:  Livelihood Strategies and Annual Income from Major Strategy   
                   Choice in Swat (Pak rupees) 
Livelihood 
Strategy (LS) 
Obs.  Percent 
of 
Sample 
Mean Minimum Maximum S.D 
Daily wages 
(informal work) 
LS 1 
25 9.1 174,576   48,000 355,200 
 
  81,899 
Self - 
employment in 
business  
 LS 2 
73 26.6 269,159 60,000 840,000 
 
171,949 
Agricultural 
production 
LS  3 
91 33.1    95,018 11,200   572,700    91,587 
Public sector 
jobs (formal) 
LS 4 
42 15.2 342,418   84,000 768,000 
 
168,735 
Private sector 
jobs 
 + remittance 
LS 5 
44 16    409,590 84,000 1,632,000 
 
  354,458 
Total HH 
Income 
275 100 260,462 11,200 1,930,000 
 
245,151 
Exchange rates at the time of survey are taken as 88 PKR = 1 US $ 
Source: Field survey in Swat 
 
6.5   Identification of Livelihood Strategies with Cluster Analysis 
Cluster analysis is a statistical data reduction method that summarizes large 
observations into a smaller number of distinct groups or clusters of observation. 
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The details and accruing benefits from household clusters or groupings were 
explained in section 6.4. 
This statistical tool was applied to further validate the household classification in 
Swat. The classification is based upon more than 60 percent of household income 
being earned from the dominant livelihood strategy. This data partitioning method 
requires establishing the number of clusters a priori (Berhardt, Allen, & Helmers, 
1996). Observations at the initial analysis stage are randomly assigned to each of 
the k-clusters, and then reassigned with an iterative method so that the within-
cluster variance minimises and the between-cluster variance maximizes. Mooi and 
Sarstedt (2011) point out that this method does not require deciding on a distance 
measure, and it uses Euclidian distances, an extension of Pythagoras‟ theorem. 
They further regard k-means as superior to hierarchical methods as they are less 
affected by outliers and irrelevant clustering variables.
79
  
The available household data from Swat adequately fulfilled the fundamental 
requirement of the k-means: predefining the number of clusters. The data allowed 
grouping of livelihood groups into five distinct strategies based on major income 
earning sources. Having this prior knowledge of the number of clusters or groups, 
referred to as k = 5, IBM SPSS software version 19 was used for the cluster 
analysis to produce different clusters with the greatest possible distinction. The 
clustering algorithm produced five robust clusters, maximizing the variance 
between each cluster.  
Table 6.4 describes the final cluster centres from the software output. Table 6.4 
shows that for households with agriculture as their major livelihood strategy, on 
average 97.9 percent of their income comes from this source. The average for 
self-employed business is 92.4 percent, and from public sector jobs as the main 
livelihood strategy, the average is 86.7 percent. Private sector jobs including jobs 
in other cities or countries produced 89.5 percent and from the strategy choice of 
daily wage work (informal work), 99.1 percent of total income is earned.  
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Table 6.4: Livelihood Clusters and Average Income Share from 
       the Major Source 
 
Livelihood Strategy 
Identification 
Number of 
Households 
Share of income from 
the source 
  
Agriculture             91           97.9 
Self-employment in 
businesses 
            73           92.4 
Government Jobs             42           86.7 
Private sector jobs + 
remittances 
            44           89.5 
Daily wages             25           99.1 
 
6. 5.1 Other Significant Differences between the Livelihood Clusters  
The k-means cluster identification of households in Swat was further tested to 
determine what other significant differences prevailed in the identified livelihood 
strategies. The aim was to discern whether per capita income, per capita food 
consumption and consumption including food and non-food, differ among the five 
core household clusters in Swat. Following Brown et al. (2006) ANOVA tests 
were performed for the five identified clusters to identify significant household 
differences between the clusters. The results are presented below: 
1. There is a significant difference in per capita income of the five livelihood 
clusters in Swat,   F(4, 270) = 29.0,  p < .01 
2. Significant differences exist in yearly household food consumption 
between the five identified clusters, F (4, 270) = 4. 0, p < .05 
3. Total household consumption including food and non-food is significantly 
different between  the livelihood clusters, F (4, 270) = 6.6, p < .01 
 
The statistical results above explain that in addition to total income, the per capita 
income of households, yearly household food consumption and total consumption 
(food and non-food), significantly differ among the identified livelihood clusters 
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in post-war Swat. These results, clustering five livelihood groups, allow a more 
detailed livelihood analysis, in which empirical analysis and interpretation of the 
endowment of different capitals (human, physical, financial, natural and social) is 
conducted to determine the effects of the choice of different household livelihood 
strategies in the post-war economy of Swat.  
6.6   Empirical Analysis 
The effects of asset endowment on livelihood choices are observed in the 
following sections, using a Multinomial Logit Model (MLM). In this model the 
livelihood strategies (LS 1……LS 5) are used as limited dependent variables and 
as a function of household characteristics. This is the most widely used 
econometric model for multicategory response variables because of its easier 
estimation and straightforward interpretation (Cheng & Long, 2007; Fox, 1997). 
The Probit version of these models is theoretically possible, but as Greene (2003) 
observes, computation and identification issues limit their use However MLM 
requires the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which implies that 
choice between two alternatives is not influenced by other available options 
(Hausman & McFadden, 1984). Cheng and Long (2007) recommend that 
researchers should refer to an early advice by McFadden (1974) that MLM should 
be applied where the outcomes can be hypothesised to be dissimilar. In same 
manner Amemiya (1981) suggests that MLM most suitably operates when the 
outcomes are distinct. The previous detailed cluster analysis in sections 6.4 and 
6.5 distinctively identifies five mutually exclusive livelihood strategies in Swat. 
The above discussion and as Tran (2013) suggests too, choice of MLM for various 
quantifying factors affecting household livelihood choice is much plausible. A 
general formulation of the multinomial model given by Douarin et al. (2010) is:  
    =  
e p(   )
∑ e p(   ) 
                     for j = 0, 1… j 
where     is the probability of selecting portfolio j, from a set of J + 1 portfolios 
(here j + 1 = 5), and xj is a vector of variables influencing the choice of portfolio. 
The parameters β are to be estimated for the reference portfolio, i.e. agriculture in 
this particular analysis. 
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On the basis of above, the particular equation used for the forthcoming livelihood 
analysis becomes: 
Livelihood outcomes = 
                                                                        
                                           
6.6.1 Model Specifications 
The parameters selected for human capital include household size, which 
determines labour availability. Household size in Swat, as was explained in 
Chapter Five, is higher than the national average. The total number of men and 
women in the working age category (16 to 60 years) further captures the labour 
endowment in the model. Following Rahut and Scharf (2012) other human capital 
variables include the mean age of household members aged from 16 to 60 who 
were employed in the one year pre-survey period. Average educational attainment 
of the same household group is also included in the model. Studies by Alwang et 
al. (2005) and Jansen et al. (2006) regard education of the household head as a 
contributing variable in identifying livelihood strategies. However, in the cultural 
and social context of this study area, he/she may not be the main earner in the 
household.
80
 The mean years of education for household members are recorded in 
some studies (Jansen et al., 2006) but this could improperly reflect the formal 
educational status of households in Swat district. This is because, as survey data 
reveals, about eight percent children of both genders either currently are or have 
been enrolled at madrassas.
81
 The proportion of females aged 16 to 60, considered 
similarly to male labour endowment in labour markets is included. Jansen et al. 
(2006) identify that in developing countries this female age group influences the 
availability of non-domestic labour for labour markets. Gender, as Ellis (1998) 
identifies, is often found to constrain the patterns of income diversification 
pursued by the household, either directly due to the total or partial prohibition of 
women working outside the home or indirectly by giving girls less access to 
                                                          
80
 The household head is the eldest household member in joint families in Swat. In old age they 
may not be employed but have a decisive role in major household decisions.  
81
 Madrassas teach religious education and also provide accommodation and food to those 
enrolled. The formal educational syllabus is not part of madrassa education. Household members 
enrolled in madrassas reported this as education, but educational attainment for some members 
only in religious seminaries and for some in formal educational institutions could not be 
practically compared in the study area.    
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schooling than boys. The survey in Swat validated this observation and 
established its relevance for the study area, as less than 1 percent of female 
members reported working outside the home in formal employment.   
The focus of this study is a war zone, Swat, where physical capital was destroyed 
or severely damaged. Ibanez and Moya (2009) observe that during periods of 
conflict, civilians become the targets of armed groups, and such groups either 
seize assets from civilians or destroy assets, resulting in heavy losses to physical 
capital. Public utilities and infrastructure such as communications, bridges, 
electricity supplies and health facilities become the targets of the militants. In a 
post-conflict era, as Douarin et al. (2010) observed in Kosovo, it becomes very 
difficult for households to undertake wage labour in a physically damaged 
environment. Physical capital becomes highly significant in determining 
livelihood choices. Another study by Alwang et al. (2005) probes the significance 
of livelihood assets in three Central American countries. They use predictors for 
physical capital including distance to key facilities and access to paved roads in 
livelihood selections. Following their approach, but modifying it according to 
more detailed available information from the field survey, a variable representing 
scores for household access to various basic public utilities was used. These 
scores are based on a list of 15 basic household facilities and public utilities in 
Swat, where access or  possession of an asset is assigned a score 1 and the total 
score for access and use of public and private physical assets is then summed.
82
 
This criterion was set to assess uniformity in assets and their availability to 
sample households.  The list contained the basic assets required for sustainable 
living in Swat. A proper shelter was asked for, as displaced people on return may 
have been living in temporary accommodation (provided by the government), or 
with relatives or friends. Assets which were considered out of the reach or 
utilisation of the sample population were not asked for, such as access to an 
airport or ownership of a motor vehicle. The scores for households range from 0 
to 15. For example, if a household had access to or was using 10 out of 15 assets, 
it received a score of 10.  Another physical capital variable represented the 
monetary value of the household productive assets, including machines, tools and 
                                                          
82
 The detailed list of assets is in Section 5.5, Table 5.7 of Chapter 5. Score of 10 among 15 
relevant assets in Swat‟s context is to be quite robust. 
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other useful household items. Households in Swat were found to have few assets, 
and the mean values calculated earlier in Chapter Five are quite low. The total 
asset values in Pak rupees were divided by 1000 to make the unit coefficient 
values in the MNL model results more meaningful: a one unit change represents a 
change of Rs.1000 in asset values. A one unit change in the original currency 
values would be very small and could be difficult to interpret.
 83
 
The variables for financial capital are included. Dercon and Krishnan (1996) note 
that livelihood activities having entry constraints are in the form of special skills 
and capital requirements. The survey revealed that 41.7 percent of households 
adopted low return post-conflict livelihoods in agriculture and working for daily 
wages in Swat. Lack of finances can create entry barriers into high return 
activities, and it is a hindrance to enhancing human capital. Lack of finance also 
constrains the adoption of proactive management practices in the farm based 
livelihood selection, such as timely and quantitatively proper use of different farm 
inputs and investment on farm care practices. In response to a survey question, 
households considered lack of finances to be a major constraint on improved 
outcomes. Barret et al. (2000) conclude that limited endowment of productive 
assets like land and livestock in rural Africa makes it unaffordable for households 
to turn to high return activities. This constraint directly relates to lack of financial 
capital. Following Brown et al. (2006), this study observes the effects of financial 
capital with self-reported access to credit and receipt of remittance payments.  
Social capital is represented differently in studies exploring livelihood choices. 
For example Alwang et al. (2005) regard it as participation in agricultural 
organization in Africa, while Jansen et al. (2006) examine membership in 
different formal groups and organizations. This particular study environment did 
not find a strong presence of formal groups and associations, whereas horizontal 
dimensions of social capital are widespread in Swat. Family, relatives and friends 
are the main source of and hope for financial help and assistance during any 
household crisis. Variables representing expressions of confidence and trust in 
many people who can be helpful during any difficult household circumstances, 
                                                          
83
  Physical capital as found in Chapter 5 is very low, a unit change in PKR at survey time‟s 
exchange rate would make a difference of US$.01, and with this conversion in the model a unit 
change is to represent US$ 11.3, which seems more meaningful.  
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and confidence in more than three people outside the immediate family who can 
provide financial assistance in a crisis are included.  
Natural capital, like physical capital, is heavily affected during a violent conflict. 
In a mostly agrarian setting, this becomes more damaging for households relying 
on agriculture. The displacement of more than one million people from Swat left 
farms and orchards unattended, while explosives and shells damaged land, crops 
and fertility. Livestock perished. The availability of canal water, the major source 
for irrigation,
84
 was compromised. Variables representing natural capital include 
ownership of land and access to canal water for irrigation purposes. Farm size is 
used in many studies as a proxy for natural capital (see for example, Barret et. al, 
2000; Brown et. al, 2006; Dercon & Krishnan, 1996) but instead of farm size, 
production patterns like subsistence or orchard farming matter more in Swat. In a 
largely mountainous area, most farms are of smaller size than in the plain lands of 
the country. Even the smallest unit, one acre of land, can provide a reasonable 
income. The specific fruits and off-season patterns of vegetable farming make per 
jareeb farm earnings better than in other areas. In this context land ownership 
instead of land size is used in the model. Table 6.5 sums up the description and 
type of the predictor variables, and Table 6.6 separately presents a descriptive 
summary of the variables used for each household livelihood choice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
84
 Other sources as explained in Chapter Five, Table 5.6 include, rain water, tube wells and spring 
water 
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Table 6.5: Definition and Measurement of Model Variables  
Outcome Variable Description Measurement 
Post Conflict Livelihood 
Strategy 
Clusters 1 to 5 (Based on 
major Income sources) 
Cluster analysis 
Explanatory Variables   
Human Capital Household size. Total adult 
members (15-60 years) 
Average age of the working 
members. 
Mean years of education, age 
16 to 60 
Number of female members 
age 16 to 60 
Numbers, Percentage 
Physical Capital Approximate value of 
productive assets 
Access to basic public 
infrastructure 
Local currency value/1000 
 
Total of calculated scores 
Financial Capital Sought and received credit, 
Received remittances 
Dummy variables if  
Yes =1 
Social Capital Horizontal linkages 
(numerical strength and 
confidence)  
Dummy variables 
representing household‟s 
trust on people during any 
likely crisis  
Natural Capital Access to irrigation water 
source (canals)                              
Dummy variable if 
Yes = 1 
 
 
 Ownership of land Dummy variable if  
Yes = 1 
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Table 6.6: Summary of Household Characteristics by Livelihood Strategy 
      Choice in Swat 
Variables Mean Min Max  S.D.  
Daily wages (LS 1) 
Household size 7.4 4 14 2.29 
Total HH members (age 16 to 60) 4.6 2 8 2.08 
Average age of employed members 34.1 0 52 10.60 
Average education of employed members 3.2 0 12 4.08 
Number of female 16 to 60 years 2 1 4 1.11 
Access to public facilities 12.3 7 15 2.82 
Household Asset value 20.5 2.3 89.1 16.23 
Remittance received as additional income 0 0 1 0 
Credit/loan sourcing options for any purpose 0.8 0 1 0.37 
Association with family and friends  0.7 0 1 0.45 
Finances/credit received in need 0.5 0 1 0.50 
Land ownership 0.08 0 1 0.27 
Canal water availability 0.3 0 1 0.47 
Self-employment in businesses (LS 2) 
Household size 8.71 3 15 2.94 
Total HH members (age 16 to 60) 5.45 2 12 2.74 
Average age of employed members 35.95 21.5 58 7.45 
Average education of employed members 8.69 0 17 4.14 
Number of female 16 to 60 years 2.54 1 8 1.53 
Access to public facilities 14.02 2 17 2.92 
Household Asset Value 46.8 4.3 7 29.06 
Remittance received as additional income 0.17 0 117.1 0.38 
Credit/loan sourcing options for any purpose 0.72 0 1 0.44 
Association with family and friends 0.71 0 1 0.45 
Financers in need 0.71 0 1 0.45 
Land ownership 0.30 0 1 0.46 
Canal water availability 0.32 0 1 0.47 
Agriculture production (LS 3)     
Household size 8.06 4 15 2.77 
Total HH members (age 16 to 60) 5.01 2 13 2.32 
Average age of employed members 39.04 0 60 10.03 
Average education of employed members 7.97 0 17 4.72 
Number of female 16 to 60 years 2.30 0 6 1.28 
Access to public facilities 11.93 3 18 3.24 
Household Asset Value 29.67 0 99.4 17.85 
Remittance received as additional income 0.21 0 1 0.41 
Credit/loan sourcing options for any purpose 0.75 0 1 0.43 
Association with family and friends 0.56 0 1 0.49 
Finances/credit received in need 0.71 0 1 0.45 
Land ownership 0.96 0 1 0.17 
Canal water availability 0.63 0 1 0.48 
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Table 6.6 continued - Variables Mean Min Max  S.D.  
 
Public sector employment (LS 4) 
 
Household size 
 
8.11 
 
3 
 
16 
 
2.83 
Total HH members (age 16 to 60) 5.21 2 12 2.36 
Average age of employed members 38.99 0 58 9.87 
Average education of employed members 12.53 0 16 4.24 
Number of female 16 to 60 years 2.42 1 7 1.57 
Access to public facilities 14 7 18 2.41 
Household Asset Value 49.49 16.3 105.3 23.81 
Remittance received as additional income 0.35 0 1 0.48 
Credit/loan sourcing options for any purpose 0.54 0 1 0.50 
Association with family and friends 0.76 0 1 0.43 
Finances/credit received in need 0.76 0 1 0.43 
Land ownership 0.76 0 1 0.43 
Canal water availability 
 
0.47 0 1 0.50 
Private sector jobs (LS 5) 
Household size 8.97 5 15 3.09 
Total HH members (age 16 to 60) 6.22 2 14 3.19 
Average age of employed members 34.12 0 60 10.04 
Average education of employed members 8.47 0 16 4.56 
Number of female 16 to 60 years 2.65 1 6 1.52 
Access to public facilities 13.52 4 17 3.00 
Household Asset Value 45.22 5.5 120.1 28.22 
Remittance received as additional income 0.18 0 1 0.39 
Credit/loan sourcing options for any purpose 0.59 0 1 0.49 
Association with family and friends 0.68 0 1 0.47 
Finances/credit received in need 0.81 0 1 0.39 
Land ownership 0.61 0 1 0.49 
Canal water availability 0.61 0 1 0.49 
     
Refer to Table 6.5, in which the averages for variables with dummy values in all five strategies 
serve as a percentage. For example in LS 1 the mean 0.5 of variable „financers in need‟ explains 
that 50 percent of households have confidence in three or more people outside the immediate 
family who can be requested to provide financial help during any household crisis.   
 
6.7   Empirical Interpretation 
The numerically largest household group in the above classifications engages in 
agricultural production and receives earnings from subsistence crop cultivation or 
orchard farming. This household cluster (3) is selected as the base category to 
analyse whether livelihood diversification into other earning and occupation 
categories, apart from agricultural self-employment, can be regarded as 
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systematically different from other livelihood choices. Table 6.7 reports the 
parameter estimates and the relative risk ratios for the multinomial logit model. 
Rahut and Scharf (2012, pp. 570) give a standard interpretation for relative risk 
ratios (RRR). “It implies that for a unit change in the predictor variable the 
relative risk ratio of a particular outcome, relative to the base outcome (which in 
this research is agricultural income based cluster 3), is expected to change by a 
factor of the respective parameter estimates given the other variables in the model 
are held constant. More specifically RRR can be interpreted as how many times or 
(RRR-1) percent a one-unit change in the corresponding variable will increase or 
decrease the likelihood of choosing an outcome relative to the base outcome 
(agriculture in this study). For example, If the age of the employed household 
members increases by one unit (year), the relative risk of diversification in 
comparatively low-income daily wage work relative to earning all income from 
agriculture farming is expected to decrease by a factor of 0.93 or 7 percent 
(parameter estimate), given the other variables in the model are held constant. 
The estimation results in Table 6.7 explain that reliance on daily wages in Swat is 
negatively associated with the age of the working household members. Daily 
wage work is mostly available in construction or tourism-related businesses in 
Swat, and is usually more physically demanding, sometimes with longer working 
hours than formal employment, making it difficult for older people to be involved 
in this form of income generation. Moreover, in the construction and rebuilding 
activities that followed the war, most of the contracts were awarded to the 
military, and their regular employed work force provided the construction labour 
(Mehmood, 2011). That limited the job openings for civilian workers. If wage 
work was available, wages were not sufficient to meet even basic household 
expenditure, as was observed during the field study. Simultaneously the cost of 
food items and utilities increased in the post-war period, and these households 
remained unsuccessful in overcoming vulnerability. The tourism industry was 
estimated to employ 40,000 regular or irregular workers before the conflict: most 
remained out of work even after peace was restored (ADB & World Bank, 2009). 
Regarding land, its ownership increases the likelihood of preferring the strategy of 
agricultural production, relative to the alternative strategy of daily wage work.  
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The second livelihood classification in Swat, self-employment in businesses, 
consists of small-scale enterprises to medium-level business establishments. It 
includes a host of family-based businesses like shops, retail outlets and businesses 
providing some essential services. As expected, the surveyed businesses in Swat 
rely significantly on household size and labour endowment that minimizes labour 
and business running costs, by excluding as far possible any formal or informal 
wage workers hired from the labour force. The value of the RRR for household 
size is 1.285. It implies a positive association between increase in household size 
and the likelihood of continuing self-employment in business versus agricultural 
production, holding all other variables constant. One additional family member 
increases the probability of pursuing self-employment in business rather than 
adopting the alternative strategy of agricultural work.  
Education does not explain the continuation of the livelihood option of self-
employment in business. It is subject to the fact that in Swat, household members 
are, from a young age, engaged in family-based businesses as a substitute for 
hired labour and usually do not pursue formal education.  More physical assets are 
positively associated and help households to pursue this more remunerative 
livelihood strategy.  
 
Land ownership in Pakistan is considered a very safe investment and 
diversification option as land prices rarely decrease, and agricultural activity can 
also be pursued on a part time basis. However, that depends upon household 
savings and as Chapter Five observes, about 80 percent of the sample households 
in Swat did not report having savings. The result shows a negative association 
between land ownership and small business holding as a livelihood selection. 
Land ownership decreases the likelihood of pursuing self-employment in business 
relative to the alternative strategy of agricultural production. 
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Table 6.7:   Multinomial Logit Model Results of Livelihood Strategies in Swat   
          Parameter Estimates and Relative Risk Ratio (RRR) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Errors RRR 
 
Daily wages versus Agricultural production 
Human Capital 
Household size 0.028 0.232 1.029 
Total HH members (aged 16 to 60) 0.254 0.337 1.289 
Average age of employed members -0.071 0.034 0.930** 
Average education of employed members -0.086 0.073 0.916 
Number of females aged 16 to 60 years -0.017 0.033 0.982 
Physical Capital 
Access to Public Facilities -0.094 0.132 0.910 
Household Asset Value -0.0018 0.024 0.988 
Financial Capital 
Remittance -15.104 0.000 2.76e-07 
Credit/loan sourcing options for any purpose -0.539 0.497 0.583 
Social Capital 
Association with family and community 1.174 0.480 3.235 
Financers in need -0.460 0.002 0.630 
Natural Capital    
Land ownership -6.316 0.002 0.001*** 
Canal water availability 0.055 0.755 1.057 
Self-employment in business versus Agriculture production 
Human Capital    
Household size 0.251 0.169 1.285** 
Total HH members (aged 16 to 60) -0.037 0.164 0.962 
Average age of employed members -0.039 0.022 0.961* 
Average education of employed members 0.066 0.055 1.068 
Number of Females aged 16 to 60 years -0.005 0.023 0.994 
Physical Capital 
Access to Public Facilities 0.018 0.088 1.018 
Household Asset Value 0.028 0.120 1.028*** 
Financial Capital 
Remittance 0.078 0.589 1.082 
Credit/loan sourcing options for any purpose -0.679 0.251 0.497 
Social Capital    
Association with family and community 0.525 0.855 1.690 
Financers in need 0.525 0.540 0.996 
Natural Capital 
Land ownership -4.765 0.006 0.008*** 
Canal water availability -0.346 0.325 0.707 
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Table 6.7 continued 
 
Capitals and Variable                                 Coefficient       Std. Error              RRR 
 
Public sector employment versus Agriculture production 
Human Capital 
Household size -0.009 0.143 0.990 
Total HH members (aged 16 to 60)  0.105 0.206 1.111 
Average age of employed members -0.025 0.025 0.974 
Average education of employed members  0.289 0.090 1.335*** 
Number of females (aged 16 to 60) -0.132 0.024 0.986 
Physical Capital    
Access to Public Facilities  0.037 0.096 1.038 
Household Asset Value  0.023 0.012 1.023** 
Financial Capital    
Remittance  0.959 1.328 2.610** 
Credit/loan sourcing options for any purpose -1.252 0.147 0.285*** 
Social Capital 
Association with family and community  0.959 1.430 2.611* 
Financers in need  0.102 0.650 1.108 
Natural Capital    
Land ownership -2.712 0.551 0.066*** 
Canal water availability -0.523 0.294 0.592 
 
Private jobs versus Agriculture production 
Human Capital 
Household size 0.0196 0.130 1.019 
Total HH members (aged 15 to 60) 0.335 0.230 1.398** 
Average age of employed members -0.055 0.204 0.945*** 
Average education of employed members  0.015 0.054 1.015 
Number of females (aged 16 to 60) + -0.032 0.225 0.968 
Physical Capital 
Access to Public Facilities  0.045 0.092 1.046 
Household Asset Value  0.022 0.012 1.023** 
Financial Capital 
Remittance  0.064 0.580 1.066 
Credit/loan sourcing options for any purpose -1.470 0.115 0.229*** 
Social Capital 
Association with family and community  0.027 0.531 1.028 
Financers in need  0.796 1.31. 2.217 
Natural Capital 
Land ownership -3.642 0.203 0.026*** 
Canal water availability  0.631 0.919 1.880 
Prob > chi 2  0.000   
Pseudo R
2
  0.3335   
Observations   275   
Statistically significant at 10% (*), at 5 % (**) and at 1 % (***). 
Source: Author’s field survey in Swat 
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Public sector employment (LS 4) is considered as a mostly secure livelihood 
selection in Pakistan, particularly among the lower and middle-income groups. 
Economic fluctuations do not affect salaries and public sector employment is also 
associated with pensions and other work related benefits. The households in Swat 
show similar attitudes. In response to a survey question about what was 
considered the best livelihood option, 39.3 percent of households choose public 
sector employment. Education is crucial for better employment, and the 
estimation results validate this known empirical finding. An increase in average 
education of employed household members significantly increases the likelihood 
of pursuing public sector employment relative to post-conflict low return 
agriculture-based strategies. Household asset value has a positive association with 
this relatively stable livelihood option in terms of income. The parameter 
regarding remittance has a positive association with public sector jobs. It explains 
that receiving remittances substantially increases the probability of pursuing 
public sector jobs relative to agriculture-based livelihoods, given that all other 
variables are held constant.  
Remittances remain a preferred and stable income source in post-conflict Swat. 
During the field survey it was noticed that households whose members work in 
other countries, mostly employed in the Middle East (a common destination of 
workers from the Northern Province), consider it a good diversification option. A 
striking result reveals that access to credit and sourcing options increases the 
probability of adopting the agricultural production strategy. Public sector jobs, 
though giving employment security, are not rewarding in salary terms in Pakistan. 
The cost of living is consistently rising: inflation has remained above 10 percent 
for many years, while salaries in public sectors have not increased accordingly. 
Particularly in the post-war environment, the cost of living has further increased, 
associated with rehabilitation and reconstruction expenditure. Land ownership 
was found to decrease the likelihood of adopting public sector jobs relative to 
agricultural production. The ability to diversify into the pre-conflict rewarding 
option of agriculture appears to be a function of households‟ relatively greater 
financial liquidity by access to credit and remittances. This finding is consistent 
with previous studies on the importance of financial capital to livelihood 
diversification (Barrett et al. 2005; Brown et al. 2006; Dercon & Krishnan, 1996). 
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Agricultural production as a complementary choice alongside public jobs is very 
practical in the context of Swat. Agricultural work can be done part time, and 
there is also the possibility for surplus household members to engage themselves 
in farming work. Finally, for this livelihood cluster, the parameter for social 
capital positively associates with the possibility of pursuing this strategy choice. 
More social relations and horizontal interactions increase the likelihood of 
continuation of public sector employment.   
Employment in the private sector includes jobs in Swat as well as those in other 
cities and countries. These are the most rewarding livelihood selections in the 
post-war economy of Swat district. Human capital is most significantly associated 
with this choice. More household members in the working age group increase the 
probability of pursuing this livelihood. Larger households presumably benefit 
from returns to scale in different household tasks. A number of studies emphasise 
that if all markets are perfect, household size should not have an impact on labour 
supply (Rahut & Scharf, 2012). The finding that household size has a significant 
impact on diversification behaviour suggests that labour markets in Swat are 
imperfect. This livelihood selection is negatively associated with the average age 
of a household‟s working members. Increase in age decreases the probability of 
adult members working in private jobs or away from Swat. Younger household 
members seem to prefer this livelihood option. The physical asset value is 
significant; those with more physical assets are more likely to pursue livelihoods 
in this comparatively rewarding non-farm sector. More access to  and availability 
of credit significantly decreases the likelihood of pursuing private jobs compared 
to agricultural farm work, similar to the results with public sector employment. 
There is no inconsistency in results regarding land ownership and livelihood 
portfolios; all show a statistically negative association. Land ownership drives the 
likelihood of choosing agricultural production as a household livelihood choice, 
suggesting that households without land are constrained from adopting this 
strategy.      
Summing up the empirical findings, the gender effect represented by the number 
of adult females of working age in a household does not associate with any 
livelihood choice. It validates the survey results regarding the role of female 
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working-age household members. A significant majority of working-age women 
are involved in household work and do not participate in outside economic 
activities.  Social capital positively associates with public sector jobs, and as 
expected the likelihood of adopting public sector employment increases with the 
strength of social relations with relatives, friends and community. Social relations 
were found to be good sources of information and indicated confidence in survey 
results for the post-war year in Swat. Physical capital‟s value effects are 
significant in driving all livelihood choices except for daily wage work. This is 
understandable since daily wage work is the least remunerative of the selected 
livelihood portfolios and this creates constraints on physical asset accumulation. 
Moreover, it involves manual labour and physical asset value may not influence 
this choice. Public sector jobs and private sector employment have higher rewards 
compared to other choices, and with more financial capital the likelihood of 
diversification increases. As noted above, this looks plausible given that 
agriculture is considered a rewarding diversification option in Swat. Finally, in 
terms of empirical interpretations as mentioned in the introduction, this study is a 
first attempt to explore the effects of assets on livelihood strategy choices in Swat, 
therefore comparisons of results with other available livelihood studies on Swat 
are difficult to achieve. The results, wherever possible, are compared with field 
survey findings, and are explained based on information and insights gained 
during field discussions in Swat.   
6.8   Conclusions  
Households in Swat not only experienced violent occupation by the Taliban, 
followed by a full scale military operation against the Taliban, resulting in 
displacement for months, but upon returning also faced a natural shock in the 
form of severe floods, just as these displaced households were struggling for 
resettlement. Vulnerability rarely occurs on this scale. This chapter focuses on 
these households, and contributes to understanding their post-war livelihood 
portfolios. 
The losses in Swat were enormous. A once-thriving agricultural and tourism-
based economy turned into chaos and ruins, and became dependent on 
humanitarian assistance and aid. Conflicts, as Ibanez and Moya (2009) argue, 
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leave a legacy of structural poverty that is difficult to overcome. Households at 
the lower end of the income distribution find it tremendously difficult to cope 
with the conditions created in the post-conflict environment. Justino (2009) 
believes that in such times households may find it difficult to continue even their 
known survival strategies. That is the case for agriculture in Swat, as this study 
observes. In the pre-conflict period, it was the centre of a fruit orchard industry, 
coupled with related facilities for grading, storage and processing to enable 
transport of the products to other parts of the country. Zahid (2009) estimates that 
losses in fruit production as a result of war ranged from 30 to 60 percent. Fruit 
orchards by their nature take not less than five years to recover from damage 
provided proactive agricultural practices are followed. These require substantial 
capital investment, which post-war shattered households do not possess. The 
survey data revealed that this was also the lowest income earning sector among 
the five classified household groups. It was not like this in the pre-war period. 
Households in Swat usually own small farms but were previously able to earn 
reasonable amounts. For example with one hectare (2.47 acres) of mature apple 
orchards, a household was able to earn an approximate yearly income of Rs 0.5 
million (approximately US $5700)
85
 in the pre-war period. This is quite a 
reasonable living in Swat. This study selected agricultural households as the base 
comparison group, because it was the largest in the sample. The ADB and World 
Bank (2009) also identify that more than 70 percent of the population of Swat is 
dependent upon agriculture, directly or indirectly, as their primary livelihood 
source. 
This chapter contributes to the micro conflict literature that focuses on war zones. 
It studies the post-conflict economy of Swat, and its impact on how various 
capitals (human, financial, physical, social and natural) affect the adoption of 
livelihood strategies in the regional post-conflict environment. It is the first 
attempt to fill the gap in the literature that exists regarding the recent violent 
conflict involving the Taliban and state forces. This study introduced the approach 
of identifying livelihood strategies from household survey data in Swat, using 
cluster analysis. The resulting partitioning of the data shows that some livelihood 
strategies offer demonstrably higher income returns, yet are unattainable for some 
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households, given their post-war asset endowment. The findings of this research 
reveal that small businesses are just above the daily wage informal group (LS 1), 
in terms of income earning. This again is a changed economic situation. The post-
war survey was conducted within a devastated economic and business 
environment. In the pre-conflict period Mingora (the biggest city in the district) 
was the largest market in the country for Chinese-made goods. Thousands of 
people were associated with this business, which was among the major economic 
casualties of the Taliban‟s occupation. Thousands visited these markets on 
business trips. It was not only that hundreds of shops were destroyed during the 
civil war, but related sectors like transport, hotels and restaurants collapsed almost 
completely. Not only did the inflow of tourists visiting for the pleasant weather 
and sightseeing end, but business visitors also stopped travelling to Swat.   
A practical limitation in the micro post-conflict studies (section 6.2 reviews some 
such studies), is reliance on cross-sectional field data.  Among the studies 
reviewed, Justino and Verwimp (2008) use panel data for their study on Rwanda. 
But even they rely on secondary data for pre-conflict information about the same 
households which they surveyed in the post-conflict environment. Conflicts are 
uncertain in terms of their intensity, timing (when they will begin or intensify), 
locational aspects (which areas are most affected), and with respect to 
displacement and rehabilitation of affected households (who may change their 
location if they return, or may not return at all). Such characteristics make it 
impractical to rely on any other form of primary data-based analysis. The exact 
quantitative nature of pre- and post-conflict asset and income losses is thus quite 
difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, this study asked people questions (in 
qualitative terms), about pre- and post-conflict losses and about livelihood coping 
strategies (see Chapter Five). For earnings (e.g. agriculture), and pre-conflict 
prices it also relied on secondary information sources.  
This chapter suggests various asset-based constraints as the main factors 
influencing livelihood diversification. Certain activities have high entry 
constraints in the form of skills (education), and financial capital. Physical capital 
remains significant in driving livelihood strategies LS 2 to LS 5, but not LS 1, 
which is work based on daily wages. The two high-return livelihood choices, 
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private jobs (LS 5) and public sector employment (LS 4), are more likely to 
diversify into farm-based income earning if they have access to credit, and 
remittances increasing their financial liquidity. However, few formal credit 
disbursement mechanisms exist in rural Swat. Some NGOs grant limited amounts 
and a micro-credit bank operates in the area, but the interest rates and collateral 
requirements put these out of reach of most people. Low physical asset values 
make diversification less likely: an increase in physical assets enables households 
to pursue the known livelihood strategies. A consistent and strong finding of this 
study is that ownership of land (increase in natural capital), increases the ability of 
households to diversify into farm-based livelihoods, which were a rewarding 
option in pre-conflict periods.  
In terms of policy options, this chapter suggests that the biggest and once-
rewarding livelihood option of agriculture requires assistance for its revival. 
Similarly, the natural and time-tested advantage of the area as a tourist destination 
associated with small businesses must be a focus of development priorities, 
including broad based infrastructural development. This requires peace and no 
further Taliban intervention.    
This livelihood choice analysis and its connection with asset holdings will lead to 
the next research question. This final question identifies post-war developmental 
interventions that may result in labour allocations to profit-orientated sectors. 
These interventions may enable revival of the pre-conflict thriving sectors in 
Swat: agriculture and tourism businesses, which this study establishes as the worst 
affected. The next chapter addresses these issues and the potential impact of the 
revival of the regional economy. Such revival may decrease the likelihood of 
household members joining militant groups solely for economic gain.    
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Chapter Seven 
The Inter-Sectoral Model for Household Assets and Opportunities 
in Post-War Swat        
7.1   Introduction 
Civil war in Swat changed household assets and livelihoods. Injuries, recruitment, 
imprisonment, and loss of life in a household altered household compositions. In 
the post-conflict economy, many households‟ earnings decreased and 
expenditures increased, as confirmed when analysing the survey data. The 
economic status of affected households drastically changed with destruction or 
theft of assets, and the forced displacement resulting from civil war. The survey 
data revealed that about 80 percent of households did not have savings, and had to 
sell their assets, take credit or decrease spending as survival strategies. 
Agricultural and business activities were affected thus decreasing employment 
and wages in the shattered post-conflict economy, as explained in the previous 
chapter.  
With this background, this chapter focuses on changes in labour movements in the 
post-conflict economy of Swat, and thus investigates the final key research 
question of this thesis: how do households‟ livelihood assets interact to determine 
livelihood opportunities, which may emerge from the positive shocks (as 
discussed in later sections) applied to the regional post-war economy of Swat. 
This exploration is based on assets, which were found to significantly affect 
livelihood choices during the econometric analysis reported earlier in Chapter Six. 
These include human, financial, natural and physical capitals. Livelihood revival 
depends upon the accumulation of assets, and these create livelihood 
opportunities, such as employment. More employment opportunities may increase 
wages and thus income. This chapter investigates these significant effects of asset 
increase on the creation of opportunities, which have the potential to enhance 
livelihoods in Swat.  
Another goal in this chapter is to discover which development policy 
interventions may create alternative livelihood opportunities, whereby 
employment and wages can increase in an integrated manner in the major sectors 
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of Swat. This encompassing analysis will help to answer the question of whether 
improved livelihood options including employment and wages can decrease the 
chances of recruitment into militant organisations such as the Taliban. Post-war 
resettlement efforts and policies undertaken by the Government and international 
donors so far, which are mostly similar, consist of across-the-board interventions 
in conflict-affected areas, including Swat. These interventions include welfare 
assistance, housing reconstruction grants, subsidised inputs for agriculture (one-
off or more broadly distributed), and reconstruction of some infrastructure. An 
integrated framework to enhance sustainable livelihood is lacking. If a 
government framework exists in this field (more details in section 7.3), it is not 
area-specific, and does not address the needs-based requirements of different 
areas suffering from different types of damage. Further, these interventions lack 
any estimation of their quantitative impacts. Such interventions as have been 
carried out have been found to have negligible time-based impact on livelihood 
revival, which are discussed in more detail in later sections. Consequently, as 
reported widely by the media, this raises questions about whether the slow 
economic recovery may undo the-hard earned military gains and result yet again 
in recruitment to the militants.
86
 The challenging question of this chapter, against 
this background, is that in such random efforts, the concept of security is taken as 
protection from insurgents and relief is considered in terms of training, welfare 
donations and subsistence aid, rather than in terms of enhancement for sustainable 
livelihoods. This study considers the sustainable livelihood approach as a possible 
way to reduce the chances of recruitment to the Taliban militia in Swat.    
The analysis in this chapter is based on several interconnected findings from 
earlier chapters, which analysed post-conflict household characteristics and the 
adoption of livelihood strategies with certain asset endowments. That foundation 
provides some understanding of post-war labour allocations, and the most relevant 
interventions for livelihood enhancement, within a dynamic simulation modelling 
framework.  
The literature which discusses successful post-war livelihood revival phases 
includes a study by Ibanez and Moya (2009) in Colombia. They observe that 
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better educated households, access to savings and credit, support from 
government agencies and, in general, increase in the asset base are the factors 
which contribute to early household recovery. Dourian et al. (2010) observe in 
post-war rural Kosovo that with better infrastructure (such as good road networks 
that link efficiently with other areas), and creation of economic opportunities, 
livelihoods can be rebuilt. They further stress the need to heavily support the pre-
war competitive sectors. In the same context, Justino (2009; 2006) argues that 
post-conflict policies require focussing on structural development programmes. In 
her study in India, she finds that in the medium-term (i.e. over a period of five 
years), increased public expenditure on social services, alongside improvements 
in education, is an effective means to prevent the outbreak of violence.  
The analysis in the previous chapter explains that assets have different impacts on 
different households, depending on their adopted livelihood strategies. The 
previous analysis also reveals that the dynamism of Swat‟s pre-conflict economy 
relied on its largest and second largest sectors, agriculture and tourism businesses. 
However, these sectors fell into the lower income bracket after the combined 
shocks of the civil war and displacement. The following sections focus on these 
two sectors for reviving Swat‟s economy and improving household livelihoods. 
The next section looks at some damaging impacts of civil war on these two 
sectors.  
7.2   Devastation of Agriculture and Tourism 
More than 70 percent of the population in Swat district relies on agriculture 
(directly or indirectly) as their primary livelihood option (ADB & World Bank, 
2009, Zahid, 2009). The climatic and geographical conditions of the district make 
it very suitable for fruit farming, including apples, peaches, plums, apricots, and 
persimmon. Walnut trees are another high-income earning source in Swat. The 
survey information revealed that the per acre income output from these farms was 
higher than from other agricultural crops in different parts of the country. Produce 
sales provide instant cash, and many wage work opportunities for related 
agricultural activities. Thousands earned their livelihood by spraying and pruning 
trees, and packing and transporting fruit. The militancy and civil war affected 
farms and orchards most, and the resulting displacement left them unattended and 
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unprotected. Although some farmers were able to pack and send products to 
markets, as Zahid (2009) observes, damaged roads, bridges, risky movements and 
curfews resulted in higher rates of transportation charges that further reduced net 
profits. Fruits with short perishable life cycles rotted and were wasted, while 
being loaded on trucks and transported to the main fruit markets. This incurred 
losses of millions (PKR) to the growers.  
ADB and the World Bank (2009) estimate that in war-affected districts of 
Pakistan, including Swat, the losses were about 70 percent as direct damage to 
agricultural assets and stocks, and about 30 percent were due to indirect damage 
to agricultural production. Most of the immediate losses were recorded in the 
livestock sub-sector, including sheep, goat, and cattle farming and domestic 
poultry. Livestock either perished or was lost. Households abandoned their 
animals when they had to move, and many of those animals subsequently died or 
were slaughtered by the militants in the area. During field visits for this study the 
locals stated that if they wanted to sell their animals, traders made “distress sales” 
and bought them at around 10 to 20 percent of their market price. The survey data 
in Swat conforms with this observation, as few households reported livestock 
holdings in the post-conflict period. In comparison, in the provincial mountainous 
regional setting of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, livestock farming remained a reasonable 
livelihood option alongside crop production and fruit farming.   
The direct damages to the crop sector were in the form of un-harvested standing 
crops and fruits. When the military operation began, wheat crops and fruits 
(mainly apricots and plums) were about to be harvested. Shelling, aerial 
bombings, militants and military movements severely damaged crops and fruits 
and irrigation sources like canals, tube wells, dug wells and flood embankments. 
In addition, it was estimated that about 80 percent of Kharif (summer) crops in 
2009 could not be cultivated as displaced families did not return to their villages 
and farms (Zahid, 2009). Losses of crops, particularly orchard crops, are difficult 
to quantify in the short term. Orchards if allowed to degenerate take years to 
recover. The farming patterns of orchards are unique and have special 
maintenance requirements. Usually other crops are not sown in areas allocated for 
orchards, although sometimes vegetables are grown in the same lands for 
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additional income in Swat. Wheat is also sown, but rice is out of the question, as it 
requires standing water, which is harmful to orchards. Both, the militants and the 
military, damaged crops and trees in pursuing their objectives. If new trees are 
planted, most take about 10 years to matsure and reach reasonable production 
levels.      
Tourism was a dynamic and major sector over the past three to four decades as a 
source of employment and income generation in Swat. This was complemented by 
the high growth of hotels and associated businesses, which played a major part in 
the valley‟s economy. The tourism-related employment network included the 
transport sub-sector, taxi drivers, tour guides, plumbers, electricians, and related 
shops providing mobile phone services, internet cafes, local handicrafts, 
electronics and routine daily items. Ali, Shah, Jan and Man (2012) in a survey-
based study, estimated that there were 400 hotels providing accommodation and 
food services to tourists, thus generating income for the locals. Among them there 
were about 90 comparatively high-priced hotels in the area, and about 45,000 
workers were associated with hotels and restaurants. The growth in trading, 
mentioned in the concluding section of Chapter Six, further boosted tourism. It is 
estimated that 24 hotels were either completely destroyed or severely damaged 
during the civil war or in the severe flooding, a year after. Aside from complete 
destruction, the overall hotel and food industry and related workforce suffered in 
multiple ways. During field discussions, it was noted that the decline in number of 
tourists decreased wages, while expenditures by hotels on security increased after 
the war and the number of permanent and casual locally hired workers decreased 
significantly. Ali et al. (2012) calculate that on average salaries in the hotel 
industry decreased by 50 percent, expenses on hotel security increased many 
times, and the number of permanent staff was reduced by up to 25 percent. Casual 
staff was the worst affected: on average their number decreased by 50 percent in 
the hotels, according to the survey by Ali et al. (2012).  
Losses to small businesses were higher in Swat than in other war-affected 
districts, because the Taliban specifically targeted and destroyed shops in the 
region. ADB and the World Bank (2009) estimated that more than 2600 shops 
were either fully destroyed or damaged. As observed during the field visits and 
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discussions in the post-conflict period, with fewer buyers the sellers have to 
decrease their prices, particularly of locally produced handicrafts. These include 
embroidered clothes, famous Swati woollen shawls and decorative items made 
from marble and other locally produced stones. The female work force, working 
from home, was also involved in the manufacture of traditional Swati embroidery, 
knitting, and dress-making. This had an overall adverse income impact on 
households involved in the production and sale of these products.   
7.3   Post-Conflict Livelihood Revival 
Low income from agriculture and tourism, unemployment, increased health and 
education expenditure, and losses of physical, natural and financial capital, are 
among the major identified constraints for the reestablishment of livelihoods in 
Swat. To date, financial resources and manpower have been provided for 
assistance and rebuilding of infrastructure by the government, with support from 
countries including the US, China and the UAE. Such assistance has included 
direct support of agricultural inputs for farmers, in the hope of restoring 
production. However, most donors and aid organisations were concerned with the 
return of the displaced population, instead of mapping longer and more effective 
revival programmes. The government‟s view remains that aid did not come as was 
promised in commitments of more than US $263 million (PaRRSA, 2011). But 
with what it got, it did not practically formulate an integrated strategy for the 
revival of the post-conflict economy. One available document about the strategy 
for stabilisation and socio-economic development of Malakand division (Swat is 
one of its districts) provides a framework for different post-conflict interventions 
(Government of NWFP, 2009). However, this framework and the proposed 
interventions are not district-specific, and contain uniform and across-the-board 
proposals. It can also be argued that these proposals are not need-specific, 
according to the requirements of various districts. Further, this strategy lacks any 
quantitative estimates of the impacts the proposed interventions are likely to 
create. Regarding district-wise spending, the only detailed document available 
concerning rehabilitation is a report by the Provincial Relief and Rehabilitation 
Settlement Authority (PaRRSA),
87
 published in 2011. It provides details about 
spending in Swat. The highest amount was allocated for providing housing 
                                                          
87
 This organisation was established at the provincial level  to integrate the relief efforts in 2009 
  
 
160 
  
reconstruction subsidies of US $11.7 million, for partially or completely damaged 
houses. In its needs assessment, this document prioritises road network 
development and agriculture, including livestock and irrigation as having the most 
funding requirements in the post-conflict revival. In contrast, the donors 
committed to provide the highest amount (US $65 million) for housing needs. 
This could be due to the background of displacement, when people were 
compelled to live in refugee camps, but it also shows the differing priorities in 
foreign aid distribution and in locally felt requirements. Even local requirements 
sometimes do not address the realities, as will be discussed later.  
Donor organizations like USAID and UNDP selected tourism as a priority sector 
for the rehabilitation of Swat‟s economy. Working with the collaboration of 
PaRRSA in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the programme provided working 
capital and cash grants to selected hotel owners,
88
 alongside technical training. 
USAID targeted assistance to agriculture also, with a US $ 0.6 million programme 
for peach orchard farmers. The focus was on technical training of the farmers to 
equip them with improved farming techniques. For revival of tourism, UNDP 
sponsored festivals and events like Aman (peace), and a ski gala in collaboration 
with the Pakistan army. Tourists from different cities attended these events, as 
there was a strict commitment for peace from the army. 
These targeted and selected efforts helped people, whether these were made 
through public organizations or by international donors. However, no 
documentation could be found that provides time-based evaluations of the various 
rehabilitation efforts. The government‟s development strategy mentions a five-
year period for the completion of different interventions. However, as Ellick 
(2010) reported, more than a year after the displaced returned to their homes, the 
various development initiatives remained far from being realized. Similarly, 
Conway (2011) reported that at that time no across-the-board resettlement 
integrated policy perspective had been developed even two years after the end of 
the civil war. However, on a positive note, the floods in 2010 may have diverted 
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attention from reconstruction efforts and altered spending priorities. The 
government and donors still have a chance to reconstruct the post-war economy 
and livelihoods, and obtain comprehensive gains after a large-scale civil war. 
Distribution of aid and relief procedures raised questions too. The relief to 
targeted persons or households was mostly via a selection procedure. The field 
staff of aid agencies and PaRRSA selected the beneficiaries. However, selections 
can be biased, ignoring those who may meet one criterion but not another. 
Complaints were often reported in the media and were observed in the field 
survey too. People on one side reported quite a reasonable income but 
simultaneously received grants from NGOs. Nyborg et al. (2012) in their research 
study on post-war Swat mention that targeting of aid was problematic; food and 
livelihood support suffered from poor assessments and biased distribution. There 
was considerable elite capture of funded resources. By comparison, infrastructural 
investments are more visible and beneficial to the larger population.  
For revival of livelihoods in Swat, given an initial expansion in tourism 
businesses, a simple simulation model of economic interactions between 
agriculture and tourism is developed in the following sections. The labour force 
makes decisions to shift between sectors based on relative profits or net wages. 
Net returns from tourism-related activities depend on labour availability and costs. 
This also depends on farm production and profits: if these decline, the surplus 
labour shifts to the expanding tourism sector. The simulation model will note that 
switching between sectors may be complicated (Lim & Saw, 2006). The model is 
an illustration of the underlying processes of revival of the affected economy, 
inter-sectoral labour supply, and about reducing chances of recruitment to the 
militia. Most of the parameters of the simulation model are derived from the 
household survey data, from its analysis and the significance of a range of 
covariates during the subsequent econometric analysis.  
7.4   The Modelling Framework  
This section turns to a model of inter-sectoral interactions that highlights the 
salient issues associated with infrastructural development. These include main 
roads, bridges, tourism-related facilities including tourist resorts, facilitation of 
interconnected multiple businesses, education, and public health infrastructure. As 
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mentioned earlier, two previously dynamic economic sectors, agriculture and 
tourism, are considered. The tourism sector as described in section 7.2 consists of 
hotels, restaurants, retail shops, transport and multiple interconnected small 
tourism businesses. Agriculture has various crop-yielding practices ranging from 
subsistence crops to orchard farming.  This sector includes a range of village-
based economic production activities that relate to food inputs or outputs, 
including farming, forestry, livestock herding and the process of transportation of 
products from farms to markets. Orchards are financially rewarding and the 
climate of the district suits fruit tree growth and production. To simplify the 
model, the aggregated variable agriculture is considered to consist of orchard 
farming. The revival of orchards is crucial: these were the main cash crop and are 
exclusive to the district‟s agricultural economy. 
Farmers lack financial capital and credit is mostly unavailable for investing in 
required inputs. The low input and output and damaged infrastructure have 
created surplus or underpaid labour in the agricultural sector. This was the finding 
in Chapter Five, sub-section 5.2 and in Table 5.3, which explains individuals‟ 
reasons for not being part of the job market. The labour surplus pool is largely 
people with low skills and education: the other sector, tourism businesses, 
simultaneously affected, cannot create new employment opportunities for the 
surplus pool. The unemployed and underpaid workers in the agriculture sector 
have a high probability of joining militant groups, as most of the initial 
recruitment by the militants drew on such segments of the rural population (Khan, 
2009). The chances of joining the militants reduce if jobs emerge and profits 
increase, or they leave the agriculture sector for better wage-earning opportunities.  
The model presents a „hypothetical economy‟ with an assumed size of labour 
force, and addresses three broad issues. The first looks at the change in labour 
allocation between the two sectors in a safe environment (peace is maintained). It 
observes the impact of agricultural production on the income of workers in the 
agricultural sector, and the possible reduction in the chances of recruitment to the 
militants, as result of improvement in sustainable livelihoods. The basic model is 
summarized in Figure 7.1, which assumes that militants are not able to destabilize 
peace (either through talks or force). Major routes are safe and in working 
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condition, leading to increased and rapid access of available food production to 
market, thus increasing the income per worker. (This would include the roads 
from Mingora to Khwazakhela and Matta in upper Swat, which are major centres 
for orchard farming.) As more agricultural products quantity is available, prices 
may go down or increase, as with improved infrastructure produce can be sent to 
non-local markets provided prices are better there. Simultaneously, costs decrease, 
particularly for transportation, both locally and further afield. Better infrastructure 
decreases transit time, which is crucial for fruits with short storage life, and there 
is also a more competitive transportation network. The profits per worker in the 
sector would depend on the cost of inputs, production, and market prices.  
If crop prices increase, the capital gains may be invested in buying more tools or 
equipment, which help in increasing crop productivity and further profits for 
workers. Alternatively, if prices decrease and affect wages, workers would decide 
about shifting to a higher income earning sector, such as tourism businesses. 
Tourism growth also has prerequisites: the basic infrastructure like main roads 
must be repaired or rebuilt, and hotels and related facilities must function well in a 
competitive environment. The decision of workers to relocate is based on the 
comparison between net wages earned in tourism and in agriculture with given 
skills. This alternative is even being considered with a certain increase in profits 
from the agricultural sector. Workers will look at the net expected tourism wage, 
as there are still constraints on finding work and on the nature of the available 
work. The expected tourism wage would affect decisions about sectoral 
movement (Lim & Saw, 2006). Expected wage refers to the net tourism wage 
times the probability of getting a job and the probability directly relates to the 
growth of tourism businesses. However, as found in Chapter Five, about 72 
percent of household members have basic literacy skills and this may positively 
affect the probability of getting jobs. Figure 7.1 next, represents the dynamic 
hypothesis, and extracts the essential elements and connections in the Swat‟s 
economy (the system boundary), observed (through survey) and anticipated 
behaviours (through observations). 
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Figure 7.1: Inter-Sectoral Labour Allocations in Swat: 
        Dynamic Behaviour 
 
Sustainable orchard farming has positive impacts on production. With more 
production the relative price advantage may not be maintained. However, costs 
are expected to decrease in a competitive market that has better infrastructure. 
Also significant is the time lag in revival of production, which could be more than 
expected. Financial capital is not readily available to invest more in agriculture 
inputs. Without knowledge of the relative sizes of these potential impacts, the 
direction of labour movement is difficult to determine. If the conceptual structure 
is close to reality, it can be expected that as surplus labour arises in agricultural 
production, its re-location, or engagement in newly created jobs will result in 
additional income support to the household. If some of it were invested in more 
farm inputs this would mean that profits per household are likely to be 
maintained, offsetting any potential loss from family labour diversification. If 
prices of agricultural products increase, profits may be enhanced by increased 
production resulting from more inputs and better management practices.  
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7.5   Simulation Modelling and Livelihood Analysis  
This section illustrates the time paths of the variables under alternative scenarios. 
The software Vensim PLE 32 version 5.1 was used. It is a simulation modelling 
tool for dynamic systems. The relationships between different variables in the 
system (post-conflict) are entered as causal links to build stock and flow 
diagrams, which show relationships in the parameters which have the potential to 
change over time: these in combination represent the system to be simulated 
(Kirkwood, 1998). The structural validity of the model comes from the knowledge 
of the system structure (survey data in this study) (Sterman, 2000). Various 
studies use these models for different research objectives, including management 
and planning issues, and particularly for livelihood analysis. Kristjanson et al. 
(2005) study livelihood strategies in the semi-arid areas of Kenya; Gladwin et al. 
(2001) investigate the multiple livelihood strategies of African women farmers 
and their implication on food security. Grasso (1998) exclusively focuses on 
labour allocations in forestry and fishery production as a trade-off in mangrove 
ecosystems. Similarly, Lim and Saw (2006) study landmine casualties and the 
resulting labour interactions in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors in rural 
Cambodia. In another study Rohorua and Lim (2006), observe sustainable 
livelihoods in the small island economy of Tonga, and the inter-sectoral labour 
movements between the fisheries and tourism sectors if mangrove sustainability 
affects more than a certain limit.   
7.5.1 Modelling Parameters  
The simulations use data from the household survey in Swat to set the initial 
simulation parameters such as agricultural production, profits per worker, and the 
cost of production. The data for prices from the survey information are cross 
checked with market prices. However, the market prices are higher than the prices 
which growers receive. These include additional costs of packing, transport and 
profits of the traders. In agriculture, multiple harvesting patterns exist for wheat, 
rice, maize and vegetables, but more financial remuneration is obtained from 
orchards of apples, peaches, plums and amlook (date-plum, a member of the 
persimmon family). Growth in agriculture in the model is taken as subsequent 
growth in orchard farming and production. Landholding in the area is measured in 
jareeb (used in the survey for size of landholding), which is equivalent to 531 sq. 
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meters, and about 10 Jareeb are equal to 1 acre of land (5318.8 sq. meters). Most 
landholdings in Swat are not large. The survey respondents with agricultural lands 
had an average of 1 acre per household.  
Average agriculture income (US $943) was estimated from the survey data, and is 
used in the model.
89
 Among the tree crops, apples, peaches and walnuts have 
comparatively high market prices, and yields also vary for different fruits. For 
example, pears usually have a higher per/acre yield, while walnuts result in more 
profits. With a constraint to have uniformity in the model the fruit price based on 
survey data is calculated with an average production of 2.1 metric tonnes per acre, 
thus income per acre is divided by production per acre (943/2.1), giving an 
average income of $450/tonne per acre. 
An exact estimate for the number of tourists visiting Swat is hard to make, 
however, locals and hotel owners stated during the survey that in peak times there 
used to be 100 percent occupancy in the hotels. Tourist spots and hotels are spread 
all over the Swat district including properly built resorts, and restaurants spread 
alongside the river Swat offering freshly-caught fish-based dishes. Related 
tourism businesses including restaurants, transport, retail shops (particularly for 
local handicrafts), and various other shops used to have more customers during 
the peak tourist inflow, resulting in reasonable earnings. Workers in tourism 
businesses include those who travel from adjoining areas and return home after 
work. However many live at their work sites, thus helping the employers (work 
hours increase for them) and saving costs for the workers too. Rents are not paid 
for temporary lodging at the site, food is usually free for the employees (it is a 
local work tradition: employers share food with the employees) and clothing costs 
very little. As labour is reallocated from agriculture to other sectors, farm output 
does not fall; labourers were already surplus or were underpaid as discussed 
earlier. The relocation from agriculture to the tourism sector (given disguised 
employment on farms) thus has a very low or zero opportunity cost of foregone 
food output.     
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 That included income from subsistence crops also, which is less than orchard farms income.  
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The wages of unskilled workers in businesses ranged at the time of survey from 
$35 to $45 per month.
90
 The model assumes average earnings of $40 per month in 
tourism businesses, which includes expenses, such as transport or other living 
costs. The choice of working in a particular sector is dependent upon the choice of 
lifestyle too. The lifestyle associated with working in the tourism sector may be 
more desirable than living in the village. However, Lim and Saw (2006) observe 
that in determining inter-sectoral labour allocation the preferred criterion for 
workers is the net financial remuneration. The data validates that the skill and 
educational level of workers in low paid jobs in the two sectors are almost similar. 
Movement from agriculture to tourism tends towards low-skilled, labour intensive 
work.   
7.5.2 Model Assumptions 
This section discusses the outline and key assumptions,
91
 which form the 
foundation of the simulation equations. Where possible, the theoretical 
assumptions and resulting equations present an approximate reality of the 
economic and demographic regional environment as derived from the survey data, 
and presented in the outline described earlier. For simplification purposes, the 
total labour force in the model is fixed at 10,000 workers. This is to represent an 
economic unit at community level. From the average household size of eight as 
calculated from the survey data, three are assumed to be working age male 
members employed in orchard farming or tourism businesses, and constitute the 
initial employment numbers in both sectors. Others are either old or very young, 
studying, or female members (who usually do not work outside the home in 
Swat). The land ownership of each household is assumed as one acre. The 
agricultural price is initially valued at $450/tonne from a production of 2.1 tonnes 
per acre, consistent with my field survey of prices. Each worker‟s production is 
0.7 tones/worker/year (giving a low annualised output in the post-conflict period). 
The average cost of agricultural production is at least 40 percent ($180/tonne), as 
estimated from the survey data.  
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 For consistency with other calculations in the thesis, conversion rate is taken with an 
approximate value at the survey time. However, the current US $ rate is higher, and so are the 
wages in PKR.  
91
 Assumptions are flexible in the model 
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Simulations start with the assumption that 625 businesses are initially operating 
and employing workers. At the start of simulations around 33 percent or 3300 
workers are employed in the tourism businesses. Agriculture is employing about 
6700 workers initially. This percentage share (67 percent) is very close to 
estimates of employment in the agricultural sector in Swat as noted earlier in the 
chapter. The survey data further revealed that around 60 percent of households 
reported landholdings and 24 percent were employed in businesses. While 
considering the two employment sectors, the model thus assumes that 
employment in agriculture or tourism are the only available choices for workers.  
The growth rate of food production is dependent on multiple exogenous and 
endogenous factors. Improved infrastructure is one of the exogenous factors, as is 
the intrinsic growth rate of agricultural output. The intrinsic growth rate of 
agriculture
92
 will result from more inputs, and resultant possible increases in 
natural capital i.e. land quality and production (per worker). The outcome is 
increased profit, and these factors link financial and physical capital with the 
overall growth in agriculture. In the simulations the positive shocks will also 
involve the role of increased human capital e.g. short-term educational attainment 
including better management practices and the role of improved inputs. 
Infrastructural improvements involve improved irrigation systems and facilities 
such as better transportation and parking spaces, and all-weather sheds for 
temporary storage of products at the local markets. Similarly, tourism businesses 
are dependent upon infrastructure development that consists of more than just 
communication networks. Management training for small businesses and possible 
mechanisms for provision of financial capital are part of the infrastructure 
development. Available financial capital will influence the growth rate of tourism 
businesses. These links will explicitly explain the role of increases in assets 
(physical, financial and human), in the growth of agriculture and tourism 
businesses, and resulting improvements in livelihoods.   
                                                          
92
 Only labour and infrastructure (more capital) are the determinants of agricultural output. 
Without them, the growth in marketed agricultural products will be close to zero (i.e., the intrinsic 
growth rate is low). 
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Following Lim and Saw (2006) and Conrad (1992), the model assumes that food 
output per worker grows logistically.
93
 Improvement in agricultural infrastructure 
in the model assumes that better farm management practices, including timely 
input practices and improved road and transport networks will increase food 
output per worker. Tourism businesses also grow logistically; new businesses will 
enter alongside the revival of the existing ones. Model assumptions for tourism 
infrastructure involve improved road and transport networks, better 
entrepreneurship, access to financial capital and better provision of public utilities 
and services. However, both sectors will have a maximum limit of expansion. The 
potential annual agriculture output per worker is set at 1.5 tonnes/year, slightly 
more than double the initial output, given the revival of farms with uninterrupted 
production and benefits associated with infrastructure services. The assumed 
potential volume of production was common for most of the farms in pre-conflict 
times, as per information from the survey and in related discussions. The 
maximum number of sustainable businesses is initially set at 1250. Given the 
infrastructural improvements and in the context of the pre-war economy when 
tourism was a thriving sector, the maximum number seems plausible over the 
simulated period. The model considers a time of five years (60 months), as a 
medium-term revival framework.  
Growth in the number of tourism businesses drives up tourism wages. The 
monthly tourism wage as noted in the forthcoming list of equations is given by   
W = 40 + 0.001 T. The intercept relates to the above mentioned $40/month wage 
and wages rising with growth in T, the total tourism businesses. The net expected 
tourism wage is the actual wage less costs or expenses borne by workers in the 
sector (CT), adjusted by the probability of getting a job in the sector (this 
probability is given by 0.00055T). However, it is possible that employers hire 
people from outside the district. In practice, labour movements can take place 
from outside the region, but growth will still have a slight upward pressure on 
wages. However, it is assumed that the total number of workers does not change 
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 Logistic function is explained by Lim & Saw (2006) as follows: initially the number of 
operating firms is small, but with expansion in the market new firms enter, and growth accelerates. 
Ultimately, the growth rate declines as the industry becomes saturated, when the number of firms 
reaches the upper limit that the industry can sustain.   
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over time. There is no possibility for more workers to enter the system or for the 
number of workers to decrease (Grasso, 1999).  
If agricultural output rises due to infrastructural development, prices fall, 
assuming there is no big upsurge in demand. This leads to changes in profits per 
agricultural worker. Agriculture profits per worker per month  ( πA ) are calculated 
as output  (tonnes) per worker per year, divided by 12 months, all multiplied by 
the price of agriculture/tonne, PA, less the cost/tonne for production (inputs, 
labour), CA (refer to the equations list).
94
 The agriculture price equation is 
modelled based on the actual price-quantity relationships reported by households 
during the field survey. Production costs for orchards include fertilizers (including 
micronutrients), pesticides, ploughing or herbicides, pruning and irrigation, less 
the assumed production benefits accruing from infrastructural development. The 
positive impacts of benefits resulting from infrastructure services are part of the 
growth equations for agriculture and tourism businesses. The coefficients of these 
impacts for per unit growth rate in agriculture give a plausible overall sectoral 
growth rate in modelling results as informed by field discussions for the pre-
conflict periods. It is to be noted that as income increases, the increased financial 
capital enables farmers to spend more on inputs and productive physical capital 
for further income increase.  
The relative net returns for workers determine the inter-sectoral labour allocation. 
These follow the worker‟s decision about whether to work more in agriculture 
(NA) or in tourism (NT). The allocations are based on the following equations:  
    
 
 
      ,     
 
 
      , and  N = NA +  NT  where N is the total 
labour force of 10,000 workers in the simulated unit. The term d refers to the ratio 
of profit difference per worker among the two sectors. For this model d is 
calculated as: d = (πA – W
T) / π, where WT is the expected monthly wage in 
tourism and π equals πA + W
T
. The numbers employed in both sectors depend 
upon the ratio of profit difference (d) in wages between the two sectors, given that 
total employment remains unchanged. It is assumed that if d = 0, labour is 
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 Lim & Saw (2006) suggest using the functional form of the agriculture price equation. The 
simultaneity problems in the simulation do not allow multiplying agriculture output/worker by the 
number of agricultural workers to determine total production. The output per worker is scaled to 
derive total agricultural production.  
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distributed evenly across agriculture and tourism. However, the ratio of profit 
difference between two sectors (d) is not equal to zero as found in data and 
through observation in Swat. Changes in profits occur due to increased food 
production and workers re-allocate their labour across the sectors.  This will have 
impacts on employment levels and on sectoral growth rates. In the case of 
agricultural growth rate, for example, a shift of workers from agriculture to 
tourism businesses is to have a relatively small impact on production. This is due 
to the diminishing or low marginal productivity of shifting workers in agriculture 
as discussed above.  The key simulation equations are presented next.  
 
Scenario 1: The baseline model 
The key simulation equations for Scenario 1 are given below. 
Agriculture Sector (A) 
Growth rate of agricultural output: 

A = (rA – rA A/ A  +0.25× AI +    
0.003× AE)× A     
 Agriculture output/worker/year:  dtAA 

    
Potential agriculture output/worker/year: 5.1A tonne/worker/year 
Intrinsic growth rate:     rA = 0.001 
Price/tonne      PA = 580 – 150 A  
Cost/tonne     CA = 180 – 0.4 AI 
Profit/worker/month:  πA = 0.08 (PA – CA) A 
Initial agriculture/output/worker  0.7 tonne/worker/year 
Initial agriculture employment:  AE = 6700 
Agricultural infrastructure services:          AI = 100  
   (Initial $/month/person) 
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Tourism Sector (T) 
Growth of tourism businesses:               

T  = (rT- rT T/  ̅ + 0.00005×TI)T 
Tourism businesses:                                         dtTT 

  
Maximum businesses                                 ̅ = 1250 
Intrinsic growth rate:      rT = 0.001 
Tourism work cost ($/month):    CT = 15 – (100 ×0.01) 
Tourism businesses wage/month:    WT = 40 + 0.001 T 
Net expected wage:      W
E
 = (WT - CT) 0.00055 T 
 
Ratio of difference in remuneration/worker     d = (πA - WT)/π 
Initial tourism business employment:    TE = 3300 
Tourism infrastructure services:    TI = 100 
   (Initial $/month/person) 
 
Employment (N) 
 
Total employment:     N = NA + NT = 10,000 
Agriculture:                   
 
 
       
Tourism:         
 
 
       
Ratio of profit difference per worker              d = (πA – W
T) / π 
Total profit/worker                π = πA + W
E 
 
Initial Conditions 
Agriculture production (tonne/worker/year):   0.7 
Number of tourism businesses:               625 
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7.6   Results and Discussion: Why Recruit? 
The simulation modelling seeks to dynamically characterise the behaviour 
patterns of parameters representing annual agricultural production, profits per 
worker and resulting labour movements across the two sectors in post-conflict 
Swat. The simulation objectives include observing changes in the growth of 
tourism businesses and employment over the simulation period. These changes 
will be dependent upon the net expected wages in both sectors. The modelling 
experiment selects infrastructure services as the potentially most relevant 
parameter to shock the regional economy. The baseline simulation assumes an 
amount of US $100/month of infrastructural services per person, which 
independently influences the growth of agriculture and tourism businesses. An 
initial equal dollar value helps to evaluate both the effect of improvements in each 
sector and their reinforcing impacts on the economy overall. For example, 
improvements in irrigation systems are helpful for increased agriculture 
production. Better tourism infrastructure is likely to attract more tourists and in a 
reinforcing way, the market potential of agriculture production will increase 
locally.  
The figures below illustrate the time paths for production, growth of businesses 
and employment. Infrastructural development services have positive impacts on 
the growth of agriculture output per worker, and thus on agriculture production. 
Figure 7.2 shows that food output, from an initial 0.7 tonne/worker/year, increases 
substantially to 1.05 tonne/worker/year, which represents about 34 percent growth 
in the simulated time. The results conform to the findings during interview 
responses and field discussions in 2010, of agriculture growth averaging above 6 
percent per year in the pre-conflict period in Swat.  
Positive impacts are not limited to agriculture: tourism businesses also grow 
substantially. From the initial number of 625 tourism businesses, there is an 
increase to 865 businesses in the simulated period, a 28 percent increase in the 
simulated period and on average above 5.5 percent annually (Figure 7.3). The 
growth in tourism businesses is conditional upon an increase in number of 
tourists, which are not expected to increase much in the short run. As 
infrastructural services improve, the pull factors for tourism will increase in Swat.  
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Figure 7.2 
 
Figure 7.3  
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Figure 7.4 
 
 
Figure 7.5 
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Figure 7.6 
 
 
Figure 7.7: 
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Workers‟ remuneration increases in both sectors but at a faster rate in tourism 
businesses where net expected tourism wages increase by 28 percent at the end of 
the simulation period (Figures 7.4 and 7.5).  
According to the fundamental hypothesis, labour allocations take place depending 
upon profits per worker (Figures 7.6 and 7.7). Some labour shifts from agriculture 
to tourism businesses. The factors accounting for this labour movement are 
described in the sections containing background discussion about employment 
(particularly in section 7.4), based on the survey data results. One crucial aspect is 
how the rise in production affects prices. Prices over the five-year simulation 
period with increased production decrease by more than 12 percent per tonne.  
A significant role of the growth in agricultural profits is that financial capital will 
not only contribute to its own growth but will also add to the intrinsic growth rate 
of businesses. More profits will increase consumption expenditure, which directly 
and positively affects the growth of the business sector. In other words, increased 
profit creates incentives for the rural community to adopt a better standard of 
living. The positive growth outcomes and employment opportunities observed in 
the simulation address the challenge to create barriers to any monetary incentive 
associated with recruitment to the Taliban.  
7.6.1 Why Recruit? 
There are various incentives to become a militant. Militancy in Swat had a 
declared ideological motive to enforce sharia law across the district and adjoining 
areas. Militants considered this was possible by getting control of the region. To 
gain support, the Taliban militants highlighted religious sentiments like declaring 
their movement in Swat and in neighbouring Afghanistan to be a jihad between 
infidels and Islam. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Three (section 3.6), the 
militants made social and economic promises such as delivering quick justice, 
driving out the big landlords or Khans, and making equitable distribution of land 
to the landless (Khattak, 2010). Economic and social disparities acted as catalysts 
for initial support and recruitment to the Taliban in Swat (Mehmood, 2010). In 
particular, the promise of land distribution attracted many followers.  
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Teenage boys and young men were recruited to roles ranging from scouts to 
suicide bombers due to multiple push factors. Khattak (2010) identifies that many 
joined because the attached power of guns, money and respect allowed them to 
settle personal scores with their opponents (mostly influential people). The 
Taliban also used coercion in recruitment: parents in remote villages were ordered 
to send one male member to join the militia. Those who refused to comply were 
threatened with eviction (Meo, 2009). Further, the media reported in 2009 that the 
Taliban started forcing schoolchildren to sign as fighters, informants, or suicide 
bombers. The Taliban leadership denies such reports and insists their battle is for 
faith, not for material ends (Siddique, 2010). 
Genuinely rooted grievances about economic hardship and inequalities in the past 
are not easily forgotten (Sen, 2008). Such a situation applied in Swat, where 
economic and social exclusion for the marginalised was significant, spanning long 
periods of time.
95
 In addition, abuse and unfair treatment from the 
counterinsurgent forces during the civil war incited support for the militants and 
increased recruitment.  These factors contributed to seeking justice (economic and 
social), security, and revenge by participation in the militant movement (Qazi, 
2011). Conflict severely affected livelihoods and had negative repercussions for 
household income and employment in Swat. The army, during its 
counterinsurgent operations, depended heavily on aerial power and artillery that 
led to further extensive infrastructural damage and civilian casualties. The 
government was unable to provide economic and employment alternatives, both 
initially and later. The resulting increase in vulnerability, infrastructural 
destruction that restricted movement, and limited opportunities in formal sectors, 
emerged as prominent economic incentives for recruitment. People supported and 
joined, as the Taliban told them that their lives were worse and the Taliban could 
make it better. Owen Bennet-Jones, in a remarkable documentary for BBC 
television, visited Swat and interviewed some Taliban fighters in Mardan city 
prison.
96
 He concluded that poverty, lack of economic development, and 
infrastructure were the main reasons which led some Pakistanis to think that the 
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 Refer to discussion on income inequalities in Swat from a historical perspective in Chapter 
Three 
96
 Titled “Pakistan inequality fuelling Taliban support”, Retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/8681024.stm 
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Taliban could do better for them. A Taliban recruit explained to Bennet-Jones that 
by getting land from the Taliban his family could have sold the land and got the 
money. These remarks emphasise that the dispossessed joined the Taliban as they 
offered escape from generations-old poverty traps. 
The alternative but significant question of ideological radicalisation as a 
motivation for recruitment is complex to answer. For example, the leadership of 
the Taliban (shura) and the hierarchy of amirs (commanders) have different 
reasons to be permanent members of the militia. Threats to their lives and the 
chance of being captured by security forces are consistently part of their anti-state 
activism. With these risks, the motivation of income alone may not be a sufficient 
explanation. Similarly, ideological motivation can be a likely factor for militants 
having long associations with the Taliban, and holding important portfolios in the 
organisational structure, which consists of different committees. Roggio (2010) 
identifies these as military, finance, political affairs, prisoners and refugees, and 
recruitment. The Taliban sometimes release video recordings of suicide bombers‟ 
departing messages before suicide attacks. Meo (2009), reports one such video in 
which a teenage boy says, “some hypocrites (a reference to government claims 
that families of suicide bombers are paid after attacks) say that we are doing this 
for money ….  but we are told by Allah to target these pagans.” While for suicide 
attackers, ideological motives are supreme, for rank and file recruits or foot 
soldiers, the push factors in recruitment may not solely be ideological, as 
discussed earlier. Qazi (2011) notes that young recruits, including many suicide 
bombers, are usually poor, uneducated, or seminary students. Sen (2006, p.145) 
comments, “Poverty and economic inequality may not instantly breed terrorism or 
influence the leaders of terrorist organizations, but nevertheless they can help to 
create rich recruiting grounds for the foot soldiers of the terrorist camps”. 
Ideological consensus with the Taliban‟s views was found mostly lacking at the 
household level in post-conflict Swat, from the survey findings in Chapter Five. 
The Taliban strictly oppose female or even male formal school education. 
However, when people were asked whether girls should receive formal education, 
they responded overwhelmingly in favour. It is very relevant to mention that this 
survey finding is in conformity with the election results in 2008 (held when the 
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Taliban were occupying most areas). The majority of voters in the province and in 
Swat voted for a secular and democratic party, the Awami National Party (Peoples 
National Party) (ANP), which remained in power in the province from 2008-2013.   
It is hard to quantitatively analyse the different subjective push factors to join as 
militants, which include revenge in local settings, the military‟s maltreatment of 
many, the level of ideological consensus, fear of repercussions for failure to join, 
and even a sense of adventure. From the above discussion and because rank and 
file fighters and others in the organisational structure of the Taliban receive 
salaries and other economic benefits (Khosa, 2009; personal communications, 
September 2010; Qazi, 2010; Rodriguez, 2012),
97
 the likely explanations for 
recruitment focus on concrete economic factors, which as discussed in previous 
sections of this thesis, fuelled the Taliban insurgency in Swat.  
These factors include inequality and lack of opportunities in the economic and 
social system (particularly land holdings), a very low incidence of secondary or 
higher education, and involvement either in underpaid employment or the 
absolute unavailability of employment for the educated. All or some of these 
factors may have worsened in the post-conflict damaged economy. Such a 
situation demands implementation of an integrated developmental framework, 
which supplements growth and employment in major economic sectors. In 
addition job creation in formal public sectors (including employment in security 
forces)
98
 can complement job opportunities in the private sector to reduce the risks 
of joining the militants. Continuing from the earlier baseline analysis, the next 
simulation modelling section will observe the impacts of various shocks to the 
regional economy, and aims to find potential solutions for the revival of 
livelihoods in Swat. Livelihood revival links with the subsequent decrease of 
income-based push factors for recruitment to militant organisations.  
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 The amount of salary received had a reported range of US $25 to $150 per month, depending 
upon the nature of tasks in the first year after recruitment 
98
  In Afghanistan employment opportunities were created in rebuilding Afghanistan National 
Army (ANA) not only for former Taliban fighters, but for unemployed youth. They were given 
salaries in range of $15 to 170 per month during first year of joining the ANA. Retrieved from 
https://www.understandingwar.org/afghanistan-national-army-ana 
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The exogenous assumption held for modelling the following scenarios is that 
funding is available and an efficient implementation mechanism is in place, to 
achieve development goals for the revival of sustainable livelihoods in post-war 
Swat. A prioritised focus is required from both the government and major 
international donors. The underlying assumption is that the revival of conflict-
affected livelihoods is crucial in reducing the chances of another outbreak of 
militancy in the region. 
7.6.2 Individual Infrastructural Services Shocks 
In the next modelling experiment the amounts spent on agricultural and tourism 
business infrastructure services per person/month were separately increased to see 
the effect on the variables, which were discussed in the baseline model. This 
separate hypothetical treatment enables identification of whether these form better 
livelihood revival options by comparison with combined shocks to both sectors.  
Initially only agricultural infrastructure services were increased, from US $100 to 
$140 (40 percent increase), with the tourism business infrastructure retaining the 
same dollar value as in the baseline model. This percentage increase is very close 
to the total annual development budget of Swat district from 2011-2012 to 2013 -
2014 for agriculture, which amounts to approximately a 35 percent increase for 
agriculture alone. If expenditure on public health engineering
99
 is included that in 
total, the increase is about 64 percent over the previous year.
100
 In this model, 
agricultural employment increases and tourism business employment falls more 
than six percent, compared to baseline model. The outcome from this shock is that 
tourism businesses and expected tourism wages remain unchanged when 
compared with the baseline model. Regarding outcomes in the agricultural sector, 
agriculture profits/month/worker increase by nine percent, and annual agricultural 
output increases by nine percent, by the end of the simulation period. This 
increase in agricultural production is less than the decline from the pre-war 
period. That was also found during field discussions and as Zahid (2009) 
estimates, for very good farms producing apples, walnuts, plums and peaches, 
production losses ranged from 20 to 50 percent (and sometimes even more) in the 
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 Public health engineering includes improvements in rural water supply and sanitation. Pakistan 
and India have set up these departments for water supply programmes.   
100
 These figures are taken from the Finance and Planning Department in Swat. Retrieved from 
http://www.swat.financekpp.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_attachments&task=download&id=40 
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post-war era. However, in reality not all farms have the same level of production, 
so the estimated increase in the simulation outcome is quite realistic and 
represents an average increase.  
In an alternative modelling shock, the level of infrastructure services was 
increased by 40%, but only for tourism businesses such as sports festivals and 
improvements in local cultural heritage (both ancient and modern), while the input 
for agriculture remained the same as in the baseline model. The results indicate 
that employment increases by about eight percent in tourism businesses, whereas 
for agriculture it decreases by more than four percent. The overall growth in 
businesses indicates that their number increases by 12 percent, and wages increase 
by 13 percent over five years. This resembles the earlier shock to agriculture 
alone, where growth in the other sector (tourism businesses) remains similar, and 
agricultural profits and output in the second experiment show an almost similar 
outcome to the baseline model.  
Overall results from the above separate shocks indicate positive changes only in 
the sector where the shocks are applied. These changes do not seem abrupt: for 
example, changes in employment, output, and number of businesses have growth 
percentages very similar to those found during field discussions about the local 
tourism economy. However, these may not be very appropriate in the context of 
Swat‟s economy, where both sectors were much affected by the conflict, and were 
thriving in the pre-war era. The likely revival of both pre-war dynamic sectors is 
the objective in the simulation modelling, derived from the cluster and livelihood 
analysis detailed in Chapter Six. The next sub-section looks at viability of 
livelihood improvements where both sectors undergo simultaneous positive 
shocks in the modelled hypothetical economy of Swat.   
7.6. 3 Scenario 3 - Combined Infrastructural Shocks 
In scenario 3, the investment in agriculture-related infrastructure is increased by 
20 percent ($100 to $120) and in tourism-related infrastructure by 40 percent 
($100 to $140). These combined positive infrastructural services shocks are 
applied to investigate the growth-orientated supporting factors between these vital 
sectors of Swat‟s economy.  For example, improved roads and transport networks, 
and better public facilities resulting in more tourism, facilitate both sectors with 
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increased demand factors. Alternatively the infrastructure services specific to 
agriculture include improvements in irrigation, and in services and training, which 
improve farm management. Figures 7.8 to 7.12 present the comparative results 
from this positive shock over the five-year period. The results complement the 
background expectation for this combined shock. Sustainable livelihoods 
associated with both sectors significantly improve over time. The results indicate 
that agricultural production/worker and number of tourism businesses grow 
simultaneously. Profit per worker also increases in both sectors, with a higher 
percentage increase in tourism businesses. In alignment with the theoretical 
assumption, higher profits in tourism attract more workers, and these increase by 
about three percent at the end of the simulation period (Figure 7.13). Labour 
movements from agriculture to more profit-orientated tourism sector businesses 
are in agreement with the survey data findings, where such movements were 
expected from analysis of the reasons for not being employed or for being 
underpaid as discussed in Chapter Five, sub-section 5.2.1. 
 
Figure 7.8: 
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Figure 7.9: 
 
Figure 7.10: 
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Figure 7.11: 
 
 
Figure 7 12: 
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Figure 7.13: 
 
 
7.7   Conclusions 
Livelihoods once shattered are hard to rebuild, particularly after a violent shock, 
such as that which occurred in Swat. Rebuilding involves substituting capabilities 
and increasing the asset base of households. This may be difficult, at least in the 
short to medium term, in view of the loss of assets and limited post-war 
opportunities. Recovery requires structural interventions, which may assist people 
in asset enhancement and early livelihood recoveries, at least enabling them to 
pursue their pre-conflict livelihoods. This chapter addresses these issues in a 
needs-specific context, and presents quantitative estimations of livelihood revival 
outcomes in Swat district. It focuses on a livelihood enhancement framework, 
which may decrease the chances of recruitment to the militants (Taliban) out of 
economic necessity. 
This chapter discusses the multiple push factors for recruitment to militant groups. 
If reasons lie in ideology, revenge or similar motives, then these are complex, and 
Sen (2008) considers they require a complete paradigm shift on behalf of the state 
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to focus on issues which are of economic concern to the people (poverty and 
inequality). Sen (2008) terms this shift in focus “the role of conscious politics” 
which can act as a barrier to violence related to ethnicity and religion. Earlier 
discussion in Chapter Three highlighted that the Pakistani state often used religion 
and related militancy for short-term gains: such policies now are having serious 
repercussions.  
If adverse economic conditions are what drive people to join the militants, then 
different solutions may be required. Chapter Two found that contemporary 
incitements, particularly economic development failures, low income and lack of 
rights, are strongly linked with outbreaks of violence.  
Reasons for joining the Taliban may be a combination of both sets of factors. 
Militancy and resulting recruitment are of course not a one-off phenomenon, and 
they may last until plausible grounds and grievances are realistically addressed. 
Thus, my approach in this chapter has been two-pronged, addressing 
infrastructural development directly and highlighting approaches such as 
alternative job creation in expanding livelihood opportunities that complement 
positive infrastructural interventions.  
Developmental interventions in the regional economy provide modelling 
outcomes that increase profits, output, and growth in both agriculture and tourism 
businesses. Labour shifts accordingly. It may be argued that if the pre-conflict 
economy was functioning well, then why did the Taliban occupy the district and 
succeed in getting local recruits? The question has been discussed in previous 
chapters, and some explanations offered. First was their militant power, which 
created an environment in which only the Taliban could flourish. In addition to 
this, the economic, judicial and social systems in Swat were slow-acting and 
lacking in competence. Further, state institutions under the military dictator, 
General Musharraf, did not adequately evaluate the repercussions and made 
compromises with the Taliban. Finally, the locals were unaware of the governance 
style which was to be imposed in Swat.  
Some of the push factors for recruitment have already subsided: democracy 
currently prevails and local needs can be better evaluated, so the general 
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ideological support for the militants is less likely to exist. The simulation 
modelling concludes that with a broad range of infrastructural improvements, 
livelihoods can improve once again. Labour positively shifts to profit-orientated 
formal sectors, breaking the constraint of working for low pay (a strong incentive 
to recruit). This is highly likely to decrease the income- and employment-based 
push factors for recruitment. This seems probable in the context of examples 
relating to alternate livelihood choices made by former fighters. Militants, as 
mentioned earlier (section 7.6.1), were getting salaries ranging from US $25 to 
$150 per month depending on the nature of their work and their experience. 
Income higher than the minimum recruit salary is likely to create more incentives 
for participating in formal wage work. In a rehabilitation centre at a 
deradicalisation programme set up by the government in Lahore, 300 hard-core 
and rank-and-file fighters undertook a three month programme, in which they 
were taught peaceful Muslim teachings along with receiving vocational training. 
Rodriguez (2012) reports that after completion they went back to their hometowns 
and villages, were awarded a stipend of US $255 for the programme and if 
required, given interest-free assistance for being self-employed. In Swat, the army 
set up a school for rehabilitation of former fighters, called „Sabawoon.‟ Rodriguez 
(2102) reports army officials as saying that once the former militants were trained 
as technicians, carpenters and plumbers, they were no longer idle and became part 
of society. They had been targeted by the Taliban for recruitment and joined when 
they were unemployed or underpaid.  
Finally, some government interventions in the post-conflict period have involved 
positive policy initiatives for people in Swat. The formation of seven tehsils from 
the former two in Swat district (decentralisation of authority), has been 
particularly beneficial for people living in remote areas. They do not have to 
travel long distances to visit public offices and to seek solutions to problems 
relevant to state institutions. This saves both time and money. The militants, in 
their early slogans, exploited the gap between people‟s grievances and delivery of 
assistance from public institutions to gain support.  
Communities can still be hit by other external shocks, as experienced by the 
people of Swat in the form of severe rains and floods in 2010. The prospect of 
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natural disasters strengthens my case for infrastructural development and for 
creating off-farm employment opportunities. Without urban-based jobs, losses in 
farm output may lead to more vulnerability and increase the likelihood of 
household members considering joining militias. Moreover, increases in farm 
income also increase business expansions. Lim and Saw (2007) note that with 
rising income, farmers can increase spending on inputs, equipment and consumer 
goods, which are provided by industries, and these industries in turn also support 
agricultural development. A close connection then emerges in which businesses 
and agriculture can expand alongside each other.  
By understanding the dynamics of the improvements in various infrastructural 
services, villagers will be in a better position to evaluate the worth of 
infrastructure projects and related services. Some of these may come at the 
expense of providing short-term individual household assistance, which is 
currently the preference and practice during re-settlement programmes in post-war 
Swat. If complaints arise, the current democratic environment is conducive to 
accommodating and listening to people‟s grievances. As agriculture income 
increase overall, the financial returns to other service providers such as health and 
education and the provision of more physical infrastructure will increase. These 
have the potential to attract more resources and investment to the rural areas and 
to the Swat district overall.  
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusions  
8.1   Key Findings and Policy Implications 
The findings of this thesis suggest several conclusions. These relate to the onset of 
violent conflicts in countries at a global level. These findings explain the 
repercussions of conflict for households, and suggest appropriate interventions in 
reviving livelihoods in the post-conflict economy of Swat, Pakistan. The 
conclusions in this thesis are expected to have wider policy implications. The key 
methods, resulting findings, and their implications follow.  
First, an extensive analysis for different sets of countries modelled the outbreak of 
conflict and its links with income, some widely accepted development indicators, 
and democratic rights. Shortcomings in the necessities for development, including 
low income and decreased health status, literacy rates and democratic freedom 
were strongly linked with onset of violent conflicts the cross-country global 
investigation. These determinants of conflicts are found in other studies too. 
However, combinations of income, well established development indicators and 
lack of freedom had not been analysed in previous research attempts, establishing 
their links with violent conflicts globally for various sets of countries. The 
selected study period had also not been the focus of earlier research, although the 
paradigm of global conflicts changed after the September 2001 terrorist attacks in 
United States. In this paradigm shift, Muslim countries are considered the likely 
breeding places of international anxiety about the origin, recruitment, training, 
and financial sourcing of terrorism. Muslim countries are widely believed to be 
the source of revenge terrorist acts across the globe, mostly emerging from their 
internal economic and political problems, for which they put the onus of 
responsibility on developed countries, particularly the USA. Thus the focus of this 
research was made specific to the Muslim majority countries to develop an 
understanding of what results in the occurrence of conflicts, and whether these 
links are substantially different from or similar to those found for countries in the 
larger global sample. This study found that not many stark differences exist: 
conflicts globally originate from poverty, lack of rights, weak institutions, limited 
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education and marginal health infrastructure, in both Muslim and non-Muslim 
countries.  
Secondly, literature examining post-conflict effects at household and individual 
levels includes studies covering different conflicts and their various micro 
perspectives. The recent conflict in Swat has remained, so far, not a focus in 
conflict-based economic literature. Conflict in Swat had a Muslim identity and 
objective (of implementing sharia), and had large repercussions on people, 
households and on the regional economy. The conflict in Swat and other areas 
associated with the Taliban has so far resulted in more than 46,000 casualties and 
large-scale damage to infrastructure and institutions. Based on household survey 
information from Swat, Chapter Five provided the asset portfolio, including 
quantitative descriptions of losses to human, physical, natural, financial and social 
capital for conflict-affected households. In addition, income and consumption 
patterns and subsequent changes in the post-conflict period were described. 
Chapter Five concluded that violent conflict in Swat had serious negative 
repercussions on household assets, and on their income and expenditure patterns: 
their income decreased and expenditures increased in the post-conflict period.  
Household assets act as building blocks to form different livelihood choices. 
Chapter Six investigated the post-conflict household livelihood choices with a 
damaged asset base in Swat. This analysis of livelihoods in post-conflict Swat is 
the first of its kind, using household data, clustering and econometric techniques. 
Initially, using a clustering method, households were grouped into clusters on the 
basis of their dominant share of income originating from major earning sources. 
The distinct household clusters were econometrically analysed for the effects of 
various assets in making post-conflict livelihood choices. This analysis extended 
the findings of Chapter Five, and provided conclusions about specific effects of 
asset endowment on particular livelihood choices. A combination of the findings 
of Chapters Five and Six suggested that households had limited assets and thus 
low livelihood substitution capabilities and were experiencing constraints in 
adopting more remunerative livelihood choices. Losses in assets, lack of financial 
capital and savings, and limited employment opportunities left them vulnerable. 
Post-conflict low-return livelihood choices of agriculture and tourism were 
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identified and it was noted that these were better performing pre-war economic 
sectors in Swat. These hard-hit livelihood choices for revival were found to be 
dependent on asset accumulation and on overall infrastructural improvements. 
This suggests the need for a development policy framework which not only 
identifies the worst-affected economic sectors, but also forms and implements 
policies which target the revival of the largest and most affected sectors 
(agriculture and tourism) which remain crucial for the enhancement of livelihoods 
and in employment creation in post-conflict Swat.  
Thirdly, Chapter Seven exclusively focused on livelihood revival possibilities. 
The complex interactions of assets, their enhancement, and likely post-conflict 
impacts from infrastructure development on livelihood revival were investigated. 
Simulation modelling of infrastructure developmental shocks resulted in increased 
employment and wages and subsequent movements of underpaid labour into 
profit-orientated sectors. Such profit-orientated movement among formal sectors 
has the potential to reduce the income-based motivation to join militia groups (the 
Taliban). For these time-specific and quantitatively estimated outcomes, 
visualised in a dynamic simulation environment, various shocks of broad-based 
infrastructural development services were investigated. The approach used 
consisted of iinfrastructural development directly, which complemented 
alternative job creation and labour allocation towards more profit orientated 
sector. A combined increase in infrastructural services values for the major sectors 
(agriculture and tourism businesses), in Swat‟s economy, provided integrated 
growth outcomes for the production of agricultural output, and in terms of number 
of businesses and profits per worker, in both sectors. Labour shifted to profit-
orientated sector, tourism businesses. These outcomes address both post-conflict 
household livelihood enhancement and the related decrease in income or low paid 
employment which act as push factors to join militant groups. Based on 
quantitative conclusions, the recommended post-war resettlement interventions 
are different from welfare-based targeted assistance, which are region and time 
specific.  Welfare-orientated programmes were adopted both by government and 
most of the international donors dealing with post-conflict rehabilitation. The 
survey findings revealed the limited reach of this form of rehabilitation assistance. 
The limitations of these programmes were discussed, and the development 
  
 
193 
  
alternative of infrastructural improvement for the economy overall, which not 
only has long term impacts but has integrated outcomes for livelihood revival was 
suggested. This thesis suggests that post-conflict interventions and development 
programmes must carefully examine household-and region-specific requirements, 
and these requirements should be adequately reflected in the development and 
rehabilitation strategies adopted.  
8.2   Future Research Needs 
Future research on the subject should address some of the limitations of this 
thesis.  
First, as mentioned in Chapter Two, the cross-country global analysis has some 
data limitations. For example, data for the parameters mostly reflects country-
level statistics, which may not be reflective of intra-country differences present in 
different regions. In addition, some data sourced from domestic household 
surveys and reported by countries to international organisations was observed to 
be unrealistic. This suggests an apparently difficult future research task, involving 
similar analysis, which needs to find a set of indicators that more accurately 
represent the statistical values of the parameters investigated. Another significant 
outcome in Chapter Two was the identification of lack of consensus on the 
definitions of civil wars and international terrorism. This requires extended 
research on defining these phenomena in ways which seem more realistic and 
current, and are more widely accepted by researchers in this field.  
Second, a real limitation in investigating post-conflict effects is that the data 
represents the post-conflict asset endowment and livelihood patterns. It is quite 
difficult to use a panel data technique (data from two points of time) in post-
conflict studies, particularly if conflicts are associated with displacement of 
households. On return, they might be not living in the same houses or even in the 
same villages or towns, depending upon asset losses and available livelihood 
opportunities. In addition, if pre-conflict data is collected, it is hard in practical 
terms to predict an end to a particular conflict. The post-conflict livelihood 
analysis can be extended in some ways by comparing it more extensively with 
secondary data sources containing pre-conflict statistics on different household 
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aspects and livelihoods, if these are available. In the case of Swat in Pakistan, 
such secondary data was not available.  
Finally, the proposed livelihood revival framework in this thesis has some 
exogenous assumptions. These include availability of the necessary financial input 
to enable positive interventions in developmental infrastructure services, and a 
commitment to structural improvements. In reality, the post-conflict revival 
programmes as implemented by the government and assisted by international 
donor countries and organisations are shadowed by allegations and counter-
allegations about finances and mismanagement. From the government‟s 
perspective, aid did not arrive as was promised (PaRRSA, 2011), while the donors 
argued that inefficiencies in implementation and management of different 
programmes prevented the desired outcomes from occurring. For example, 
contracts to rebuild schools in Swat were awarded to a handful of construction 
companies who had strong links to various government departments (Ellick, 
2011). This study suggests attending to such issues in future studies in more 
detail. In conflict rehabilitation programmes, there must be a more explicit 
resolution of such problems to obtain larger benefits for both the regional 
economy and individual households, not only in Swat, but anywhere in conflict-
affected regions.   
8.3   A Final Comment 
The research design and modelling techniques in this project could be adopted and 
applied to study post-conflict livelihood losses and revival in any country or 
region which shares similar characteristics to Swat and Pakistan. For example the 
civil war in Pakistan‟s neighbouring country Afghanistan has many similarities 
with the conflict in Swat. The militants in both countries are well connected, and 
can move freely across the border in the absence of any strict border controls. In 
addition, militants and the affected population mostly have similar religious and 
ethnic identities. The adopted livelihood asset-based approach in this study and 
the simulation modelling to identify the livelihood revival possibilities may be 
useful for studying other conflicts such as in Afghanistan.   
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Appendices  
Appendix 1  
List of 87 Countries with Conflicts: Level 3, 4 and 5 – Global Analysis 
Afghanistan Greece Russia 
Algeria Guatemala Rwanda 
Angola Guinea Saudi Arabia 
Argentina Guinea Bissau Senegal 
Armenia Haiti Serbia 
Azerbaijan Honduras Sierra Leone 
Bangladesh India Somalia 
Bhutan Indonesia South Africa 
Bolivia Iran Spain 
Brazil Iraq Sri Lanka 
Burma – Myanmar Israel Sudan 
Burundi Jordan Swaziland 
Cambodia Kyrgyz Republic-
Kyrgyzstan 
Tajikistan 
Cameroon Laos PDR Tanzania 
Central African Republic Liberia Timor-Leste 
Chad Macedonia, FYR Thailand 
Chile Madagascar Togo 
China Mali Turkey 
Colombia Mauritania Uganda 
Comoros Mexico United Kingdom 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic/Zaire 
Moldova, Rep. Of Uzbekistan 
Cote de ivory/Ivory Coast Nepal Venezuela 
Dominican Republic Nicaragua Yemen 
Ecuador Niger Zimbabwe 
Egypt Nigeria  
Estonia Pakistan  
Ethiopia Panama  
France  Paraguay  
Gabon  Peru  
Georgia Philippines  
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
List of 45 Countries: Level 4 and 5 (severe crisis and civil wars): Global 
Analysis 
Afghanistan Nepal 
Algeria Nigeria 
Angola Pakistan 
Bhutan Peru 
Burma – Myanmar Philippines 
Burundi Russia 
Central African Republic Rwanda 
Chad Saudi Arabia 
China Senegal 
Colombia Somalia 
Congo, Democratic Republic/Zaire Sri Lanka 
Cote d ivory/Ivory Coast Sudan 
Ethiopia Thailand 
Georgia Turkey 
Guatemala Uganda 
Guinea Bissau Venezuela 
Haiti Yemen 
India  
Indonesia  
Iran  
Iraq  
Israel  
Kenya  
Laos PDR  
Lebanon  
Liberia  
Mali  
Mexico  
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Appendix 1-A 
List of 29 Muslim countries’ subset – 
Conflict levels – 3, 4 and 5  
 
List of 17 Muslim countries’ subset – 
Conflict levels – 4 and 5 (severe crisis 
and civil wars) 
 
Afghanistan Afghanistan 
Algeria Algeria 
Azerbaijan Chad 
Bangladesh Indonesia 
Chad Iran 
Comoros Iraq 
Egypt Lebanon 
Guinea Mali 
Indonesia Nigeria 
Iran Pakistan 
Iraq Saudi Arabia 
Jordan Senegal 
Kyrgyz Republic-Kyrgyzstan Somalia 
Lebanon Sudan 
Mali Turkey 
Mauritania Uganda 
Niger Yemen 
Nigeria  
Pakistan  
Saudi Arabia  
Senegal  
Sierra Leone  
Somalia  
Sudan  
Tajikistan  
Turkey  
Uganda  
Uzbekistan  
Yemen  
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Appendix 2 
Data Sources – Global Conflict Analysis 
Conflict occurrence is taken as reported in the Heidelberg Institute for 
International Conflict Research‟s annual publication Conflict Barometer, from 
2002 to 2009. The reports for years prior to 2002 are not available in English and 
for 2000-2001 the data is verified from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 
Retrieved from www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University©2008  
1 – Political Rights Score, from the Freedom House organization, available for 
different years is averaged for the period from 2001 to 2009. Retrieved from 
www. freedomhouse.org 
 
2 – Political Terror Scale is taken from two sources: Amnesty International‟s 
ratings and U.S. State Department‟s country reports on human rights practices. 
Data is available for different years but the average from the two institutions is 
taken for the year 2000. Gibney, M., Cornett, L., & Wood, R., (2008) Political 
Terror Scale 1976-2008.  Retrieved from http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/  
 
 3 – HDI The Human Development Index is taken for the year 2000. In a few 
countries not reported in 2000, the index value for 2002 is used. Values obtained 
from United Nations Human Development Reports, published annually. 
4 – Per capita GDP (PPP). The sources are human development reports for 
different years and World Development Indicators from the World Bank. 
5 – Adult 15+ Unemployment Rate /Youth (15-24) Unemployment rate total: 
source is Key Indicators for the Labour Market (KILM), International Labour 
Organization and United Nations Statistics Division. 
6 – Education – Literacy 15 +/School Life Expectancy, UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics. Retrieved from 
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=143&IF
_Language=eng and United Nations Statistics Division  
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7 – Under 5 mortality rate A proxy for health facilities and also for nutritional 
standards for the newborn. Source: UNICEF – Childinfo.org and United Nations 
Statistics Division. 
8 – Corruption Perception Index This widely accepted index from Transparency 
International is extremely relevant. The Index is available from 1998 – 2009. The 
average from 2000-2009 is used. Retrieved from 
http//www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
